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Abstract 
Nietzsche's controversial "aestheticist" claim that existence and the world are only 
justifiable as aesthetic phenomena provides the motivation for this thesis. The 
aestheticist claim is summative of Nietzsche's characteristic aestheticism, which allows 
for a link between the typically distinct concepts of art and truth. Although the available 
literature includes analysis of Nietzsche's aestheticism, no full defence of it has 
previously been offered. The general view seems to be that aestheticism should be 
treated sceptically, and as such, it remains underdeveloped within contemporary 
Nietzsche studies. The chief aims of the thesis are therefore to respond to this relative 
neglect of the aestheticist view of the art/truth relation, and to develop and defend a 
standard account of aestheticism. Additionally, in so doing the thesis aims to offer 
implicit evidence of Nietzsche's philosophy as continuous in order to raise the question 
of the textual periodisation technique, which lends methodological weight to the 
sceptical attitude towards Nietzsche's aestheticism. 
The question of aestheticism is contextualised within the 'Two Cultures' debate 
on the relation between art, truth and science and the nihilistic crisis of values in 
modem culture. As such, the wider significance of defending Nietzsche's aestheticism 
is made appreciable. Following analysis of the available readings of aestheticism, key 
elements are considered and the features of a standard account are identified. However, 
three problems which turn on issues surrounding the art/truth relation in Nietzsche are 
also identified: the problems of metaphysics, ethics and common ontological ground. 
The thesis proposes solutions to each of these in turn. Nietzsche's aestheticism is 
therefore defended by appeal to an interpretative link between art and truth in the terms 
of Nietzsche's conception of being. 
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Note on Citations 
References to the main text of Nietzsche's works are given by abbreviation and 
paragraph number (§) in round brackets at the end of the relevant sentence or quotation, 
in order to minimise footnotes (eg.: GS, §1, BT, §1). This is also the easiest method of 
locating a passage across different translations. Where paragraphs are not numbered 
consecutively, the appropriate essay number, section and/or chapter title is given in 
addition to the relevant abbreviation and paragraph number in order to distinguish the 
relevant paragraph fully (eg.: UO 4, §1, or "Attempt", §1). In the case of some 
translations of Nachlafi material, references are given by abbreviation and page number. 
Al l emphases in quotations are from the original. 
Abbreviations of the following translations and corresponding citation methods 
are used throughout: 
AC The Antichrist, R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1990). (§). 
BGE Beyond Good and Evil, R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1990). (§). 
BT The Birth of Tragedy, Shaun Whiteside (trans.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1993). (Attempt/Preface and §). 
D Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). (§). 
EH Ecce Homo, R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1992). (Section title and §). 
GM On the Genealogy of Morals, Douglas Smith (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). (Preface, Essays 1-3, and §). 
GS The Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann (trans.), (New York: Vintage Books, 
1974). (§). 
HA Human, All Too Human, Marion Faber & Stephen Lehmann (trans.), Marion 
Faber (ed.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1994). (§). 
KGW Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, G. Colli & M . Montinari (trans. & ed.), 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967-). 
NW Nietzsche contra Wagner: Out of the files of a psychologist, Walter Kaufmann 
(trans. & ed.). The Portable Nietzsche, (New York: The Viking Press, 1954). 
(Page number). 
OTL 'On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense', Ronald Speirs (trans.), Raymond 
Geuss & Ronald Speirs (eds.). The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). (Page number). 
P 'The Philosopher', Daniel Breazeale (trans. & ed.), Philosophy and Truth: 
selections from Nietzsche's notebooks of the early 1870s, (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1990). (Page number). 
TI Twilight of the Idols, Duncan Large (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998). (Section number and §). 
UO Unfashionable Observations, Richard T. Gray (trans.), (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998). (Essays 1-4 and §). 
WC The Case of Wagner, Walter Kaufmann (trans. & ed.), Basic Writings of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, (New York: Random House, 2000). (Preface/section 
number). 
WP The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1968). (§). 
Z Thus Spake Zarathustra, R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1969). (Preface/Parts 1-5, section title, and § where appropriate). 
Although I have used Nietzsche's texts in translation throughout, I have checked the 
quotations used for sense against the KGW. I have also made comparative use of 
additional translations of the texts, which are given in my bibliography. In the case of 
each text, I have chosen to cite the translation which best reflects my own sense of 
Nietzsche's style and methodology. The significance of translation issues for any 
reading of Nietzsche notwithstanding, neither sustained comparison between the 
translations nor volume and page references to the KGW are given. This reflects the 
strongly philosophical (rather than philological) aims of the thesis, and simplifies the 
citations. 
References to secondary sources are generally given in footnotes, and follow the 
style of Philosophy. Given the length of the thesis, however, some amendments to this 
style are necessary. Each secondary source will be cited in full on the first occasion that 
it is used in each chapter, in order to avoid the need for continual reference to previous 
chapters or to the bibliography. Where more than one work by a given author is cited 
within a chapter, the inidal citation will include an abbreviation of the relevant title that 
will be used thereafter within the chapter for the sake of clarity. 
Introduction 
Why did we choose it, this extravagant task? (BGE, §230). 
Writing on the question of being understandable in GS, Nietzsche claims that "one does 
not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just as surely not to be 
understood" (GS, §381). Rather than finding an objection to a book in its 
incomprehensibility, Nietzsche argues that we should consider whether or not this was 
part of the author's intention; perhaps, he suggests, the author did not want to be 
understood by just "anybody" (G^, §381). Nietzsche justifies this argument on the 
grounds of style: 
All the nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate; 
and choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against 'the others'. All the more 
subtle laws of any style have their origin at this point: they at the same time keep away, 
create a distance, forbid 'entrance,' understanding, as said above - while they open the 
ears of those whose ears are related to ours (GS, §381). 
The author of the present thesis retains a more humble attitude, in the hope that the 
thesis will be found accessible to all of its audience. Perhaps Nietzsche would 
disapprove of such scholarly egalitarianism. However, my thesis is a work of Nietzsche 
scholarship, and must therefore own itself to be a product of a "philosophical labourer", 
whose guiding principle in what follows is to make Nietzsche himself - or at least his 
distinctive aestheticist views on the relationship between art and truth - "clear, distinct, 
intelligible and manageable" (BGE, §211).' 
I cannot claim to "subdue" Nietzsche in the course of this labour, and thus to 
"abbreviate" him, i f only because he is, unlike perhaps any other philosopher, not 
something "long" - he prides himself on his brevity (BGE, §211, GS, §381). Hence at 
the same time as I hope to make Nietzsche's views on the art/truth relation clear in 
appropriate scholarly style, I also have a secondary, appreciative desire: to echo the 
fundamental force and passion of Nietzsche's aspirational philosophical commandment 
"thus it shall be!", which characterises the future philosopher whose "'knowing' is 
creating, and whose "wil l to truth is - will to power" (BGE, §211).^ 
' Cf. Peter Poellner's introduction to his Nietzsche and Metaphysics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995). 
^ Such a philosopher would be something different from a scholar of philosophy; and yet, as Nietzsche 
acknowledges, being scholarly is nonetheless unavoidable {GS, §381). 
0.1: Nietzsche and the art/truth relation 
The scope of my project is ambitious. The thesis has three specific aims, two of which I 
shall present in detail in this section and the third of which will receive my full attention 
in section 0.2 below. I explicitly engage with the first two of my aims in the thesis, 
while giving my third aim a more implicit treatment. These aims may be outlined as 
follows. First, the thesis responds to the relative neglect within the recent available 
scholarship of Nietzsche's aestheticist view of the relationship between art and truth.^ 
Second, I aim to defend Nietzsche's aestheticism. My third aim in the thesis is to offer 
evidence in support of Nietzsche's philosophy as continuous, in contrast to the 
commonly-held view of it as discontinuous, in order to support what has been identified 
as the methodological question of textual periodisation. 
The thesis takes as its point of departure the view that the art/truth relation 
rendered by Nietzsche's aestheticism remains a complex and frustrating matter of 
interpretation. In response, I assert a basic position concerning the nature of Nietzsche's 
wider thought with a view to developing a more satisfying account. This basic position 
may be defined by the claim that Nietzsche's thought is wholly accessible to the reader. 
This is to follow Tracy Strong in claiming that "there is no hidden doctrine in 
Nietzsche", and that as a result, our discussion of him does not need to clarify a 
previously "obscure" Nietzsche.'* This is not to overlook the complexity of Nietzsche's 
views; nor is it to suggest that there is only one possible reading of the texts. On this 
point, we would do well to remember Alan White's characterisation of Nietzsche's text 
as a labyrinth, within which there is no single path.^ I do not consider that Nietzsche's 
aestheticist philosophy is authentically obscure. However, I do hold that the existing 
scholarship on Nietzsche's aestheticism does not provide a sufficiently accessible or 
clear account and that a view of aestheticism as obscure therefore remains prevalent 
within contemporary Nietzsche studies and in philosophy as a whole. In contributing to 
the available scholarship on Nietzsche, I intend to show that Nietzsche's aestheticism is 
worthy of renewed attention, and that it does constitute a fully defensible philosophy. 
As such, my account constitutes an attempt to chart one of the many possible paths 
within Nietzsche's works more faithfully than has previously been the case. Having 
outlined my basic interpretative position and my aims in the thesis, I shall now move on 
to explain these aims in greater detail. 
Henceforth, I shall refer to this as the 'art/truth relation', for reasons of space and of clarity. 
* Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1975), p. 5. 
^ Alan White, Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth, (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 9. 
The first aim of my thesis, recall, was to respond to the relative neglect within 
the recent available scholarship of Nietzsche's aestheticist view of the relationship 
between art and truth. In considering this aim in more detail, it is first necessary to give 
some explanation of terminology. It is somewhat difficult to define aestheticism without 
involving certain of the significant critical issues surrounding it, as will be made clear in 
later chapters. In the broadest of terms, therefore, we should take Nietzsche's 
aestheticist claim from BT, that "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence 
and the world are eternally justified', as summative of what is intended by 
'aestheticism' {BT, §5).^ My view of the art/truth relation therefore envisages an 
aestheticist connection between the two, in which art and truth are equally justifiable as 
aesthetic phenomena. This position has not been entirely overlooked in the available 
literature despite my charge of neglect, and the particular significance of three critical 
works as motivating factors of my thesis ought to be noted from the outset.'' The first 
volume of Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures, taken within the context of all four published 
volumes, stands as one of the seminal readings of the art/truth relation in Nietzsche.^ In 
the lectures, Heidegger recognises the significance of Plato in shaping Nietzsche's view 
of the art/truth relation, and shapes the possibility of an ontological reading of Nietzsche 
on this point. While the influence of Heidegger's reading has been widely felt, notably 
in the production of David B. Allison's The New Nietzsche, reception of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism remained tied in a significant way to a common understanding of 
aestheticism as an attitudinal expression of agreement with the Wildean sentiment of art 
for art's sake.^  However, Alexander Nehamas redeemed aestheticism for contemporary 
Nietzsche studies in his highly-acclaimed 1985 monograph entitled Nietzsche: Life as 
^ I shall turn to a full definition of aestheticism in Chapter 2. 
^ In accordance with my stated aim, I focus upon treatments of the art/truth relation within Nietzsche 
studies. However, this is not to overlook the many engagements with this question in modern philosophy. 
For an historical perspective on the influence of the question of the art/truth relation in philosophy, and a 
serious engagement with the question in the light of that history, see Herman Rapaport, Is There Truth in 
Art?, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). Rapaport considers some of the central themes pertinent to 
issues surrounding the art/truth relation in modem aesthetics and literary theory with which this thesis 
cannot engage in more than a superficial manner. 
* Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volumes 1-2, David Farrell Krell (trans. & ed.), (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1991), Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 3, Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell & Frank A. 
Capuzzi (trans.), David Farrell Krell (ed.), (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), and Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, Volume 4, Frank A. Capuzzi (trans.), David Farrell Krell (ed.), (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1982). 
' David B. Allison (ed.). The New Nietzsche, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). James Kirwan points 
out quite correctly that while on the one hand, the aesthetes of the nineteenth century conceived of beauty 
as a matter of choice, and that this was the essential tenet of aestheticism, on the other hand, there is no 
nonhistorical necessary connection between aestheticism as 'art for art's sake' and Wilde's or 
Baudelaire's practice of aestheticism. See Kirwan, Beauty, (Manchester & New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), p. 95. 
Literature}^ But it is only fair to attribute at least some of the same regard to Allan 
Megill's 1981 paper 'Nietzsche as Aestheticist' and his subsequent monograph, also 
1985, entitled Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida)^ These 
three readings together provide grounds for selecting Nietzsche's thinking on the 
relation between art and truth to act as the focus for this project. Put simply, despite the 
received quality of their arguments, neither Heidegger nor Nehamas nor Megill have 
responded adequately to the question of the art/truth relation in Nietzsche. They too 
have neglected his aestheticism: not by omission, but by not taking it sufficiently 
seriously as a viable outlook. For Heidegger, Nietzsche remains an inverse Platonist 
who is trapped within the 'two world' metaphysics he wishes to evade, despite his 
claims to the contrary. For Megill and for Nehamas, the status of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism remains uncertain even despite their acknowledgement of its wider 
significance for his thought and for modem philosophy. As a consequence, the art/truth 
reladon constituted by Nietzsche's aesthedcist philosophy remains open to the 
misinterpretations of inaccessibility, incoherence, and to a lesser but not inconsequential 
extent, insignificance. 
One additional concern ought to be noted here. My claim is that Nietzsche 
reconnects art and the aesthetic with concerns of truth. The modem process of aesthetic 
alienation, in which art is acknowledged to lose its tmth-function, therefore poses a 
particular challenge to the coherence of Nietzsche's views, and constitutes a further 
reason for the development of a fresh perspective on the art/truth relation in his works. 
J. M. Bemstein's argument in The Fate of Art encapsulates the discordance between 
aesthetic alienation and aestheticism.This problem, coupled with the inadequacies of 
earlier treatments, prompts the need for the present study. While previous writers have 
dealt with Nietzsche's thoughts on art and on aesthetics more generally, and although 
his perspectival critique of tmth has received increasing critical attention in recent 
years, works that address both of these points in terms of their precise connection to one 
another are comparatively scarce.'^ 
Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
" Allan Megill, "Nietzsche as Aestheticist", Philosophy and Literature. Vol. 5, No. 2, Fall 1981, and 
Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985). 
J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
On Nietzsche's aesthetics, see for example Julian Young, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), and also my Conclusion. On his perspectivism, see for example 
Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
and my discussion in Chapter 2. 
Having shown that an examination of the relation between art and truth in 
Nietzsche's thought is needed, however, consideration of the exact nature and the 
direction to be taken by such an examination is also required. Recall that the second aim 
of my thesis may be divided into two distinct questions: first, how the aestheticist claim 
links truth and art in Nietzsche's philosophy, and second, whether this claim is fully 
defensible. Nietzsche's question, cited at the beginning of this introductory chapter, was 
formulated in BGE in response to the problem of translating the "terrible, basic text" of 
man back into nature (BGE, §230). This problem of translating man back into nature 
may be taken as establishing the broad Nietzschean context of my thesis. The problem 
is a product of aestheticism. Specifically, I argue that Nietzsche's task of translating 
man back into nature, conceptualised as the revival of the tragic disposition, is a therapy 
for what was, at the end of the nineteenth century, and what remains today, the cultural 
problem of nihilism. Nietzsche's aestheticism allows him to recognise and identify the 
problem of nihilism that plagues our culture, and to propose a therapy for culture. Yet 
Nietzsche can legitimately make the aestheticist claim only from within an ontology of 
will to power. This necessitates an account of how aestheticism is related within 
Nietzsche to the significant doctrines of perspectivism and will to power. And thus the 
question of the defensibility of aestheticism is raised. There are both moral and 
metaphysical grounds for objection to aestheticism, as we will see in section 0.3.''^ Both 
of these must be overcome i f Nietzsche's aestheticism is to be counted as defensible. 
To summarise, the key innovation of the thesis is its development and full 
defence of a standard account of Nietzsche's "aestheticism" as the site of connection 
between truth and art in his wider philosophical project. This is reflected in the two aims 
which have been considered in this section: to respond to a neglect of aestheticism, and 
to defend aestheticism. But there are also some methodological considerations at work 
in what follows, as I shall now explain. 
A cautionary note must be observed here. First, I do not set out to accomplish a systematic reading of 
Nietzsche's metaphysics or his aesthetics in what follows. Simple categorisation of Nietzsche's remarks 
on art and on truth into broad aesthetic and metaphysical terms is resisted throughout, in keeping with my 
claim for the wider aestheticist context of those remarks. Second, I do not offer a sustained comparison of 
Nietzsche's own views on art and truth, and issues within modern aesthetics and/or metaphysics. I shall 
speculate on the potential of a defended aestheticism to impact upon certain of such issues in my 
Conclusion, but it should be borne in mind at all times that my main focus is upon the nature of the 
art/truth relation in Nietzsche and not upon the wider concerns to which this relation is linked. 
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0.2: Questions of methodology 
I shall now turn to consider the third key aim of the thesis in more detail. This is to 
maintain an implicit account of Nietzsche's philosophy as continuous, in contrast to the 
commonly-held view of it as discontinuous. This account will be implicit in as far as I 
will put Nietzsche's published texts to work without regard for the significance of their 
chronology. By a discontinuity, I refer to the view of Nietzsche's philosophy as having 
changed in significant ways between the early, the middle and the later parts of his 
career. Although this aim will remain an implicit part of my discussion in the main body 
of the thesis, in my conclusion I shall evaluate the consequences of my claim for 
continuity for the widely-used technique of textual periodisation. 
In recent years, an increasing amount of scholarly attention has been focused 
upon the methodology of critical approaches towards Nietzsche's thinking. While there 
are a number of ways of classifying and evaluating the status of Nietzsche's texts, all of 
these are chiefly concerned with two overriding principles: publication status, and 
chronology. These principles cannot be overlooked, owing to the interpretative 
significance that they hold for any sustained treatment of Nietzsche. Consequently, it 
has become de rigueur for a work of Nietzsche scholarship to explain its attitude to 
methodology. I take this one step further, by applying the results of my argument on the 
aestheticist nature of the art/truth relation to issues surrounding that methodology. Here, 
the attitude I take to each of the principles of publication status and chronology in 
developing my account within the thesis will be explained, and the possible 
consequences of my account for the periodisation technique will be outlined. 
The significance of the publication status of each of Nietzsche's texts was 
minimal within Nietzsche studies until the publication of the Colli-Montinari KGW 
edition of Nietzsche's complete w o r k s . O n publication of this edition, scholars had 
access for the first time to a full and clear picture of Nietzsche's works. This new 
edition has also enabled the (ongoing) project of providing superior translations of 
Nietzsche's works into English, thus replacing the notoriously unreliable Levy 
translations. The chief significance of the Colli-Montinari edition, however, lies in its 
consequence for scholarly response to the Nachlafi. WP provides a good example in this 
regard.'^ 
Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart & Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy As/And Literature, 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 262. 
There remains some controversy surrounding the Schlechta edition of the complete works which 
centres on its presentation of WP, and which the publication of the Colli-Montinari edition has dissolved 
by providing a reliable version of the Nachlafi material. 
WP was never assembled by Nietzsche himself, but was compiled from Nachlafi 
aphorisms, put together in what is basically a random order.Obviously, the fact that 
WP was unpublished was widely acknowledged; but prior to the Colli-Montinari 
edition, responses to Nietzsche had tended to treat remarks from WP with almost greater 
significance than works such as BGE, TI or (less surprisingly for some) BT, and their 
unpublished status was largely overlooked. With the emergence of the KGW edition of 
the complete works, which are unambiguous in their identification of not only the 
unpublished status but also the unfinished status of many of the remarks in the Nachlafi, 
the factor of publication could no longer be ignored. Hence although many influential 
readings of Nietzsche rely heavily on the Nachlafi - Martin Heidegger's lectures on 
Nietzsche and Richard Schacht's account of Nietzsche's philosophy, to name but two -
some more recent accounts have acknowledged that there remains a sufficient element 
of ambiguity in these remarks to render them unreliable.'^ Such accounts have left the 
issue largely implicit, but have chosen not to use WP as a prime source of argument, 
while others have made the issue explicit.'^ The issue is simple: the unpublished status 
of the Nachlafi suggests that Nietzsche's intent in making the remarks therein is 
undetermined. Although the intention behind the wider project of WP is known, 
Nietzsche never completed it, owing to the breakdown of his health in 1889. Hence the 
final order and the deeper interpretative significance of the remarks in WP is unknown, 
and the possibility remains that the remarks themselves might have changed 
substantially had Nietzsche been able to complete and revise the text for publication. 
This is deemed sufficient to require abstinence from, or at least a great deal of 
scepticism towards, any reliance upon the Nachlafi remarks. 
Not all Nietzsche scholars see things this way, even in the light of the 
publication of the KGW. It is known that at one stage Nietzsche intended to write a book 
that would present his philosophy in a systematic manner, and he is known to have been 
engaged in this task between 1884 and 1888, with the last plans for his main work being 
" Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, Metaphysics Without Truth: On the Importance of Consistency within 
Nietzsche's Philosophy, (MUnchen: Herbert Utz Verlag, 1999), p. 13. 
Heidegger, op. cit., note 8. Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, (London: Routledge, 1983). As Magnus, 
Stewart & Mileur note, Heidegger's and the majority of Schacht's readings were completed prior to the 
first publication of the now-standard Colli-Montinari edition of Nietzsche's texts in 1979. While it would 
be fair to criticise a contemporary reading on the basis of unmediated use of Nachlafi material, it is unjust 
to condemn Schacht's and Heidegger's accounts on this ground in as far as they did not have access to 
this edition (op. cit., note 15, pp. 35-37,262). 
" Of particular significance in this respect is Magnus, Stewart & Mileur's distinction between 'lumpers' 
who regard the use of the Nachlafi as unproblematic, and 'splitters', who do regard its use as problematic. 
Lumpers include Martin Heidegger, Richard Schacht, Arthur Danto and Gilles Deleuze and splitters 
include Maudemarie Clark, Tracy B. Strong and Kathleen Higgins (op. cit., note 15). 
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composed in the autumn of 1888.^° The claim of those who still accord the greatest 
value to Nietzsche's unpublished work is grounded in the fact that Nietzsche never 
completed this main work, and was still intending to finalise his philosophy when his 
health broke down. Nietzsche's philosophy as expressed in the published works is 
therefore taken to be incomplete.^^ As a result of this incompleteness in the published 
works, the claim follows that the unpublished fragments of the Nachlaji post-1884 
constitute the most advanced aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy.^^ 
However, I do not find this sufficient reason to displace the published works as 
the prime source of Nietzsche's philosophy. To draw an analogy, the claim that the 
unpublished works are superior by virtue of their proximity to Nietzsche's mature 
intention is like saying that as Keats would almost certainly have written greater poetry 
had he lived longer, the poems he did write constitute juvenilia and should be evaluated 
as such. The key point to consider is that regardless of our capacity to make educated 
guesses concerning Nietzsche's intentions, we simply cannot know what he may or may 
not have intended to write, or whether it would have been better and/or more complete 
than his published work. It simply makes no sense to judge what we can know of 
Nietzsche by what we cannot know of him. The many instances of Nietzsche's self-
criticisms in the published works seem to suggest not only that Nietzsche was his own 
best critic, but also that throughout his active life he was reflecting upon the published 
works and reaffirming them, even while revaluating them.^^ 
It cannot be denied that the Nachlafi remarks are consistent with themes from 
the published works, and that they do constitute valuable tools for understanding 
Nietzsche's wider project. As a result, the Nachlafi material will not be overlooked 
entirely in my thesis. But in order to render my argument immune to criticism on the 
basis of the publication issue, use of the Nachlafi will remain secondary to the published 
texts, and will be confined to footnotes. This approach enables the present thesis both to 
acknowledge the value of the Nachlafi material as a tool of Nietzsche interpretation, and 
at the same time, to avoid any charge of inaccuracy or indeterminacy that may be 
attributed to readings which do not distinguish between the published and unpublished 
works. 
The significance of textual chronology as a further issue for Nietzsche studies 
has grown out of the publication debate. Chronology refers to the order in which the 
Sorgner, op. cit., note 17. 
'^ Ibid. 
^^Ibid. 
I shall return to this point in my Conclusion. 
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texts were published by Nietzsche. This is not always as clear-cut as it might seem, with 
Nietzsche publishing some of his texts (such as Z) in separate parts, and issuing new 
editions that frequently included additional material. '^* In terms of their chronology, 
Nietzsche's texts are often divided by modem scholars into three distinct groups or 
'periods', a technique known as 'periodisation'.A handy example of this is Julian 
Young's reading in Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art, which groups Nietzsche's works into 
three main periods.^^ Young's claim is that his discussion provides a philosophical 
biography of Nietzsche that is modelled upon the latter's own template for such a 
discussion in EH. Contrasting his reading with EH, however. Young also claims 
trathfulness for his own reading, which argues that Nietzsche's thinking on the 
philosophy of art changes significantly between textual time-periods. The major factor 
of change in this case is Nietzsche's attitude to metaphysics in as far as it determines his 
attitude towards art.^ ^ Hence Young's account supports the common view that these 
periods are largely dependent upon the changing status given to metaphysics by 
Nietzsche.^^ But while Young addresses Nietzsche's work as a whole, more recent 
discussions opt to ignore this wider context and to discuss only one period of 
Nietzsche's writing in terms of its relation to a given theme. One example of this is 
Ruth Abbey's recent monograph entitled Nietzsche's Middle Period, which defines the 
period of his writing from HA to G5 as distinct in terms of its moral engagement.^ ^ 
Abbey's comparative reading is of three of Nietzsche's texts (HA, D, and the first four 
books of G5) that seem to share a particular thematic and stylistic identity, and which 
she claims have been neglected in comparison with others of his oeuvre.^'^ 
What has solidified into the periodisation technique is actually based upon Lou 
Salome's initial classification of Nietzsche's work into three periods in her Friedrich 
Nietzsche in seinen Werken, originally published in 1894.^' The main periods are "1868 
See the "Chronology of Friedrich Nietzsche" which sets out the significant details from Nietzsche's 
personal life in relation to his publication record, in Duncan Large's translation of Twilight of the Idols, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. xl-xlii. 
James I. Porter, The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on The Birth of Tragedy, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 6-9. 
^ Young, op. cit., note 13, pp. 1-2. 
" Ibid., p. 8. In inversion to this view, Michael Gillespie argues that it is the significant Nietzschean 
theme of music that recedes in Nietzsche's supposed 'middle period', and which thus determines that 
period's distinction. Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 
pp. 215-216. 
Porter, op. cit., note 25, pp. 6-7. 
Ruth Abbey, Nietzsche's Middle Period, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
Abbey, op. cit., note 29. 
'^ Ibid., pp. xi-xii. Salome's book has since been republished as Nietzsche, S. Mandel (trans. & ed.), 
(Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001). For a more detailed discussion of the text, see 
Carol Diethe, "Lou Salome's Interpretation of Nietzsche's Religiosity", Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 19, 
Spring 2000, pp. 82-87. Diethe points out that Mandel's translation of the title does no little injustice to 
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- 78, 1878 - autumn 1882 and autumn 1882 - the end."^^ Salome's origination of this 
division is rarely credited, owing to the frequency with which it is put to work in 
contemporary Nietzsche criticism.^^ The nature of Salome's classification of the texts 
was purely heuristic, and as such, it is perhaps not unexpected that it should have 
become standardised; Nietzsche is known as being a difficult philosopher to read, and 
any heuristic device by which to first approach him is likely to be welcomed.^ "* 
However, problems arise when the device is incorporated as a standard part of scholarly 
methodology; it is one thing to suggest the device as an aid to the individual encounter 
with Nietzsche, but it is quite another thing to base a reading upon periodisation as an 
independent and meaningful interpretative standard. 
The increasing emphasis on the critical value of periodisation may well have 
certain advantages for the analysis of Nietzsche's work in specific instances, such as is 
the case in Abbey's reading. Whilst there is no doubt that Nietzsche's thought and, 
arguably, his style of expression matured over time, it does not follow directly from this 
that a strong periodisation of the texts is either necessary or desirable in contemporary 
Nietzsche studies as a whole. Attempts to read Nietzsche via the technique of 
periodisation run the risk of overlooking not only continuities, discontinuities and self-
contradictions between the texts but also the broader interpretative significance of these, 
on various issues from truth to religion.^^ This holds regardless of whether a continuity 
or a discontinuity between the texts, or indeed a wider acceptance or denial of 
Nietzsche's arguments, is ultimately espoused. The most frequent form of periodisation, 
on the ground of Nietzsche's rejection or acceptance of certain features of metaphysics, 
"misstates the problem" in assuming that metaphysics lends itself to either of these 
possible positions held by Nietzsche.^^ Periodisation by inversion, on the ground of art 
or music, is merely to make the same misstatement.^^ Any account based on a strong 
periodisation of the texts claims that either metaphysics or art is Nietzsche's 
fundamental concern, while claiming at the same time that Nietzsche's fundamental 
concern changes over time. The contradiction at work here is apparent.^ * 
the book, in as far as Salome's key aim was to trace Nietzsche's personal experiences and particularly his 
suffering through the works themselves; consequently, Diethe's view is that a more apt translation of the 
title should read Friedrich Nietzsche in his Works. 
Diethe, ibid. 
" Abbey, op. cit., note 29, pp. xi-xii. 
Ibid. 
Porter, op. cit., note 25, p. 8. 
''Ibid. 
" I b i d . 
As such, the claim for continuity is commensurate with the other aims of the thesis. 
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To avoid this contradiction, accounts of Nietzsche's works must either hold an 
increasingly fragmented view of Nietzsche's wider philosophy, or must return 
periodisation to its original function as an heuristic device, the value of whose function 
will be determined by each individual reading of the texts. Rather than this resulting in a 
clearer understanding, our collective conception of Nietzsche can only be damaged or 
held back by increasing fragmentation. As a therapeutic measure in support of the latter 
option, therefore, this thesis deliberately ignores the alleged significance of the 
chronology of publication of Nietzsche's texts. I do not propose to offer a full 
commentary on the continuities and discontinuities between the texts, as the scope of 
such a project would constitute an additional thesis in itself. Nietzsche's texts will 
simply be used to illustrate my argument and, in so doing, provide implicit evidence of 
a continuity between the texts. My conclusion will speculate upon the potential of this 
implicit evidence to impact upon what should be recognised as the question of 
periodisation. 
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0.3: Outline of a defence of aestheticism 
With the basic structure of the thesis having been estabHshed, the final task of this 
introductory chapter is to set out the content of the forthcoming arguments in more 
detail. In addition to these introductory remarks and my conclusion, the thesis consists 
of four chapters. 
I begin in Chapter 1 by offering a broader historical contextualisation of the 
main claims of the thesis. I consider how the consequences of the art/truth dichotomy in 
the history of philosophy speak to the methodological authority of contemporary 
philosophy in its relation to culture. This is so both in terms of the relation between 
philosophy and the arts, and between philosophy and science in their regard to truth. As 
a corollary, these consequences also speak to the modem polarisation of philosophical 
discourse between analytic and Continental styles. I discuss the genealogical history of 
the art/truth dichotomy in the light of Plato's expulsion of the poets from the Republic, 
often cited as its source.''^  I show that Plato is responsible for the art/truth dichotomy, 
but in a non-pejorative sense, owing to manifold misappropriation of his ontology of 
Forms. I also consider the possibility of a connective approach to the art/truth 
dichotomy, and show how the aesthetic alienation of art from truth, coupled with beauty 
as a modem token of the correctness of scientific theories, speaks to the contradiction of 
value inherent within modem culture. This is linked to nihilism as the problem of 
culture. I take up Nietzsche's view of the nihilistic crisis in value for European culture, 
discussing nihilism as a disease of the modem European condition, and explore 
Nietzsche's proposal for a kind of 'gene therapy' to remedy this disease. However, the 
success of Nietzsche's therapy for culture is shown to be dependent upon his genesis of 
a supporting ontology that is discrete from the Platonic ontology of Forms. Aestheticism 
is thus identified as the point on which ontology and nihilistic therapy must balance. 
Chapter 2 is concemed to develop a more complete account of aestheticism, 
drawing on the work of Allan Megill and Alexander Nehamas in order to coalesce these 
discrete discussions into what I have termed the 'standard account' of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism, which I propose to defend. This standard account identifies the key 
features of aestheticism, holding the aestheticist claim from BT as definitive of 
Nietzsche's broader approach. On this basis, I move on to consider problems of the 
standard account. Three main areas of objection are identified: metaphysics, ethics, and 
^' See Babette E . Babich, "Nietzsche's Critical Theory: The Culture of Science as Art", Babette E . Babich 
& Robert S. Cohen (eds.), Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory: Nietzsche and the 
Sciences 1, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), p. 21. 
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an apparent lack of common ontological ground between art, truth and life (being) in 
Nietzsche. In the remainder of Chapter 2,1 focus on the metaphysical problems facing 
aestheticism. Metaphysically, the possibility of justifying existence and the world on 
aesthetic grounds is questionable in as far as the aesthetic has traditionally been 
divorced from considerations of truth; the aestheticist claim must answer the 
requirement of metaphysical correctness. It must also be shown to overcome the 
difficulty of counting Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power as an ontology. I contend 
that Nietzsche may have already considered the possibility of these problems, and put 
his own distinction between metaphysical and historical philosophy to work in order to 
refute the problems raised by metaphysics. 
The main task of Chapter 3 is to tackle the ethical problem for Nietzsche's 
aestheticism. Given the pain and terror inherent within existence, it seems morally 
dubious to attempt to justify such experiences on the ground of the aesthetic.'*'^  The 
chapter draws on Nietzsche's critique of pity in order to begin to show how the 
aestheticist claim itself is justifiable, explaining what are often taken to be Nietzsche's 
cruelly practical views on suffering in the terms of his critique of pity. Through 
analysing the critique of pity, I show that Nietzsche's views on suffering and pity are 
practical but not cruel. In so doing, I further develop a way of reading the critique of 
pity that was first used by Henry Staten, in which a mirroring power-relationship 
between individuals within the context of pity and suffering is identified.'*' I suggest that 
this power-relationship can act as the solution to the third and final problem facing 
Nietzsche's aestheticism: the question of common ontological ground between art, truth 
and being. 
Following on from this suggestion. Chapter 4 proposes a relation of ontological 
identity between beauty and suffering as evidence of wider common ground between 
art, truth and being. I explain the way in which ontological identity works within 
Nietzsche's wider project. This is done by showing how the critique of pity discussed in 
Chapter 3 is linked to Nietzsche's critique of tragedy. I identify the mirroring power-
relation as a common factor, and show how this counts as an ontological link for 
Nietzsche. Mirroring is shown to operate both as a formal argument in Nietzsche's 
aestheticist thought, and as evidence of ontological identity between art, truth and being. 
This is rendered particularly evident in the chapter by a comparative reading of BT and 
This is certainly the rationale behind Allan Megill's urging of his readers to approach the phenomenon 
of Nietzsche's (and indeed others') aestheticism with what he describes as a "healthy skepticism". Megill, 
op. cit., note 11, p. 345. See also Chapters 2 and 3. 
••'Henry Staten, Nietzsche's Voice, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 102-103. 
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Z, in which BT is shown to act as a blueprint for Z. In solving the problem of common 
ontological ground, the art/truth relation in Nietzsche is finally made clear and 
Nietzsche's aestheticism is shown to be defensible. 
My conclusion is divided into three main parts. First, my claim for Nietzsche's 
aestheticism as the link between art and truth receives a final evaluation. I reprise the 
main points of my arguments from previous chapters in order to show that the 
significant objections to aestheticism have been countered. Second, I offer some 
thoughts on the significance of these arguments for two more technical aspects of 
Nietzsche scholarship: continuity and periodisation of the texts. I confirm that the factor 
of mirroring is common to the three major periods into which Nietzsche's texts are 
commonly divided (the early, middle and late periods). Nietzsche's aestheticism is 
argued to be the most fundamental aspect of his thought insofar as it has been shown in 
previous chapters to run throughout his works, informing and directing his concerns. 
With this claim for continuity, the efficacy and the domination of the periodisation 
technique is called into question. Hence the defence of aestheticism attempted by the 
thesis is shown to have an applicable benefit for the argument recently advanced in 
favour of continuity and against periodisation by James I . Porter.'*^ Third, my attempt to 
redress the comparative neglect of Nietzsche's aestheticism is shown to be justified with 
respect to an improved understanding of Nietzsche's thought and also in terms of the 
potential benefit to contemporary philosophy. Some possible effects of a defended 
aestheticism are considered both in terms of Nietzsche's wider writing on matters 
aesthetic, and in terms of the potential of aestheticism to impact upon contemporary 
issues surrounding the art/truth relation in modem philosophy. The question of whether 
a distinct Nietzschean aesthetic is possible is considered from the perspective of a 
defended aestheticism, and the implications of this for contemporary approaches to the 
art/truth relation are explored. The final comments in my conclusion consider the 
interrelation of Nietzsche's aestheticism with his theory of mind, and suggest that while 
defended aestheticism provides a basis for a critical account of the art/truth relation in 
Nietzsche, it also presents the opportunity for a fresh approach to the relationship 
between culture and mind in Nietzsche's thought. 
Porter, op. cit., note 25. 
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Chapter 1: Contextualisation 
My introductory remarks clarified the aims and objectives of the thesis in relation to 
some key issues within contemporary Nietzsche studies. The purpose of this chapter is 
to give the thesis its proper context in the history of philosophy. As we will see, the 
relation between truth and art is determined by European culture. It is this link between 
the art/truth relation and culture that is significant for my claim that there is a 
connection between art and truth in Nietzsche. The history of the art/truth relation is 
dominated by the notion of there being a dichotomy between art and truth. This view of 
a dichotomy was notably held by Plato, and is also reflected in contemporary 
philosophy. This seems to place my claim for Nietzsche's view of the art/truth relation 
into direct competition with established accounts of the art/truth relation. Both of these 
accounts, as I will show, offer perspectives on the art/truth relation that are determined 
by a more fundamental relation that exists between philosophy and culture, in which 
philosophy is determined by its desire to act as the representative of a culture of truth. 
Correspondingly, I offer an historical approach to the problem of competing 
accounts of the art/truth relation. In section 1.1, I contend that the consequences of 
accounts that hold a dichotomous view of the art/truth relation speak to the 
methodological authority of contemporary philosophy in its relation to culture. 
Specifically, this is so both in terms of the relation between philosophy and the arts, and 
between philosophy and science in its relation to truth. As a corollary, these 
consequences also speak to the modem polarisation of philosophical discourse between 
analytic and Continental styles, depending upon the extent to which science, as the 
determining methodological factor of metaphysical truth, is upheld by philosophy. What 
this analysis reveals is a continuing tension between the desire of modem philosophy to 
act as representative of a culture of science as tmth, and the impossibility of science as a 
culture. 
Section 1.2 supports the findings of this analysis by considering the genealogical 
history of the art/truth dichotomy in the light of Plato's expulsion of the poets from the 
Republic, which act is often blamed for yielding the dichotomy.' Plato's rejection of the 
poets is shown to be justifiable on the contextual ground of antiquity and within an 
ontology of Forms. However, it is nonetheless identified as the source of the art/truth 
' See Babette E . Babich, "Nietzsche's Critical Theory: The Culture of Science as Art", Babette E . Babich 
& Robert S. Cohen, (eds.), Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory: Nietzsche and the 
Sciences 1, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), p. 21 (henceforth A'CA). 
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dichotomy in modemity in a non-pejorative sense. I consider how the basic Platonic 
project of the philosophic life, which is dependent upon the Forms, has been 
misappropriated over time. The deep questions surrounding philosophical issues (such 
as aesthetics) that are raised by Plato in the course of his wider project of the 
philosophic life have become the ends-in-themselves of modem philosophy.^ The 
modem misappropriation of Plato's project is thus shown to be reflected strongly in the 
tension within the methodology of modem philosophy, as addressed by section 1.1. 
Specifically, this tension is reflected by the art/tmth dichotomy: Plato's distinction 
between beauty and the work of art is functional in as far as it is informed and directed 
by his ontology, but the distinction becomes dysfunctional as a result of the modem 
rejection of this ontology. 
In section 1.3, I shall introduce the possibility of a connective approach to the 
art/tmth relation in relation to the dysfunction of the Platonic distinction between beauty 
and the work of art. This possibility is afforded by the recognition of misappropriation 
of Plato's project of the philosophic life, and the way in which modem aesthetics in 
particular takes up his distinction between beauty and the work of art as a part of the 
misappropriative process. Where Plato could afford to reject the work of art on the 
ground of a unity between beauty and tmth based on the theory of Forms, modem 
aesthetics is determined by a methodological commitment which, as shown in section 
1.2, is founded upon a notion of art and tmth issues as animated in themselves, and not 
by virtue of their fundamental context as aspects of a unifying ontology. In modem 
aesthetics, beauty and the work of art have become connected once again in a negative 
and problematic way. Where philosophy once linked beauty and tmth as equals under 
the Form of the Good, it now has alienated them from one another; beauty has been 
reunited with the work of art almost by default, by virtue of the mutual alienation of 
beauty and the work of art from considerations of tmth and morality.^ Hence where 
modem aesthetics is concemed with the dependency of beauty as a property of the work 
of art upon metaphysical tmth, this new hierarchy is mirrored by the ironic paean 
offered to beauty and to art by modem science, in which the beauty of scientific theories 
and in some cases, empirical results, are seen as a token of their correctness or 
tmthfulness. Thus, in an odd inversion, the approach which is responsible for an 
art/tmth dichotomy tums out to hold a connection between beauty and tmth. This is the 
^ Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), p. 97. 
' J . M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 2. 
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contradiction inherent to and definitive of modem culture, and which is integrally linked 
to the problem of nihilism as Nietzsche saw it. 
The final section of this chapter therefore turns to the interpretative status of 
Nietzsche's own views on the genesis of the art/truth relation. Section 1.4 shows the 
extent to which Nietzsche's identification of the problem of European culture via 
nihilism guides my basic historical account of the art/truth dichotomy given in the 
previous two sections. Nietzsche's diagnosis of the problem of nihilism is construed as 
a congenital disease of the modem European condition.'^ Rather than a straight cure, as I 
will show, he prescribes a genealogical therapy for this condition that aspires to restore 
culture to its previous vitality by restoring what animates it - namely, the tragic 
disposition. However, Nietzsche's prescription signifies the need to develop a wider 
ontology to support his therapy. A straight cure for nihilism is inadequate as this would 
presuppose nihilism as an alien organism to culture, rather than what it is: part of the 
foundation of culture. Like Plato, whose basic philosophic project was directed at life 
and the nature of being, and was also grounded in the genesis of ontology, Nietzsche 
recognised the significance of ontology. Uniquely, however, Nietzsche also understood 
the real significance of making this conceptual ontology match up to the nature of 
being. 
I therefore conclude in section 1.5, that the therapeutic measure of restoring the 
tragic disposition must be commensurate with Nietzsche's wider ontology of the will to 
power. However, this raises a number of questions conceming the way in which I think 
Nietzsche claims to balance these two necessities. My proposal is that he attempts to 
link them by undertaking a consistent project that may be described as translating man 
back into nature (BGE, §230). However, the precise mechanism of such translation 
requires a great deal more attention; it is necessary to identify this mechanism, and then 
to consider whether or not it is defensible in itself. Only in this way can an authentic 
balance between life understood as the will to power, and the prescription for a healthy 
culture, the restoration of the tragic disposition, be successfully shown to have been 
achieved by Nietzsche. 
The notion of Nietzsche as diagnosing the sickness of civilisation is presented in, for example, Sarah 
Kofman, "Accessories (Ecce Homo, 'Why I Write Such Good Books', 'The Untimelies', 3)", Peter R. 
Sedgwick (ed.), Nietzsche: A Critical Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 144. 
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1.1: The art/truth dichotomy in contemporary history of philosophy 
The dichotomous approach to the art/truth relation is best represented by the cultural 
division between art taken simply as fictional representation, and science taken as truth 
in the form of factual representation. Dichotomous treatments of the relation between 
art and truth in modem philosophy remain, to a significant degree, enthralled by the 
'Two Cultures' debate on the status of the arts in relation to the sciences. This debate 
was sparked by C. P. Snow's now infamous 1959 Rede Lecture, entitled 'The Two 
Cultures and the Scientific Revolution'. As will be shown, the debate turns on the 
question of whether science or art has (or should have) fundamental dominance in our 
culture. In his original lecture, Snow claimed that while it was a pity that so few 
scientists read literature, equally deplorable was the humanist ignorance of science; he 
therefore recommended that education ought to remedy the divide between the "two 
cultures" of arts and sciences.^  Snow thus makes what initially seems like a reasonable 
claim for intellectual synergy between the disciplines, on the basis that such synergy 
can only benefit the products of both disciplines. This appears to be a claim for a 
connection rather than for a dichotomy between art and science. This reading is 
supported to a certain extent by the literary critic F. R. Leavis' response to Snow's 
lecture. Initially, Leavis concurred with Snow's determination of the need for 
improvement in scientific education, and in regretting the existence of the two cultures 
that divide the educated population.^ 
Rather than a synergistic rapprochement, however. Snow's lecture in fact 
emphasises the importance of science to cultural progress (explaining the mention of a 
'Scientific Revolution' in its title), and portrays the humanists as Luddites, trying to 
hold back the inevitable tide of scientific progress.^ Leavis' later responses to Snow 
illustrate his fundamental disagreement with Snow's reification of the cultural progress 
promised by scientific development; the apparent claim for synergy is thus unmasked 
by Leavis as a claim for the supremacy of science.^ The division between the sciences 
and the arts encapsulated by the 'Two Cultures' debate remains highly significant for 
the question of the art/truth relation in two interrelated respects: the domination of 
science in modemity, and the impossibility of science as a culture, where science is 
' Anthony O'Hear, " T w o Cultures' Revisited", Verstehen and Humane Understanding: Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 41, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2. 
* Ibid. F . R. Leavis' collected responses to Snow are found in Nor Shall My Sword: Discourses On 
Pluralism, Compassion And Social Hope, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972). 
^ O'Hear, op. cit., p. 2. 
* Ibid. 
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understood as representative evidence of tmths about the nature of existence and the 
world.^ 
The significance of these issues for the question of the art/truth relation is 
represented particularly well in a more recent article by Anthony O'Hear, in which the 
'Two Cultures' debate is revisited.'° O'Hear argues that the defining strength of science 
is its value-freedom, which is derived from science's chief aim of an observer-
independent account of the world that transcends human meaning, culture, and 
ideology." This does not mean to say that science is oblivious to matters of human 
interest; rather, value-freedom pertains to the methodology and the subject matter of 
science. Natural phenomena are measured and described by observers who consciously 
set aside their individual beliefs, motives and cultural backgrounds in order to produce 
properly objective empirical results and evaluations.'^ Through this method, the general 
claim is that we can come to know the way things really are in the world. While O'Hear 
acknowledges that the ideal of science is unattainable from a human perspective that is 
limited by conceptual and sensory faculties, he nevertheless maintains that "there is 
something right about i t" in so far as the scientific approach enables us to understand 
the essential character of the world and thereby to manipulate it.'^ There is a tension at 
work here between O'Hear's objective scientific ideal, and his acknowledgement of 
subjective limitation. This tension gives rise to the question of precisely how the 
subjectively-limited human scientist is able to achieve and maintain the objective 
perspective that is methodologically necessary to carrying out and subsequently 
evaluating empirical research. I f the scientist-observer cannot attain the ideal of science, 
then how can he/she be justified in pursuing it?''^ 
O'Hear seeks to answer this question by relocating the focus of the 'Two 
Cultures' debate from science to culture. This move is made on the ground of the 
equation of value judgements to judgements about life. O'Hear's move is inspired by 
Leavis' remark, that the kind of judgements with which the literary critic is concemed is 
' Within the philosophy of science, methodology, which critically explores the methods by which science 
arrives at truths about the world, is most closely related to theories of knowledge and of truth. See 
Lawrence Sklar, "Philosophy of Science", Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 611. 
O'Hear, op. cit., note 5. 
" Ibid., pp. 3-5. Note that science is taken as transcending culture, and then consider this in comparison 
with the desire of philosophy to represent a culture of science. This tension will become increasingly 
important throughout the chapter. 
Ibid., p. 4. 
'Mbid.,pp. 4-5. 
Nietzsche raises precisely this problem of science through the lens of art in his 'Attempt at a Self-
Criticism' in BT. 
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judgements about life.'^ The point is that rather than seeking to support truth-claims 
about the world through scientific evidence, our priority should be to evaluate such 
claims in terms of their relevance to life (which in this case, recall, is the manipulation 
of the essential character of the worid). The necessity for the scientist to divorce 
him/herself from culturally-imposed values is taken by O'Hear as justifiable on the 
ground of personal responsibility: 
While our value judgements are initially in the presuppositions common to our culture, 
in making them we take a personal responsibility for them, which gives us the chance at 
least of loosening the bonds of cultures as given, and of moving into a more universal 
environment.'^  
Even though modem Westem society is dominated by science, it is not definite that 
each individual will have to engage with science in a formal sense. But at some point, 
all individuals will have to make judgements of value.'^ The individual act of evaluative 
judgement cannot be imposed by culture - only the individual can choose to make a 
judgement, and in so doing assumes responsibility for both the act and the nature of 
judgement. Hence for O'Hear, value judgements can be cross-cultural. As value 
judgements are inevitably judgements about life, his assumption of the correctness of 
such judgements, which is independent of Leavis' influence, seems defensible.'^ The 
"something right" about the scientific ideal is this possibility of cross-cultural, and thus 
objective, value judgements.'^ 
" O'Hear, op. cit., note 5, pp. 4-5. For O'Hear, this claim encapsulates the real significance of the 'Two 
Cultures' debate. 
Ibid., p. 3. 
" Ibid., p. 16. 
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O'Hear attempts to support his argument for universal, objective, scientific correctness by an appeal to 
a similar argument from the particular: culture understood in terms of art. Contrasting the Herderian and 
Goethean positions on judgements of value, he firstly claims that although Herder defends prejudice as 
grounding a community and thus safeguarding its happiness, the Herderian position denies the possibility 
of making cross-cultural value-judgements because the Herderian individual is embedded too deeply 
within his/her culture. Goethe's view, on the other hand, is claimed by O'Hear to allow for the possibility 
of cross-cultural value judgements, in as far as Goethe takes the poet to appeal to a universal sense of 
value that "is manifested in but transcends particular cultures" (ibid., pp.15-16). I find this argument 
unconvincing, not least because as R. H. Stephenson has shown, Goethe's activity of reformulating 
commonplaces within the context of his wisdom literature has profound historical significance: Goethe 
was well aware of his cultural context and sought to affect it by intervention. The emphasis should 
therefore be upon the manifestation of value in culture, and not on the transcension of culture by value; 
Goethe's aesthetic transmutation of inherited truths in his wisdom literature, performed in order to avoid 
the linguistic constraints of philosophical rhetoric, is evidence of this. See Stephenson, Goethe's Wisdom 
Literature: A Study in Aesthetic Transmutation, (Bern: Verlag Peter Lang, 1983), pp. 21, 258. Hence, 
O'Hear's claim for universality is unsuccessfully supported by his appeal to Goethe. 
" The emphasis upon value as cross-cultural and therefore objective is strongly reminiscent of J . L . 
Mackie's claim for value as part of the "fabric" of the world, in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 15. John McDowell considers the plausibility of this claim for the 
specific case of aesthetic value in his "Aesthetic Value, objectivity, and the fabric of the world", E v a 
Schaper (ed.), Pleasure, Preference and Value: Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics, (Cambridge: 
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However, as in the case of Snow's lecture on the 'Two Cultures', what is left 
unchallenged in O'Hear's account is the idea that there are "standards of correctness 
which stand above the particular", on which ground the notion of scientific judgements 
as cross-cultural is legitimised.^" The conflict between the scientific objective ideal and 
the human limitation of subjectivity therefore remains implicit within O'Hear's reading. 
O'Hear remains convinced of science as the representative of cultural progress, despite 
the importance attributed to life in terms of the act of judgement. Despite that the 
predominance of science in modemity has been challenged on the ground of value, in so 
far as the question of the value of science - the problem of science - has been 
articulated by Nietzsche, O'Hear does not question science as the exemplification of 
objectivity.^' As such, there is a clear parallel to be observed between O'Hear's position 
and that of Bemard Williams, who has defended the claim that the idea of science in 
itself yields an Archimedean point.^^ From this point, Williams holds that it would be 
possible to compare representations of the world with the world itself. The comparison 
that Williams suggests and which remains implicit within O'Hear's account is also 
characteristic of traditional correspondence theories of tmth, in which tmth is conceived 
in terms of representation.^^ 
As such, O'Hear's view of the 'Two Cultures' of arts and sciences may be seen 
as a symbolic product of modem Westem culture: a culture of science as tmth. This is 
perhaps the culture for which a significant proportion of contemporary philosophy 
desires to stand as a representative, in as far as philosophy as a discipline sees its role as 
that of adjudicator of claims to knowledge within a culture. '^^  To put this another way, 
the personal responsibility for judgements of value is a distinctly philosophical 
responsibility. Adjudication, like empirical observation, is concemed with the accuracy 
of the relevant representation; the philosopher's responsibility is therefore to judge the 
veracity and defensibility of judgements. As Richard Rorty puts it, the central concem 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). Where Mackie treats the view that value is in the world as identical 
with the view that value is objective, McDowell is concemed to differentiate between these views, 
arguing that disconnecting the notion of the fabric of the world from the notion of objectivity in fact 
enables the consideration of different and phenomenologically significant interpretations of the claim of 
value as part of the world (pp. 2, 16). 
O'Hear, op. cit., note 5, p. 16. 
'^ See section 1.4 below, for a discussion of Nietzsche's development of the "problem with horns" that is 
the problem of science {BT, 'Attempt', §2). 
Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, (Hassocks: Harvester, 1978), p. 18. 
McDowell, op. cit., note 19, p. 13. Paul Horwich notes that correspondence truth theory is perhaps the 
most natural and popular account of truth, according to which a proposition is true "just in case there 
exists a fact corresponding to it", in his article on 'Theories of Truth", A Companion to Metaphysics, 
Jaegwon K i m & Ernest Sosa (eds.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 492. I shall have more to say on truth 
in Chapter 2. 
*^ Richard Rorty, The Mirror of Nature, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 3. 
24 
of philosophy is to be a general theory of representation that will divide culture into 
areas that represent reality well, less well, and not at all.^' This reading characterises 
philosophy as transfixed by the idea of the mind as a mirror containing representations 
of varying accuracy; though this is open to study through nonempirical methods, it 
shares with empirical inquiry the idea of knowledge as accuracy of representation.^^ 
Hence all philosophical claims to knowledge are determined by this conception of the 
mind as mirror, in which accuracy of the reflection is of paramount importance. 
Determined in this way, philosophy is thus shown to have a desire to "underwrite" 
science as tmth, and by inversion, to "debunk" the possibility of works of art as making 
legitimate claims to knowledge. 
It is because of this twin state of science, as culturally dominant and yet 
alienated from culture in order to achieve its objective privilege, that I think Rorty 
divides philosophical representation into his own 'Two Cultures'. These are the 
"edifying" and the "systematic", in which on the one hand, philosophers like Kant and 
Russell are classified as constmctive systematisers, offering arguments and like great 
scientists, "building for eternity".Edifying philosophers such as Nietzsche and the 
later Heidegger, on the other hand, "destroy for the sake of their own generation".^^ For 
Rorty, this division is cast in terms of the relation of philosophy to science; while the 
systematising philosopher puts his/her subject on the "secure path" of science, the 
edifying philosopher retains a place for a poetic "sense of wonder" at the world and 
existence.^^ However, in as far as Plato defined the philosopher in opposition to the 
poet, it remains possible for "argumentative systematic philosophers" to say of edifying 
philosophers such as Nietzsche, that they are not philosophers at all.^' For Rorty, the 
distinction comes down to this: the philosopher can give reasons, argue for him/herself, 
justify his/her views, on a Platonic account - but a poet, necessarily, cannot do so. A 
work of art does not put forward a thesis and argue for it, and neither should it; the 
function of art here is not the same as that of philosophy. In terms of judgement, we 
may characterise the systematic philosopher as taking his/her personal responsibility for 
loosening the bonds of culture and thus as striving for objectivity. From this 
perspective, it is not surprising that the edifying philosopher is taken as not being a 
Rorty, op. cit., note 24, p. 3. 
Ibid., p. 12. 
" Ibid., p. 3. 
Ibid., p. 369 
^'Ibid, 
Ibid., p. 370. 
'^ Rorty, op. cit., note 24, p. 370. 
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philosopher at all: the aim of edification, to destroy systematic preconceptions while 
retaining a poetic sense of wonder, betrays the defining aim of systematic philosophy. 
In a simple sense, the systematic philosopher sees the edifying philosopher as 
irresponsible; the edifier fails, in the same way as the artist, to give reasons and to argue 
coherently for his/her views.^^ As a result, the function of edifying philosophy is seen 
by the systematic philosopher as being frivolous in as far as it is akin to the function of 
art. I shall clarify the function of art in the following section of this chapter through 
consideration of the role adopted by aesthetics as a response to Plato. I will conclude 
this section, however, with an explanation of the problem inherent to accounts, like 
O'Hear's, which make an unmediated claim for the supremacy of cross-cultural 
judgements. 
The supposed true correspondence between proposition and reality is not merely 
significant within metaphysics: it is also a strong factor in our understanding of art. This 
is the case within the context of a dichotomy between art and truth. To take a more 
specific example from O'Hear's analysis, the pure fact of the artwork poses no threat to 
the supremacy of the cross-cultural judgement, and thereby to the notion of standards of 
correctness that transcend the particular. On this account, judgement about art is, 
similarly to science, subject to cross-cultural development and analysis. As a result, 
judgement is not confined to the human perspective and culture from which the work 
itself emerged; judgement about both 'objective' and 'subjective' matters is a part of 
objectivity.^^ A clearer picture of the art/truth relation within modem philosophy begins 
On this point see Babette E . Babich, "On The Analytic/Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche's 
Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy", C . G . Prado (ed.), A Dubious 
Estrangement: Analytic and Continental Philosophy (forthcoming, 2003). The analytic (Rortyan 
systematic) philosopher - Babich draws on Michael Dummett as an example - explains his/her project in 
terms of clarifying one's thinking, and, as "thought is defined by language" for such a philosopher, 
analytic philosophy is reducible to the analysis of language (p. 2). However, in as far as this definition 
omits that the question of the referent is decided by contemporary science rather than by logical analysis, 
it is possible to claim as Babich does, that analytic philosophy stands to science as philosophy once did to 
theology (pp. 2-3). Continental (Rortyan edifying) philosophy would on this reading evade this state 
because it "does not aspire to take its rational warrant from science i tse l f as does analytic philosophy (p. 
3). However, though Babich claims there has never been an authentic dialogue between the two 
traditions, I think it is important to realise that a power relationship exists between them nonetheless. The 
internal logic of the analytic method is taken by Babich to be intentionally bankrupt in that it is self-
dissolving, "clarifying or analysing away" its subject matter (p. 25). As such, she claims that it has begun 
to appropriate the spiritual capital of the Continental tradition, even while the authority of that tradition is 
denounced as "non- or bad" philosophy (p. 25). A sustained comparison of this appropriation of the 
subject matter of Continental philosophy with my discussion of the power-relation of mirroring between 
weak and strong individuals in Chapter 3, impossible here for reasons of space, would conclude that the 
action of the analysts is an exercise in will to power in the same way that the weak individual uses the 
pity of the strong individual to appropriate his/her being. 
^ Hence the transcendental nature which McDowell attributes to Williams' idea of science as yielding an 
Archimedean point of view from which to compare representations of the world with that world, may be 
given its proper historical context: the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant (McDowell, op. cit., 
note 19, p. 14). As E v a Schaper notes in 'The pleasures of taste", Eva Schaper (ed.), Pleasure, Preference 
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to emerge: tmth as correspondence to reality, and art as unrepresentative of, but 
nonetheless as subject to, tmth as correspondence.^ '* 
Philosophy that treats science as a cultural value - philosophy that aligns itself 
to science as objectivity and tmth - is philosophy that allows itself to be determined by 
science. But to represent a culture of science as tmth just is, irreducibly, an exercise in 
the application of evaluation. The cultural dominance of science in modemity 
notwithstanding, the impossibility of science as an authentic culture is clear: in using its 
characteristic value-freedom to act as the defining value of a culture of science as tmth, 
science undermines itself and is therefore inadequate as the determining factor of 
philosophy. Science negates its own value-freedom and therefore remains a part of 
culture. A convincing argument that supports this claim may be found in an essay by 
Patrick A. Heelan, in which quantum theory is taken as an example of how science 
cannot escape its cultural context.^^ Heelan contends that quantum physics has 
undermined the ontological principle of objectivity, in as far as it means that a 
measurement cannot be made without changing the state of the measured 
phenomenon.^^ However, quantum physics has also undermined the epistemological 
principle of objectivity, in that it has undermined the notion of Newtonian universal 
qualities from which descriptive categories for data and phenomena are supposedly 
derived.'^ ^ Sociologists, anthropologists and historians of science as well as philosophers 
have challenged these principles of objectivity, but all from a common and inadequate 
perspective - inadequate in that it is epistemological in the classic sense - concemed 
and Value: Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), for 
Kant, a pure judgement of taste is characterised by its necessary features, namely that although universal 
validity is claimed for taste judgements, they remain subjective, and require a transcendental deduction 
(pp. 45-46). However, where Williams' Archimedean point of comparison and thereby the judgement of 
the correctness of representations is part of the notion of correctness common to truth and knowledge, a 
Kantian judgement of taste is correct precisely not in the sense of it being correct/true or incorrect/false, 
but in the sense of the judgement being made in accordance with the necessary conditions for it being a 
taste judgement (p. 47). Note here the conceptual distinction between the aesthetic (as subjective 
judgement of taste) and between truth and science (comparative correctness of representation via 
Archimedean point). See also footnote 43. 
Horwich points out that the chief difficulty with correspondence truth is that it must be supplemented 
with accounts of what facts are, and what it is for a proposition to correspond to a fact; as a result, 
verificationist and pragmatist theories of truth have been put forward by philosophers such as Michael 
Dummett and David Papineau respectively (op. cit., note 23, pp. 492-493). However, truth theory is 
consistently reliant, at least in part, on what Horwich counts as a fundamentally mysterious representative 
relation between truth and the world (p. 492). 
Patrick A. Heelan, "An Anti-Epistemological or Ontological Interpretation of the Quantum Theory and 
Theories Like It", Babette E . Babich, Debra B . Bergoffen & Simon V. Glynn (eds.). Continental and 
Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), p. 60. 
Compare this to Nietzsche's claim concerning the fluidity of form and meaning within the individual 
organism: "with each essential stage of growth of the whole, the 'meaning' of the individual organs also 
changes" ( G M 2 , §12). 
Heelan, op. cit. 
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with the relation between the mental or representational presumed known and the 
physical presumed derivable from the representation.^^ As Heelan concludes, it is clear 
that this is a dead end, because epistemological problems are not resolvable without a 
prior ontological analysis.''^ Hence in Heelan's example, the quantum theory needs to be 
given an ontological rather than an epistemological interpretation."*" Heelan therefore 
holds that the quantum theory describes phenomena as revealed through a process of 
empirical inquiry that is socio-historical in character, rather than objective in the 
traditional sense."*' As a resiilt, it becomes possible to question the whole enterprise of 
empirical science as descriptive of phenomena in a cross-cultural sense. 
Arguments like O'Hear's, which rely on the value-freedom of science, are 
caught in a curious position. Though they maintain the supremacy of science as the 
paradigm of cross-cultural judgements, as I have shown, this position is self-defeating. 
Such arguments maintain a dichotomy between tmth and art by distinguishing between 
judgement from within a culture and cross-cultural judgement. But as we have seen, this 
distinction is a false one. Empirical science is not value-free; as such, it cannot 
authentically determine philosophy as representative of a culture of science as tmth, and 
nor can it necessarily continue to claim supremacy over art. With the supremacy of the 
cross-cultural judgement in doubt, the question arises as to how the artwork might 
become increasingly significant to the determination of philosophy. However, what this 
section has not adequately explained is why the artwork was first accorded such a 
secondary role in the history of philosophy. Following Heelan's suggestion for the 
quantum theory, I propose to offer an ontological interpretation of this question. 
Heelan, op. cit., note 35, p. 60. 
^'Ibid. 
By epistemological, Heelan means "relative to the cognitive content" and by ontological, he means 
"relative to the activity of representing the cognitive content" (ibid., p. 55). 
Ibid. 
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1.2: Plato's legacy of dichotomy between art and truth 
The source of the dichotomous approach to the art/truth relation seems not to be a 
modem one, in that the original source of the 'Two Cultures' debate is not in the war of 
words between Snow and Leavis. The history of the dichotomy between art and truth 
owes its greatest debt to Plato's expulsion of the poets from the RepublicA great deal 
of contemporary scholarship in aesthetics has sought to address this dichotomy, as 
reflected in the history of aesthetics from its inception as a formal discipline by 
Baumgarten, through Kant and Hume, to the present.'*^ I shall focus upon the nature of 
Plato's ontological contribution to the formation of the art/truth dichotomy, to which, as 
I will argue, Nietzsche must be shown to have an adequate response. 
One of the most significant recent studies to comment on the dichotomy is J. M . 
Bernstein's The Fate of Art, in which Plato's action towards the poets is characterised in 
terms of a challenge to the authority of Homer.Plato's confrontation with Homer is 
argued ultimately to yield the process of aesthetic alienation, whereby the loss of the 
truth-function of art simultaneously allows for the modem conceptualisation of art as 
aesthetical in nature.*^ On this basis, Bemstein argues that aesthetics as a whole risks 
being understood as a form of inquiry unconcemed by, or disconnected from, concerns 
'^ ^ See especially Plato, Republic, 398a-b, Robin Waterfield (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993). See also Elizabeth Asmis, "Plato on Poetic Creativity", Richard Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Plato, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 338-364. As Asmis notes, the 
expulsion of the poets consists in two related stages: Plato's initial purge of the poets in Books II and II of 
Republic and his explanation of the purge in Book X (p. 347). 
""^  For a history of aesthetics in this vein, see Wolfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics, Andrew Inkpin 
(trans.), (London: Sage Publications, 1997). It is not my intention to provide an exhaustive account of the 
expanse of the history of aesthetics for reasons of space. However, it is important to be aware of how far 
philosophical aesthetics has taken on board the art/truth distinction as a part of its integral methodological 
constitution. The distinction mentioned earlier in footnote 33, between the kind of correctness found in 
Kantian judgements of taste, and in the kind of correctness appropriate to judgements concerning 
nonaesthetic representations, provides a useful example here. Modem aesthetics has approached this as a 
question of the status of aesthetic properties; broadly, approaches to this issue are classifiable as realist, 
where aesthetic properties are real and mind-independent, or as nonrealist (as might apply more closely to 
Hume's account of aesthetic properties, for example). Nick Zangwill explains how Kantian aesthetics 
evades a noncognitive rationale on the following basis, in his recent monograph The Metaphysics of 
Beauty, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2001). While Kant rejects the idea of beauty as a 
property of things, aesthetic pleasure remains integrally connected to the free play of the cognitive 
faculties; in taste judgement, the cognitive faculties are not engaged in acquiring knowledge - "they are 
on holiday, not engaged in their regular business" - but the fact remains that it is the cognitive faculties 
which are engaged (p. 204). 
Bernstein, op. cit., note 3, p. 1. Perhaps Bemstein has in mind the following lines in constructing this 
claim: "all these fine tragedians trace their lineage back to Homer: they're Homer's students and 
disciples, ultimately" (Plato, op. cit., note 42, 595b). Nietzsche would have concurred with Bernstein's 
opposition of Plato and Homer: see GM 3, §25. 
" Bemstein, ibid., pp. 3-7. James Kirwan also supports this view, arguing that the rise of aesthetics is 
almost inseparable from the concept of autonomous aesthetic qualities and values and acknowledging that 
only very recently has it been realised that the one does not necessarily imply the other. Kirwan, Beauty, 
(Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 107. 
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of truth or indeed of morality.'^^ In a more specific sense, the process of aesthetic 
alienation ultimately renders individual works of art absolutely distinct from concerns 
of truth and morality.'^^ For a defence of Nietzsche's connection between truth and art to 
be viable, he must successfully combat Plato's legacy of an art/truth dichotomy to 
philosophy. Before turning to consider the connective approach to the art/truth relation, 
therefore, it seems appropriate to question whether Plato really is responsible for the 
dichotomy, and if so, how and to what extent. We saw above that the function of art is 
distinct from the function of philosophy in terms of a negative definition of art -
namely, that art does not put forward theses, and the artist or poet does not, unlike the 
philosopher, give reasons and justify him/herself. A positive account of Plato's view of 
art and the beautiful, the possibility of which seems counter-intuitive given his 
expulsion of the poets from the Republic, ought therefore to be given further 
consideration. 
Plato's expulsion of the poets, seen by Bernstein as a challenge to Homer, is as 
much a product of the culture of Greek antiquity as O'Hear's view of the scientific ideal 
is a product of the modem Western culture of science as truth. Two related points are of 
interest here. Firstly, Homer and Hesiod were more than poets for the Greeks; theirs 
were sacred books, repositories for the religious tradition of the culture."*^ Poetry did not 
have a purely aesthetic function; poems were religious artefacts, not purely aesthetic 
ones.'*^  There was consequently no difficulty in ascribing poetry a moral character and 
function. Hence on a simple level, moral criticism, or censure, of the poets is not 
unjustified within antiquity.^" But for Plato, religion proper was subordinate to 
philosophy; in Republic he sets out a political system that gives philosophy the pre-
Bernstein, op. cit., note 3, pp. 3-7. Bernstein ultimately affirms that art is indeed the "other" of reason, 
but denies that it is the abstract negation of reason. For him, art is a placeholder for an absent politics; 
absent because of a perception of immutability of reality, which erodes the activity of politics into the 
passivity of aesthetic contemplation (p. 269). 
' I do not claim that works of art as standardly conceived within an alienated aesthetic ought to function 
as epistemological arguments. I do, however, raise the question of what might happen to art when 
removed from the defining context of an alienated aesthetic, in my Conclusion. 
J. G. Warry, Greek Aesthetic Theory, (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 55. See also Eric Havelock, Preface 
to Plato, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), for a discussion of the cultural and educational 
significance of the Greek oral tradition. 
This is not necessarily to claim that the function of poetry is entirely determined by philosophy. Gerald 
L. Bruns provides a helpful distinction between the reception of poetry by literary theory and philosophy, 
based on his reading of Maurice Blanchot's description of the poem as exile. Within literary theory, the 
truth of a poem becomes a function of the strategy used to approach it; poetry thus escapes what Blanchot 
called the "movement of the true" through a procedural resolution, in Kantian vein, of the question of 
truth. Philosophy, on the other hand, tends to adopt a Hegelian position which accepts that poetry once 
determined Blanchot's "movement of the true", but that it has since been displaced by philosophy itself. 




eminence it deserves on the basis of his account of the nature of the human soul and the 
good hfe.^' 
Secondly, where modem philosophy recognises a self-evident relationship 
between works of art and beauty, Plato simply did not hold this relationship to be the 
case.'^  This means that where the dichotomous approach to the art/truth relation has 
traditionally found its source in Plato by virtue of his expulsion of the poets from the 
Republic, the question must be raised as to whether tradition has mistaken the grounds 
of this action. In terms of the art/truth relation, the expulsion of the poets has been 
viewed as an expression of Plato's objection to art on the ground of truth; the poets lie, 
while the philosopher tells the truth, and hence the poets are made surplus to Plato's 
requirements. Now, from a modem perspective in which beauty and art are usually 
linked, this means that Plato is taken as rejecting the aesthetic as a whole on the ground 
of tmth. But this modem reading overlooks the fact that Plato connects truth with 
beauty and morality, as is made clear in Republic by the theory of the Forms which 
stmcture the ontology of an ordered kosmos, of which the form of the Good is the 
highest." 
In this ordered kosmos, phenomenal objects and experiences of such objects 
constitute an inferior world of appearance that is dependent upon the real world of the 
Forms. Plato's rejection of the work of art proceeds quite logically from this position; 
works of art such as poems are mere imitations {mimesis) of the tme perfection of the 
Forms.^ '* As such, representational or mimetic poetry incorporates what for Plato is the 
"terrifying capacity" to deform even good people, or more specifically, their minds.^^ At 
a personal level, the representational poet "establishes a bad system of government in 
people's minds by gratifying their irrational side".^ ^ The work of art is not only a bad 
influence by virtue of its effect on the mind of the observer; it is also a bad influence in 
as far as it fails to represent truth with accuracy: the creations of the poet or painter "fall 
short of tmth".^'' The same reservation, however, is not applied to beauty. Plato 
described the Form of the Beautiful as being itself beautiful, which shows convincingly 
Nehamas, op. cit., note 2, pp. 96-97. 
Warry, op. cit., note 48, p. 53. 
It is "goodness which gives the things we know their truth and makes it possible for people to have 
knowledge" (Plato, op. cit., note 42, 508e). See also Richard Kraut, "Introduction to the study of Plato", 
Richard Kraut (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Plato, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 13. 
Asmis, op. cit., note 42, p. 347. 
Plato, op. cit., note 42, 605a-e. This is so for Plato unless the audience has the antidote: recognition of 




that he did not reject beauty along with art.^ ^ On the infrequent occasions in which Plato 
does comment on the relation of art to beauty, it is frequently to reproach works of art 
with their deficiency in this respect, rather than to make a negative evaluation of 
beauty.^ ^ Plato's acceptance of beauty and his rejection of the work of art, viewed as an 
authentic product of the culture of Greek antiquity, does not constitute the source of the 
art/truth dichotomy.^° It is merely mistaken for the source of the dichotomy by virtue of 
the unity between art and beauty provided from the perspective of modem aesthetics.^' 
However, this is not entirely adequate as an analysis of Plato's role in the history 
of the art/truth relation. As we have seen, it is fair to say that 'blaming' Plato for 
holding a view of art as imitation on the ground that modem artworks are taken as 
creative rather than as directly representational, is anachronistic.^^ The stability of 
Plato's world is guaranteed by the ontological framework of the theory of Forms; they 
guarantee knowledge and truth in the face of the Heraclitan conception of the world as 
being in a state of constant flux.^^ But the theory of Forms does more than merely 
guarantee the harmonious unity of the Platonic kosmos. The universalist approach to 
philosophy that is also guaranteed by the Forms "inaugurates philosophy as most of us 
understand it today".^ "* In the remainder of this section, I shall develop this claim for the 
inauguration of modem philosophy through Plato's ontology of Forms. I shall look first 
at Plato's analysis of works of art such as poetry and painting, and shall then consider 
how this might inform his wider philosophical project. 
Plato holds that there is a distinction between purely imitative {mimetic) 
representation and authentic creation (poiesis). Elizabeth Asmis has argued 
convincingly that Plato's use of the mirror simile in Republic to distinguish between 
poietic and mimetic representation has had an overwhelming influence upon the 
interpretation of his aesthetics, and upon aesthetics generally.^^ The mirror simile refers 
See for example Plato's Phaedo, Hugh Tredennick & Harold Tarrant (trans.), The Last Days of 
Socrates, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), lOOb-e. Zangwill finds Plato's self-sustaining view of beauty 
"bizarre and implausible" on the ground that he does not hold a Platonic metaphysics. However, he 
acknowledges that as Plato's kosmos is consciously dependent upon the metaphysical structure of the 
theory of Forms, the notion of beauty and of the good as self-sustaining concepts is irreducible. Zangwill, 
op. cit., note 43, pp. 205-206. 
Warry, op. cit., note 48, p. 53. 
^ We can concur with Warry that "the obvious prejudice which Plato displays in his attitude towards art 
and poetry has in fact weakened his case against them and exposed him to the attacks and 
misinterpretations of modem critics whose prejudices run as strongly in the opposite direction" (ibid.). 
Kirwan points out that aside from the fact that works of art can be beautiful, there is at best a tenuous 
connection between the two, and thus the continued close association between beauty and art is all the 
more surprising. Kirwan, op. cit., note 45, pp. 107-108. 
"ibid. 
Kirwan, op. cit., note 45, p. 65. 
" Nehamas, op. cit., note 2, p. 97. 
Asmis, op. cit., note 42, p. 352. 
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to Plato's claim that the representative artist is capable of making and creating "all the 
artefacts there are" from plants to gods.^ ^ The classic example of a representative artist 
is the painter, who makes all things by making appearances of them. Plato argues that 
representation by a painter is circumstantially identical to a case in which a person 
acquires a mirror and carries it around everywhere: the painting produced by the 
representational artist is on an identical ontological footing to the reflections of plants, 
or gods, in the mirror.^^ 
The ontological hierarchy at work here is a creative one. Asmis gives the 
example of a bed to illustrate the connection between ontology and creation: one of the 
gods creates the Form of a bed, upon which a human carpenter models the manifold 
beds that he fabricates. The painter then represents one of the carpenter's beds in his 
painting. The carpenter is at one remove from the Form of the bed, and the painter is at 
two removes; hence the painter's mimetic art is at the furthest possible distance from the 
ultimate reality constituted by the Forms. Like painting, mimetic poetry is at the farthest 
distance from the creation of goodness because it is imitative of the world of human 
action. Asmis explains that Plato therefore banishes mimetic poetry on two counts: 
first, poetry copies things from the phenomenal world, and for Plato such representation 
is a perversion of the poet's function; second, the mimetic poet does not even give 
faithful representations of the phenomenal world, but interpretative impressions.^^ But 
we should also note that Plato does not banish all poetry. "Hymns to the gods and 
eulogies of virtuous men" are retained, because they are not indiscriminately mimetic?^ 
The same hierarchy, determined by the evaluative criterion of proximity to the ultimate 
ontology of Forms, is retained by modem philosophy in its incorporation of an alienated 
aesthetic. I shall have more to say on this in section 1.3. 
The same evidence of the distinction between poietic and mimetic representation 
also suggests that Plato's discussion of art in the Republic is, via his ontology of Forms, 
the original source of Richard Rorty's claim that modem philosophy is transfixed by the 
notion of the mind as mirror.^' To retum to my earlier point concerning the 
subordination of religion to philosophy, Plato's wider philosophical project has two 
distinct aims, the competing effects of which linger in the reflective aims and 
^ Plato, op. cit., note 42, 596c. 
" Ibid., 596e. Asmis, op. cit., note 42. 
Asmis, op. cit., p. 350. 
Ibid., p. 352. 
™ Plato, op. cit., 607a. 
Rorty, op. cit., note 24, p. 12. 
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methodology of contemporary philosophy.^^ First, Plato aims, through the production of 
one unified work (a synthesis of his various texts), to show that the "philosophic life" is 
in everyone's best interests; he claims that, as a result, everyone has a good reason for 
following this life as closely as poss ib le .Al l of the significant questions and issues 
produced through philosophical discourse are in themselves subordinate to the aim of 
securing the status of the philosophic life. 
Secondly, however, this universalist approach still requires answers to the 
deeply significant questions surrounding issues of ethics, politics, aesthetics, 
epistemology, education and metaphysics that it yields. '^* The scope and fascination of 
these questions, in Alexander Nehamas' words, "gives them a life of their own"; 
specifically, the breadth and depth of each of the issues raised by Plato has led to the 
impression that the purpose of philosophy is not to give a unified account of the utility 
of the philosophic life, but that it is to consider such issues, and the questions arising 
from them, regardless of their original purpose.^ ^ Contemplation of, and response to, the 
questions given such animation by Plato's original discourse is the predominant activity 
of modem philosophy. The question that stands for modem philosophy is whether or 
not this activity takes place with acknowledgement of the original purpose of the 
philosophic life: contemplation of the good life. 
It is clear that, in the light of my discussion of the reliance of philosophy upon 
science for its self-definition and the simple fact of contemporary philosophy's 
fragmentation into discrete areas of enquiry such as aesthetics, as evinced by 
Bernstein's identification of the process of aesthetic alienation, the idea of the 
philosophic life itself has been overwritten by devotion to the more specific issues 
encountered on the road to the philosophic life. The fact of the analytic/continental 
schism in contemporary philosophy is but another feature of this. Philosophy spawns its 
own questions and attaches fundamental significance to them; it then seeks either to 
treat them as pseudo-problems that may be diffused by analysis, or to find a 
nonphilosophical space in which to consider them.^^ The more precise function of 
Reflective should be read in a dual sense here: first as a literal description of the process of 
philosophical reflection and second as an ironic reference to Rorty's description of philosophy's 
transfiguration by the notion of mind as mirror. 
Nehamas, op. cit., note 2, p. 97. Obviously, if doing a particular thing is in an individual's best 
interests, he/she would be wise to do it. This is part of what Nehamas refers to as the "art of living", 
whereby philosophy is construed (in Aristotle's sense) as the contemplation and clarification of how the 
good life should be lived. 
^^Ibid. 
Nehamas, op. cit., note 2, p. 97. 
Jacques Derrida, Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 108. The contrast with Williams' Archimedean point is obvious. 
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nonphilosophical space is that "philosophy as such can appear to itself as other than 
itself, so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner".^ ^ The 
challenge facing modem philosophy is whether or not it can reconcile itself to finding 
such a nonphilosophical space. This is the crisis in philosophy: as Bernstein argues, 
"philosophical writing must find a way of 'expressing' its non-neutrality, its defence of 
a rationality that its own standard forms of working proscribe".^* 
To conclude this account of Plato's role in the history of the art/truth relation, 
we can see clearly that philosophy as representative of a culture of science as tmth is 
rooted in the fundamental ontology in which the Forms stmcture Plato's kosmos; the 
attitude required for correctness in scientific methodology is, on this reading, a product 
of the Socratic rationality that Plato presents to us as the grounding principle of the aim 
of the philosophic life.^^ On this basis, I think it safe to say that Plato must, after all, 
own some responsibility for the art/tmth dichotomy. Plato is not blameworthy for the 
dichotomy in any direct pejorative sense. What must be emphasised instead is that it is 
Plato's contribution to the foundation of the philosophical culture of science as tmth in 
terms of representation, via his unifying ontology of Forms, that constitutes the extent 
of his responsibility for the dichotomy, rather than the simple fact of his expulsion of 
the poets from the Republic. The next section will therefore consider the effect of Plato 
in establishing the modem relation, which holds the possibility of a connection, between 
science as tmth and a modem aesthetics of alienation. 
" Derrida, op. cit., note 76, p. 108. 
™ Bernstein, op. cit., note 3, p. 11.1 cannot claim to provide an answer to the problem presented by this 
crisis here; however, in my concluding chapter, I will speculate upon the possible consequences of my 
reading of the art/truth connection in Nietzsche for modern philosophy. 
Nehamas, op. cit., note 2, p. 97. Nehamas points out that Plato did come to reappraise Socrates, and to 
rethink the metaphysics and the epistemology that provide the framework for the politics of the Republic. 
However, I doubt that this sufficiently mediates the powerful effect of his ontology upon philosophy (p. 
220-221). 
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1.3: Aesthetics, science and the possibility of connection 
In turning to the possibility of a connective approach to the art/truth relation, the first 
thing to note is that the unity of beauty, tmth and the good that is proposed by the theory 
of Forms leaves Plato in an incongruous position. He must take a certain degree of 
responsibility for the dichotomy between art and tmth, and yet as we have seen, he 
maintains a connective approach to the beauty/tmth relation. Ironically, perhaps the 
best-known example of a connection between beauty and tmth in modernity occurs 
within an individual work of art, namely in the form of Keats' lines from 'Ode On A 
Grecian Um': 
Beauty is truth, truth beauty, - that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.^° 
In fact, following in the wake of Plato's division of beauty from the work of art, we can 
see that most of the evidence available of the connective approach to the art/tmth 
relation is not evidence of a connection between an individual work of art and tmth, but 
between beauty and tmth. This connection has been largely obscured in contemporary 
philosophy because of the close association between art and beauty (and the consequent 
dissociation from tmth) in the concept of the aesthetic. But before considering this in 
depth, we should not overlook the fact that specific works of art have been connected 
with tmth in modernity. The best example of this is the case of socially-engaged 
literature such as that produced by socialist realism in the former Soviet Union, novels 
typical of which were constmcted and evaluated on the basis of their political realism.^' 
But where socialist realism is dependent upon a manufactured truth about the political 
ideology of an enclosed culture, in which works of art have a political tmth-value, the 
situation that exists outside of such an enclosed political/cultural sphere is rather 
different and indeed deeply problematic.*^ 
We have seen that for Plato, beauty is independent of the work of art and is 
connected to tmth and the good through the theory of Forms. In modernity, beauty is 
John Keats, "Ode On A Grecian Urn", Peter Washington (ed.), John Keats: Poems, (London: David 
Campbell Publishers Ltd., 1994), p. 34,11. 49-50. 
" See for example S. Sim, "Marxism and Aesthetics", O. Hanfling (ed.). Philosophical Aesthetics: An 
Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 441-442. Examples of socialist realist literature include 
Maxim Gorky's Mother and Mikhail Sholokhov's And Quiet Flows the Don. Other examples of 
connective works of art might include religious art, such as Russian icon paintings. 
Ibid. One example here is that of early Marxist reflection theory of art, as propounded by Georgi 
Plekhanov, in which works of art were supposed to reflect accurately the political ideology of a given 
society or culture (p. 444). This assigns art a passive role; but the subsequent socialist realism theory of 
A. A. Zhdanov united the didactic role traditionally accorded to art in Marxist aesthetics with the direct 
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both separate from and yet dependent upon the work of art. To reprise Bernstein's 
discussion of aesthetic alienation, one characteristic of the modem view of the art/tmth 
relation is art's alienation from tmth and morality, caused by art's becoming aesthetical 
in nature. It is now possible to see more clearly how and why this operates in relation 
to philosophy as representative of a culture of science as tmth. The individual work of 
art can merely hint at the connection between beauty and tmth, because it has lost its 
tmth-function; i f art "speaks in its own voice" it cannot do so tmthfully and rationally.^'* 
This is reflected in a remark by Plato who, even despite his banishment of the poets, 
leaves "a door ajar" for representational poetry to re-enter the Republic.^^ Plato claims 
that " i f the kinds of poetry and representation which are designed merely to give 
pleasure can come up with a rational argument for their inclusion in a well-governed 
community", he would bring them back from exile.^^ However, as this passage of 
Republic makes clear, the return from exile would depend upon representational art 
making its argument within "lyric verse or whatever", while at the same time not 
compromising Plato's tmth.^^ There is no problem with this for antiquity, in as far as 
Plato himself retains a place for discriminately mimetic poetry within his ideal state, and 
in as far as Plato himself can be regarded as a poetic philosopher.^^ There is, however, a 
problem for modemity. 
This problem occurs because of the relative distance between beauty and tmth in 
modemity. Modem representational art cannot make the rational argument that Plato 
imagines, because art as a whole has lost its tmth-function. Thus where for Plato art can 
be readmitted to the Republic, for modemity, it cannot - it no longer has the ability to 
justify itself. Conversely, i f one were to try to defend art from within the modem 
philosophical space of tmth-only cognition, this would be a direct contradiction of the 
view that art can be more tmthful than such tmth-only cognition.^^ Thus it is for 
Bemstein, elaborating upon Hegel, that "modemity is the site of beauty bereaved -
representation possible through realism, establishing this as an evaluatory criterion of the artwork (p. 
448). 
Bernstein, op. cit., note 3, p. 4. 
Ibid., p. 2. 
or • 
Welsch, op. cit., note 43, p. 50. Warry takes a similar view, arguing that in opposition to Plato's view 
of the work of art as being less than 'true', it is possible to claim that in as far as art may more truly 
express the will of the artist and perhaps his public, art may be more 'true' than truth (op. cit., note 41, p. 
54). 
Plato, op. cit., note 42, 607c. 
" Ibid, 607c-d. 
Welsch, op. cit., p. 50. Welsch draws on Montaigne here, and claims that Plato's characterisations of 
his philosophy as an artistic activity in Republic (see e.g. Plato, op. cit., 50Ic) in addition to his leaving a 
door open for poetry to return from exile, show that Plato "bore in himself the link between poetry and 
philosophy" (p. 50). 
' Bernstein, op. cit.. 
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bereaved of tmth".^° The history of the art/truth dichotomy is thus linked to the notion 
of the death of art, in as far as the increasing distance between the work and tmth 
signifies the end of the work of art.^' But in modemity, beauty is also dependent upon 
the notion of the work of art. Without some possibility of a discrete object which can be 
described as beautiful, beauty cannot exist: for when it is conceived of as a property, 
beauty loses its place in the original Platonic hierarchy of creation.^^ For Plato, beauty 
and tmth can remain linked through the ontology of Forms; thus Platonic antiquity can 
dispense with art. Having dispensed with the ontological framework of the Forms, 
however, modemity must revive the concept of art in order to link beauty and the work 
of art and thereby to provide beauty with a home within being. This problem of the 
death and rebirth of the work of art is seemingly irreducible in modemity. 
Perhaps the most significant possible solution to this aesthetic problem is given 
by Immanuel Kant.'^ I will therefore offer a brief consideration of Kant's view here. In 
addition, I will outline the problem with this view, which is linked to Plato's ontological 
hierarchy of the creative. Bernstein characterises the significance of Kant's view as 
twofold: where on the one hand Kant's third Critique attempts to generate and 
constitute the aesthetic in its modem sense, he claims that on the other hand, Kant uses 
aesthetic judgement in order to locate the underlying unity of reason.^ '* The inception of 
the aesthetic domain to house beauty and the work of art isolates these two items from 
cognition and morality, and in parallel, renders cognition and morality immune to 
aesthetic interference. By virtue of this twofold significance, therefore, it is feasible that 
the unity of Kant's wider project constitutes a degree of retum to the conceptual 
stability characteristic of Plato's link between creativity and ontology. Wolfgang 
Welsch has referred to this in more dynamic terms as an epistemological 
^ Bernstein, op. cit., note 3, pp. 4-5. See also Arthur C. Danto, "The End of Art", in The Philosophical 
Disenfranchisement of Art, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
" Bernstein, op. cit.. 
Zangwill, op. cit., note 43, p. 1. 
Other than that of Nietzsche's aestheticism. See I. Kant, Critique of Judgement, Werner Pluhar (trans.), 
(Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1987), and I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith 
(trans.), (London: Macmillan Press, 1933). For further discussion of the history of Kant's project and its 
relevance to Nietzsche, see Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990). For a more detailed discussion of Nietzsche's response 
to Kant's aesthetics, see Matthew Rampley, Nietzsche, Aesthetics, and Modernity, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 5-6. Bernstein is well aware that a significant number of aestheticians have 
judged Kant to have taken a wrong turn here. However, he thinks that Kant's project is the cornerstone of 
what he calls the aesthetic modernism characteristic of philosophers such as Heidegger and Derrida: 
where aesthetic alienation is both a cause and a symptom of the "dislocations and deformations" 
underlying modernity, Kant's transcendental aesthetic provides insight and the possibility of therapy for 
these (p. 6). For an opposing account, see also Eva Schaper, 'Taste, sublimity and genius: The aesthetics 
of nature and art", Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
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aestheticisation, whereby the aesthetic has "pushed its way into the core of knowledge 
and truth."^^ For Welsch, Kant's transcendental aesthetic demonstrates the 
indispensability of aesthetic stmctures for modem experience, where aesthetic stmctures 
are indispensable because they are constitutive of the objects of this experience.^^ As 
such, Kant's theoretical philosophy shares its basic thesis of knowledge of phenomenal 
appearances with the fundamentalisation of the aesthetic.^ ^ 
The problem with this view is that the unity of Kant's project has been neglected 
as such. The transcendental aesthetic is much more "subjectivist" than a number of 
apologists for Kant's transcendental idealism would allow, having much in common 
with the broad notion of epistemological relativism in modem philosophy.^^ There is a 
synthesis of methodology and interpretation at work in this neglect. One specific 
example is provided by Eva Schaper, who considers the distinction between two 
interpretative approaches to the two parts of the Critique of Judgement (the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement and the Critique of Teleological Judgement)?'^ The distinction 
between these approaches is determined by critical evaluation of the First Introduction 
of the Critique of Judgement. The first approach stresses the unity of the two parts of 
the Critique of Judgement, holding that aesthetic and teleological judgements are united 
in a reasoned progression of thought, and that as such, the Critique of Judgement taken 
as a whole can illuminate the earlier discussion in the Critique of Pure Reason}^ The 
second approach denies that the two parts of the Critique of Judgement are linked, and 
concentrates on the first part, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, in which Kant makes 
his major contributions to aesthetics. Schaper's point is that even if Kant did have 
"other and grander" systematic aims in mind when he wrote the Critique of Judgement, 
these can be "kept in the background and their intelligibility left undecided" while 
issues pertinent to aesthetics are being decided.This constitutes a retum to my earlier 
discussion of the misappropriation of Plato's wider project of the philosophic life, in 
which the animation of the questions surrounding issues raised in the course of that 
project have become dominant to the project itself. The longer that the epistemological 
aestheticisation of knowledge initiated by Kant is neglected in the spirit of such 
misappropriation of the original Platonic project, the more prevalent the consequences 
Welsch, op. cit., note 43, p. 38. 
This view is shared by Charles Parsons, "Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic", Paul Guyer (ed.). The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 62-100. 
" Welsch, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
Parsons, op. cit., p. 90. 




of such neglect will become: the aesthetic nature of cognition remains overlooked by 
the culture of science as tmth of which much of philosophy remains representative. 
Plato's expulsion of the poets from his Republic as a means of securing the 
philosophic life therefore leads to the end of art via the modem process of aesthetic 
alienation and, simultaneously, to the culture of science as tmth for which philosophy 
wishes to stand as representative. The paean that science as tmth offers to the end of art 
is science's attribution of beauty to its own claims concerning the nature of the world. 
The distance between beauty and tmth, as signifier of both the end of art and the 
distance from the ultimate context of the philosophic life, is narrowed by the connection 
of beauty to nature by science. Science sees beauty to be the sign of a successful theory, 
feeling the "beauty of a theory only if the latter is ordered, coherent, harmonious with 
all parts generated naturally from simple principles, and with these parts working 
together to form a unified total stmcture"."^^ This is as much of a functional explanation 
of the relation between tmth and beauty as it is for science and beauty. Akin to the shift 
in emphasis from pure science to culture that we observed in O'Hear's take on the "Two 
Cultures" debate, this explanation holds, and pertains to the influence of Kuhn's notion 
of science not as simply reflecting tmths about nature, but as paradigms - simplified but 
typical examples - the study of which is not confined to the reflective relationship, but 
allows for the illumination of nature as a w h o l e . W i t h a nod to Rorty's image of the 
mind as mirror, we can see that the uptake of the Kuhnian notion of progress in the form 
of a paradigm shift that further illuminates nature may have loosened the grip of the 
reflection model of scientific knowledge, but reflection is maintained in a stronger sense 
by the mirroring of the paradigm as a factor by modem art theory. 
In both cases, the emphasis is, as with O'Hear's account, on methodology, or 
what David Bohm calls "pure stmcture", and resultantly, upon attitudinal perspective.'"^ 
Specifically, the development away from knowledge as reflection of the facts, or as a 
direct representation of nature, and towards scientific theories as paradigms, is mirrored 
by the metaconceptual development of art as non-representational, as seen in works by 
'"^  Kant's account is not without internal problems. Chief amongst these is the retention of the noumenal 
world as a part of Kant's notion of the moral image of the world, against which the fundamentalisation of 
the aesthetic is rendered impotent in ontological terms. Put simply, Kant's 'two world' metaphysics acts 
as a counter to the success of his own aestheticisation of epistemology. This is, as Welsch acknowledges, 
the problem that Nietzsche recognised, and which he more than any other philosopher has been able to 
counter (op. cit., note 43, pp. 20-21). I will note relevant aspects of Nietzsche's response in section 1.4, 
and will offer a more detailed reading of Nietzsche's response to this problem in Chapter 2. 
David Bohm, "On The Relationships Of Science And Art", On Creativity, Lee Nichol (ed.), (London: 
Routledge, 1998), pp. 31-32. 
'"^  Ibid., p. 33. 
Ibid., p. 35. 
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Monet and Cezanne, and which is characteristic of Cub i sm.Even when the notion of 
the mind as mirror is called into question, art and philosophy still take their cues from 
science.Hence in a modem context, where scientific tmth is given its broadest 
possible meaning, scientific tmth and artistic beauty are inseparable by virtue of the 
methodological attitude of objectivity consequently required of both scientists and 
artists. By virtue of this connection, Bohm thinks that artists must leam to appreciate the 
scientific spirit of an unbiased and objective approach to stmcture, where the scientist 
can leam from the artist's sensibility of beauty as an indicator of theoretical 
tmthfulness.'°^ 
To link art and science as tmth in this way is to perpetuate the self-animated 
questions yielded in the course of Plato's argument for the philosophic life, and thereby 
to add to the twin aspects of the cultural dominion of science and the impossibility of 
science as a culture. Science, and the distinctive scientific attitude, subsumes any 
objection that the pure fact of art as nonphilosophical space might afford, even if the 
inability of art to speak the tmth directly were overlooked; and in the perpetuation of the 
objective attitude as a value in itself, philosophy as representative of a culture of science 
as tmth moves further away from its context of philosophy as contemplation of the good 
life. The price paid by modemity for Plato's ideal of the philosophic life was art; but the 
aim of the philosophic life is itself sacrificed by the culture of science as tmth in its 
pursuit of objective answers to the questions raised on the road to that life. In so doing, 
the culture of science as tmth betrays its own genealogy, and thus its impossibility as a 
culture becomes clear. Any culture which loses its roots in this way is, as Nietzsche 
saw, in the grip of nihilism; and it is to Nietzsche's critique of modem culture on the 
ground of nihilism that I will now turn. 
Bohm, op. cit., note 103, p. 35. See also Arthur I. Miller, Einstein, Picasso: Space, Time and the 
Beauty That Causes Havoc, (New York; Perseus, 2001). 
'"^  Thus Babette E . Babich writes that "artists speak of science (Leonardo, Cezanne, van Gogh, Klee, 
Valery) invoking the language of science and scientists speak of art (and beauty) in science's terms." 
Babich,A'C4,p. 21. 
'™ Bohm, op. cit., p. 37. 
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1.4: Nietzsche, nihilism and the art/truth relation 
I need not emphasise that the account presented thus far owes a great deal to 
Nietzsche's thinking on culture. The function of this section is therefore to show 
precisely how Nietzsche understands philosophy's desire to act as representative of a 
culture of science as truth, despite the impossibility of science as a culture, in the 
context of the art/truth relation. The fundamental context within which Nietzsche's view 
is developed is the problem of nihilism that Nietzsche diagnoses, and the genealogical 
therapy that he prescribes to counteract this problem. The first task of this section, 
therefore, is to identify in what way Nietzsche saw nihilism to be a problem of culture. 
In a broad sense, nihilism should be seen as a crisis in values; Nietzsche's 
concem in his critique of culture was broadly with the crisis of values affecting 
European culture at the end of the nineteenth century.Three comments on German 
culture are particularly indicative of this crisis. Nietzsche remarks that, when the 
Germans began to become interesting to other European nations, it was "on account of a 
culture which they now no longer possess, which they have, indeed, with a blind zeal 
shaken off as though it had been an illness" (D, §190). Instead of a proper replacement 
for culture, the Germans tumed to "political and nationalist lunacy" (D, §190). It is one 
thing to tum from one set of cultural values to another (although a question of 
authenticity might well apply in such a case); but Nietzsche's point is that it is quite 
another thing to tum from one set of cultural values to a state of no values at all, or 
rather, to a state in which things that simply cannot ground culture are mistaken for 
values. Switching to the metaphor of music, Nietzsche makes a comparable point in his 
discussion of Richard Wagner's Meistersinger, this kind of music, he claims, best 
expresses what he considers to be tme of the Germans, which is that "they are of the day 
before yesterday and the day after tomorrow - they have as yet no today" {BGE, §240). 
This same point is reflected once again in Nietzsche's discussion of what the Germans 
lack in Tl, in which "constipated, constipating German music" is counted as the third, 
and most recent, narcotic of Europe, following alcohol and Christianity, both of which 
have been abused by the German mind for "practically a millennium" {Tl VI I I , §2). 
The notions of the Germans as lacking a "today", and as dmgged senseless by 
their music, stand as representative of the lack of values within European culture, or 
rather, of the collapse of a formerly-existing value system. Instead of a set of values 
Walter Kaufmann counts the theme of value as the "thread of Ariadne" by which we can be guided 
through the "labyrinth" of Nietzsche's thought. See Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, 
Antichrist, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 121. 
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which grounds a culture and which defines what is tme and what is permitted, nihilism, 
as constmed by a culture in nihihstic crisis, is the notion that nothing is tme and that 
everything is permitted."° Nietzsche gives a lyrical account of the crisis in value in Z, in 
the form of the prophet's speech heard by Zarathustra. This is worth citing in ful l : 
And I saw a great sadness come over mankind. The best grew weary of their 
works. 
A teaching went forth, a belief ran beside it: Everything is empty, everything is 
one, everything is past! 
And from every hill it resounded: Everything is empty, everything is one, 
everything is past! 
We have harvested, it is true: but why did all our fruits turn rotten and brown? 
What fell from the wicked moon last night? 
All our work has been in vain, our wine has become poison, an evil eye has 
scorched our fields and our hearts. 
We have all become dry; and if fire fell upon us we should scatter like ashes -
yes, we have made weary fire itself. 
All our wells have dried up, even the sea has receded. The earth wants to break 
open, but the depths will not devour us! 
Alas, where there is still a sea in which one could drown: thus our lament 
resounds - across shallow swamps. 
Truly, we have grown too weary even to die; now we are still awake and we 
live on - in sepulchres! (Z2 , 'The Prophet'). 
Note that this passage is contextualised in temporal terms by its situation as the words 
of the prophet who sees the future. It thus encapsulates both Nietzsche's fears for the 
future of modem culture and his acknowledgement of the extent to which these fears are 
already present in that culture. The notion of time is of particular significance. In 
analysing the moment, Nietzsche makes reference not only to time in a general sense, 
but also to the connection between time and human existence.'" Specifically, in 
acknowledging the significance of the future and the present tenses of nihilism, it 
becomes necessary to acknowledge the past tense as well; the nihilistic attitude does not 
appear ovemight. The state of having no today is a result of the effect of the past upon 
the individual, who finds him/herself aware of the problem of culture from a position 
within the crisis in values. Nietzsche describes this state as "suffering from culture's 
Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche without masks, (Chicago & London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), p. 2. See also WP, §2, in which Nietzsche claims that nihilism means "That the 
highest values devalue themselves. The aim is lacking: 'why'? finds no answer." 
See Elaine P. Miller's paper "Harnessing Dionysos: Nietzsche on Rhythm, Time, and Restraint", 
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 17, Spring 1999, p. 15. On Nietzsche's philosophy of time, see also Paul S. 
Loeb, 'Time, Power and Superhumanity", Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 21, Spring 2001, and Peter 
Rogers, "Simmel's Mistake: The Eternal Recurrence as a Riddle About the Intelligible Form of Time as a 
Whole", Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 21, Spring 2001. Both papers discuss the theme of time in relation 
to nihilism; the former in specific relation to time in Z, and the latter in relation to the notion of eternal 
recurrence. I shall discuss the importance of time in more detail later, and in subsequent chapters. 
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pasf\ in a particular and significant sense; the sense of inheritance (HA, §249). I shall 
return to this point later. 
Additionally, however, it is worth noting that the effect of the past is also 
evinced by Nietzsche's remarks. This provides an initial connection to the discussion in 
previous sections of this chapter of science's association with art in the light of 
philosophy. As is made clear within the text of TI by the fact that Nietzsche's discussion 
of the "de-intellectualizing" influence of "present-day scientific practice" follows 
directly from his discussion of music as a narcotic that can "dispatch any fine and 
daring agility of the mind", nihilism is a direct product of degeneration of the mind in 
its relation to culture over time (TI 8, §§ 2 & 3). As evidence of this, Nietzsche points 
out that "passion in intellectual matters is going more and more downhill", leading to an 
"arid, undemanding, insipid intellectuality" that is suited only to the "hard life of helotry 
to which the immense range of the sciences nowadays condemns every individual" {TI 
8, §3)."^ Not only the sciences, but also the arts are de-intellectualised; the very notion 
of the life of the mind is reconstituted into sickness and decay from a prior state of 
health."^ Returning to the individual who suffers from culture's past, the sense of 
inheritance (or more properly, of genealogy) at work in Nietzsche's analysis becomes 
clear. Not only does such an individual suffer from "a feeling similar to that of a man 
who has inherited riches that were acquired through illegal means, or a prince who mles 
because of his forefathers' atrocities", namely from the past; such an individual also 
suffers from the future, in that he/she "regards the future with melancholy", knowing 
that his/her "descendants will suffer from the past" in the same way {HA, §249). 
On the basis of genealogy, then, the nihilistic crisis of value in modem European 
culture grounds Nietzsche's response to the question of the art/tmth relation in modem 
philosophy. As much as it is a question of the nature of the relation between art and 
tmth, this is also a question of philosophical methodology in its joint relation to art and 
beauty, and to science and tmth. Nihilism is linked to the cultural relationship between 
art and science as tmth by the degeneration of the life of the mind. Philosophy is 
especially vulnerable to this degeneration, as is consistent with its desire to represent a 
culture of science as tmth. Two things are relevant here: the way in which Nietzsche 
conceives of science in relation to culture, and thence his view of the relationship 
There is also an important point concerning the future of education at work here; for a detailed 
discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy of education and its relation to nihilism, see David E . Cooper, 
Authenticity and Learning, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983). 
Duncan Large notes that "science" is used in place of the German Wissenschafi, a term that includes 
both arts and sciences as academic disciplines. See Large, Twilight of the Idols, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 96. 
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between science as truth and art. M y contention is that the latter of these is determined 
by Nietzsche's therapeutic response to the former. The remaining task of this section is 
to try to clarify Nietzsche's thoughts on these two factors in broad terms. This w i l l 
allow me to move to a conclusion to this chapter in which the precise nature of my 
claim for a connection between truth and art in Nietzsche w i l l be defined, and the 
specific problems with this claim that occupy me in subsequent chapters w i l l be 
identified. I shall return to the context of the Prophet's speech f rom Z, which 
encapsulates much of the interconnections between the themes of art and beauty, 
science and truth, and philosophy. There are two main aspects of Nietzsche's wider 
thought to consider in addition to the collapse of values, which is itself represented in 
the Prophet's speech by the themes of weariness and emptiness. First, the connection 
between the rise of rationality and the collapse of values is represented by the notion of 
the evil eye; second, the psychological need for both rationality and for the nihilistic 
crisis in value is represented by the fact of continued, but sepulchral, l iving." '* I shall 
consider each of these in turn and the reasoning behind Nietzsche's prescription for 
cultural "gene therapy" as a response to the nihilistic crisis in value w i l l be identified 
and explained. 
The Prophet's speech hints at a rational l ink existing between nihilism and 
philosophy in Nietzsche's thought. I mentioned in the previous section that the 
predominance of science has been challenged on the ground of value, in so far as the 
question of the value of science - the problem of science - has been articulated."^ The 
chief responsibility for the problem of science is of course Nietzsche's, and is first made 
clear in the 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' in BT, where it is described as: 
a problem with horns, not necessarily a bull exactly, but at any rate a new problem -
today I should say that it was the problem of science itself - science seen for the first 
time as problematic and as quesdonable (BT, 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', §2). 
Looking at this section of BT, the first significant point to note is that this articulation of 
the problem of science follows directly on f rom a distinction that Nietzsche draws 
between a pessimism of strength, in which the notion of pessimism as inevitably the 
sign of decadence is turned on its head and the possibility of a pessimism in which the 
intellect is seen as irresistibly drawn to what is problematic in existence and the 
This is supported by, for example, the following comment of Nietzsche's from GS: '"Will to truth' -
that might be a concealed will to death" (GS 5, §344). 
Babette E . Babich has taken up the task presented by Nietzsche's problem of science for both science 
itself and for the philosophy of science, in Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the 
Ground of Art and Life, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) (henceforth NFS). 
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"modesty and cheerfulness" of the theoretical man that is encapsulated by the Socratism 
of morality, and which I shall refer to as an optimism of weakness (Br, 'Attempt at a 
Self-Criticism', §1). Nietzsche questions science as being nothing but the fl ight f rom 
pessimism, by which we must understand the pessimism of strength. As he notes, the 
scientific approach is a form of self-defence against the truth; morally speaking, a piece 
of cowardice and falsehood; amorally speaking, a piece of cunning."^ 
The claim that nothing is true and that everything is permitted is therefore linked 
to the notion of limitation or boundary in a methodological sense. In BT, Nietzsche 
gives science as an example of the nihilistic demise of value in relation to methodology; 
"the optimism essential to logic" is shown to collapse in the face of the l imit of science 
(BT, §15). The "evil eye" which scorches fields and hearts in the Z prophecy is first 
encountered in BT in the form of "the great Cyclops eye of Socrates", which Nietzsche 
says would have seen tragedy as something "irrational" (BT, §14). The rationality of 
Socrates is contrasted with a new kind of rationality proposed by Nietzsche in an 
important passage f rom BT: 
the noble, gifted man, even before the mid-course of his life, inevitably reaches that 
peripheral boundary, where he finds himself staring into the ineffable. I f he sees here, to 
his dismay, how logic twists around itself and finally bites itself in the tail, there dawns 
a new form of knowledge, tragic knowledge, which needs art as both protection and 
remedy, i f we are to bear it (BT, § 15)."^ 
The eye of Socrates is symbolic of rationality as understood in the Platonic sense 
discussed in the previous section, namely as philosophy's desire to represent the culture 
of science as truth. The boundary of logic is identified and as such, the value of science 
as truth must be questioned, bringing the problem of nihilism into play in as far as value 
is linked to the culture of science as truth, as we have seen. However, as Babich has 
argued, the connection between nihilism and science in Nietzsche's thought is not quite 
so clear-cut."^ Nietzsche could argue that science is the direct representative of 
nihilism; but to do so would be to overlook the possibility of science as positive, either 
in the narrow sense of its informational potential, or in the wider sense of its 
determination of culture."^ The second, and related, point to note is that "the problem 
This brings into play the perspectival critique of truth in Nietzsche's critique of science. I shall not 
consider perspectivism here, for the sake of completing the wider picture that I have been painting in this 
chapter of the genealogical reasons relating to the methodology of philosophy, which are behind 
Nietzsche's interest in the themes of truth and science in relation to art and beauty. However, I do offer an 
account of perspectivism in Chapter 2. 
I shall consider the notion of tragic knowledge in more detail below. 
Babich, A P^^ , pp. 59-63. 
'"Ibid.,p. 61. 
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of science cannot be recognised within the context of science" {BT, 'Attempt at a Self-
Criticism', §2). The problem of science as it is recognised in the original text of BT is 
presented through the context of art; specifically, this context is that of Greek tragedy. 
Wi th this in mind, we can see how it is possible for Babich to claim that "Nietzsche 
recognises the tragic l imit of critique as such", in as far as she contends that "any 
critical project is irrecusably subject to distortion precisely because an organon, even a 
reflective organon, simply cannot be used on i t s e l f I shall return to the problem of 
critique later; first, however, I want to consider the second aspect of Nietzsche's wider 
thought as promised earlier: the psychological need for rationality, and a cultural need 
for the crisis in values. 
It would be short-sighted, I think, to claim that nihilism is represented by 
sadness in the Prophet's speech. The sadness to which the Prophet refers is the 
consequence of nihilism, rather than the cause. The tone that the Prophet describes as 
resounding f rom the hills is that of emptiness, and it is this to which nihilism 
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corresponds. The universal belief of emptiness as representative of the collapse of 
Western values is symbolic of the emotive emptiness that is evoked by its summative 
claim that nothing is true and that everything is pe rmi t t ed .Nie tzsche is not merely 
opposed to nihilism, construed as a problem for culture; he also acknowledges that 
nihilism is necessary to culture. I shall briefly consider how this view of nihilism as part 
of culture is reflected in Nietzsche's genealogy of values. 
Genealogy as a method, applied to the genesis of morality, reveals how morality 
came into being and how it is sustained.'^'' In BGE, for example, Nietzsche's 
genealogical reading shows that fear, taken as the determinant of the power relations 
within a community and between discrete communities, is the source or "mother" of 
morality in as far as moral values are established in terms of how certain actions w i l l 
affect the well-being of the herd {BGE, §201).'^"* This slave-revolt of morality is 
successful on three counts: the slave, or weak type, is by nature more shrewd. 
Babich, NPS, pp. 1-24. 
™ Though it might seem paradoxical to represent a tone by using the notion of emptiness, this 
representative illogicality adds to the impression that Nietzsche is giving of nihilism in relation to 
philosophy. 
Schutte, op. cit., note 110, p. 2. 
'^ ^ Cooper, op. cit., note 112, p. 93. 
'^ •^  Ibid. Cooper shows that the initial fear held by the community, which provokes it into committing its 
energies to defending its members, yields an initial non-moral judgement in which the warrior type, at the 
forefront of such defence, is classified as good in the sense of noble. However, when the safety of the 
community is ensured, and its collective energies are directed inwards rather than outwards, it is precisely 
this warrior type who poses the greatest threat to the weaker community members. Thus the fear of the 
community changes, and provokes the establishment of a system of rules that work to emasculate the 
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calculating and prudent; the number of such types outweighs the number of strong 
types; and the weak type has erected a convincing set of myths in order to support the 
moral code.'^^ Christianity is one such myth; as we see in GM, Christianity is the final 
expression of the ascetic ideal expressed by slave m o r a l i t y . F e a r of the oppressor by 
the oppressed is the factor at work in what Nietzsche calls the ressentiment of the slave 
type.'^' His critique of morality thus applies this awareness of the significance of power 
to the principles of herd-morality, showing that rather than being reducible to a so-
called 'pure' principle of moral rectitude (namely the concept of goodness), these 
principles are, like their logical opposites, reducible to power. As Nietzsche argues, the 
notion of moral intention as explanatory falls by the wayside when the significance of 
power is recognised: 
there is a world of difference between the reason for something coming into existence in 
the first place and the ultimate use to which it is put, its actual application and 
integration into a system of goals; that anything which exists, once it has somehow 
come into being, can be reinterpreted in the service of new intentions, repossessed, 
repeatedly modified to a new use by a power superior to i t . . . {GM 2, § 12). 
The underlying focus of Nietzsche's discussion here is not morality per se, but 
ontology. In opposition to Plato, whose ontology is founded on the Form of the Good as 
we have seen, Nietzsche's critique of morality is founded upon the basic organic 
processes of "reinterpretation and mastering" of everything in existence ( G M 2, §12).'^* 
The ontological significance of morality is thus displaced by Nietzsche's w i l l to power, 
which is categorically beyond good and evil. '^^ 
In making this move, Nietzsche proves an analogical relation between the "gap 
in every philosophy" that he has identified as the lack of awareness within both ancient 
and modem philosophy of "the extent to which the w i l l to truth . . . requires 
justification" and the domination of philosophy by the ascetic ideal (GM 3, §24). As we 
saw above, the depth and fascination of the philosophical issues raised by Plato's 
strong type. As he argues, "the values codified by the system of rules will be ones like pity, charity, 
humility, meekness, equal rights and turning the other cheek" (ibid.). 
Cooper, op. cit., note 112, p. 93. 
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 190. I give a more detailed 
discussion of the ascetic ideal in relation to suffering in Chapter 3. 
Ibid., p. 194. For an example of Nietzsche's argument that renders the power relation between the 
weak and strong types clear, see D, §189. 
There is an obvious link here to Kant's grounding of his ontology within the notion of morality, to 
which Nietzsche objects. See also Chapter 2. 
For the purpose of providing a simple definition, the will to power may be considered as Nietzsche's 
most fundamental view of being, resulting from his perspectival conclusion that there are only 
interpretations of moral (and other) phenomena: "we need a new, more definite conception of the concept 
'life.' My formula for it is: Life is will to power" {WP, §254). 
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discourse animates those issues independently of the wider project of the philosophic 
l ife as reflection upon the good life.'^° This project was shown to be based upon an 
ontology of Forms, linking truth with beauty and the good: which, as we have seen, 
remains an active force in contemporary philosophy and in modem science. In replacing 
morality with w i l l to power, Nietzsche's genealogical method allows for a clear picture 
of both the past and the possible future of philosophy to be presented. Where the 
domination of the ascetic ideal has posited truth as being, "as God, as the highest 
instance i t s e l f , the notion of truth as a problem has not been permitted (GM 3, §24). 
But " f rom the moment when belief in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied", the 
problem of the value of truth must be posed f rom this moment on (GM 3, §24). In the 
terms of the culture of science as truth, "science itself requires justification" (GM 3, 
§24). 
In taking this stand, Nietzsche's position as one of Richard Rorty's destructive, 
edifying philosophers is made clear; in order for there to be a revaluation of values, 
there must also be a devaluation of such values. Nietzsche himself comments on this in 
a historical sense, as it appears in his wider project in EH, commenting that the 
"affirmative part" of his task having been completed in Z, he turned in BGE to the 
"denying" part: "the revaluation of existing values themselves, the great war" (EH, 
'Beyond Good and E v i l ' , §1). '^ ' But Nietzsche also has a methodological awareness of 
the necessity of destruction, which is linked to his critique of culture; this supports the 
chronology that he describes in EH, in which an Archimedean point of reflection, on 
both philosophy and on culture, is afforded by the acknowledgement of the current age 
as an "interim" (HA, §248). In this interim period, "the old views on life, the old 
cultures are still evident in part, the new ones not yet sure and habitual, and therefore 
lacking in unity and consistency" (HA, §248). To bridge the gap between the old and the 
new is the task of what Nietzsche calls the "Cyclopses of culture": 
the wildest forces break the way, destroying at first, but yet their activity was necessary, 
so that later a gentler civilization might set up its house there. Frightful energies - that 
which is called evil - are the Cyclopean architects and pathmakers of humanity (HA, 
§246). 
The notion of f r ightful energy returns my discussion to the notion of the tragic l imit of 
critique, and also invites speculation as to the identity and the nature of the Cyclopean 
architect of humanity. The image afforded by such a conception of energy is distinct 
The sense of the organic nature of knowledge and thought should be noted here, and will become 
increasingly important. 
See also Kaufmann, op. cit., note 109, pp. 108-110. 
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f rom the general image that one has of the philosopher or of the critic, especially given 
their apparent identities within the culture of science as truth. Nietzsche distinguishes 
between the philosopher and indeed the critic on the ground of the creative, which 
allows for the expression of f r ightful energy in a positive and f ru i t fu l manner; on this 
reading, the authentic philosopher is a part of the future, in which the revaluation of 
values understood as the creation of new values w i l l have been rendered possible.'^^ 
The critic is ordinarily associated by Nietzsche with nihilism; this is so in that the 
narrow sense of critique with which the critic is typically concerned is as much 
determined by science as is modem philosophy in its representative sense.'•'^  In as far as 
critique is limited by its reflexive l imit , recall, the problem of science that Nietzsche 
identifies and which leads to the wider problem of value cannot be recognised on the 
ground of science; it is recognised by Nietzsche on the ground of art.'^ "* The method of 
Nietzsche's recognition invites us to consider the possibility of art as the new 
determining factor of philosophy. Certainly, a link between the authentic philosopher of 
the future and the artist is envisaged. 
However, we should also note another point conceming the contemporary 
methodological limits of both philosophy and critique, that hearkens back to Richard 
Rorty's distinction between the edifying and the systematic philosopher and the 
systematiser's claim that edification is not "proper p h i l o s o p h y " . A s David Cooper 
argues, speaking to the future of education, even i f criticism of disciplines did have to 
be intemal, it would only fol low that the best way to foster critique is by initiation into 
the relevant discipline, i f it was indeed the case that the most significant dimension of 
critique to be fostered was in the terrain occupied by the discipline.'^^ But fol lowing 
Cooper's reading of critique in terms of authenticity, this is not the case; the most 
important thing to foster is "critical openness" in a sense where philosophy as such is 
liberated entirely f rom the notion of discipline.'''^ As in the case of the aesthetic 
alienation of art, in which art becomes subsumed by the aesthetic as a critical discipline, 
the determination of philosophy by science creates the impression of philosophy as a 
discipline. Practice of the discipline is thus regulated by the correspondence of the 
''^ See Babich, NFS, pp. 59-60. See also Kaufmann, op. cit., note 109, p. 109. 
Babich, ibid., p. 60. 
Babich, NCA, pp. 1-24. See also Babich, NPS, in which Babich shows how Nietzsche's identification 
of the problem of science in Sris dependent upon the perspectival reflex of the optic of art and life (p. 2). 
This refers to Nietzsche's claim that his project is "to see science under the lens of the artist, but art 
under the lens of life" (BT, 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', §2). 
Recall that this charge is made with direct reference to the art/truth dichotomy. 
Cooper, op. cit., note 112, p. 63. 
'"Ibid. 
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products of such a discipline to its rules. But as Cooper points out, within a notion of 
disciplines, a "hawk-eye" for the errors of mathematical (or indeed philosophical) 
brethren can coexist with a "total blindness" towards problems about the human 
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condition. The animation of deep questions concerning the philosophical issues first 
raised through Plato's discourse on the way to defending the philosophic life, in 
modernity, yields similarly animated discussion: but only within the confines of 
philosophy understood as a discipline whose product is regulated by certain rules. 
Applying Cooper's argument to my discussion of science as the determinant of 
philosophy, we can see the problem clearly: the product of philosophy has been 
mistaken for its methodology. Hence rules about philosophical output, that are 
determined by philosophy's desire to represent a culture of science as truth, now apply -
quite erroneously - to its methodology.'^^ This mistake speaks to the more general 
consequences, as we saw above, of the de-intellectualisation and loss of passion in 
scholarship, commensurate with the degeneration of the l ife of the mind over time. The 
independent animation of issues arising f rom Plato's discourse is symptomatic of the 
nihilistic crisis in value with which nineteenth-century European culture was faced, and 
which looms ever larger for contemporary culture.''*^ 
In the light of the identification of nihilism as reflected in modem European 
culture as the consistent move towards an optimism of weakness on the Socratic model, 
without the balancing effect of the opposing move towards a pessimism of strength as is 
the case in the tragic model, I shall now turn to a discussion of the therapy that 
Nietzsche prescribes for European culture and philosophy. Nietzsche's response to the 
degeneration of the life of the mind is, first, to argue against the professionalisation of 
philosophy; his remarks in 'Schopenhauer as Educator' attest to the need to remove bad 
philosophers who make philosophy ridiculous, and who are therefore harmful to true, 
innovative thought (UO 3, §8). But, second, he also has a more active therapy to offer, 
the founding principle of which is as follows: 
'^ ^ Cooper, op. cit., note 112, p. 63. 
As Cooper notes, serious intellectual activity may require some general rules, but these verge on, or 
are, the truistic; thus, with irony, and with a nod to the Rortyan systematic philosopher, he suggests "do 
not express rules which practitioners of a discipline must follow on pain of being branded a non-
practitioner" (Ibid., pp. 60-61). 
Schutte makes this point particularly well, claiming that the nihilistic tendencies within European 
culture that Nietzsche identified at the end of the nineteenth century not only remain with us, but have 
accelerated in scope and intensity. Her examples include the capacity of the most powerful political 
authorities in the world to "destroy and exploit human life in unprecedented ways", which is contrasted 
against the depletion of natural resources without regard for the future of either humans or other life-
forms (op. cit., note 110, p. 2). 
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There is only one hope and one guarantee for the future of what is human: it consists in 
preventing the tragic disposition from dying out (UO 4, §4). 
How we understand this project of restoring the tragic disposition is key to a complete 
understanding of Nietzsche's wider project. As I mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, Nietzsche viewed nihilism as congenital to culture, and it is for this reason that 
he prescribes the restoration of the tragic disposition - as a conceptual version of "gene 
therapy", which arises f rom out of his genealogical method.''*' Also congenital to 
culture is, as we have seen, the oscillation between the drive towards an optimism of 
weakness, characterised by the slave-revolt in morality that is driven by fear, and the 
drive towards a pessimism of strength described above. These two impulses balance 
each other, and the tension between them provides culture with its source of value.'"^^ 
But i t would be a mistake to view their relationship as antagonistic in a pure sense. 
Nietzsche invokes the analogy of dance in order to make this point clear: 
Today we should consider it the decisive sign of great culture i f someone possesses the 
strength and flexibility to pursue knowledge purely and rigorously and, at other times, 
to give poetry, religion and metaphysics a handicap, as it were, and appreciate their 
power and beauty. A position of this sort, between two such different claims, is very 
difficult, for science urges the absolute dominion of its method, and i f this is not 
granted, there exists the other danger of a feeble vacillation between different impulses. 
Meanwhile (to open up a view to the solution of this difficulty by means of an analogy, 
at least) one might remember that dancing is not the same thing as staggering wearily 
back and forth between different impulses. High culture will resemble a daring dance, 
thus requiring, as we said, much strength and flexibility (HA, §278). 
The tragic disposition introduces the significance of suffering within Nietzsche's wider 
project, in so far as its proposal as cultural therapy is linked to the notion of generating a 
meaning for one's suffering in life. As Nietzsche understands i t , the tragic disposition 
characterises an individual who can forget the "terrible anxiety" caused by death and 
time by consecrating himself to something "suprapersonal" (UO 4, §4). What Nietzsche 
prescribes is the reinforcement of the counterbalancing effect of the tragic pessimism of 
strength upon the Socratic optimism of weakness, which is increasingly dominant 
Leiter distinguishes between the ordinary sense of genealogy as the history of family pedigree and 
Nietzsche's critical genealogy of morality. Nietzsche's method is concerned to break the chain of value 
transmission by showing how the value or the meaning of the genealogical object is discontinuous over 
time. This is so on two counts, according to Leiter: first, Nietzsche holds that there is no unitary value or 
meaning transferred from point of origin to contemporary object, and second, because there is more than 
one point of origin. Leiter does think that a stable genealogical object (such as morality) is required for 
the method to be successful; but stability does not refer to the meaning or value of the object precisely 
because this transference through meaning is the connection that the method is designed to break. See 
Leiter, op. cit., note 126, pp. 167-168. Once again, note the significance of Nietzsche's perspectivism and 
especially its relation to language: see also Chapter 2. 
This idea of a tension between two drives will become increasingly important in subsequent chapters. 
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within modem culture. The optimism of weakness safeguards the weak individual for 
the sake of self-preservation, while the pessimism of strength is wil l ing to sacrifice the 
strong individual for the sake of celebrating the unmediated power of l ife, whether life 
is individuated or not. The inverse relation between the optimism of weakness and the 
pessimism of strength that provokes the necessary tension to yield cultural values, is 
mediated by Nietzsche's awareness of their roots in the same thing: an interpretative 
ontology of the nature of existence. This interpretative ontology is of course Nietzsche's 
doctrine of the w i l l to power, which he constmcts as a replacement for the Platonic 
ontology of Forms. The sense of the creative at work in the w i l l to power should be 
underlined; this therapy is directly in line with the possibility of art as the replacement 
for science as the determining factor of philosophy.''*^ 
'•'^  As Nietzsche points out, nihilism represents a "pathological transitional stage" where what is 
pathological is the "tremendous generalization" of inferring that there is no meaning at all {WP, §15). 
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1.5: Conclusion 
M y discussion in this chapter has aimed to establish the context of my claim for a 
connection between art and truth in Nietzsche within the history of philosophy. 
Although successful, this contextualisation has raised a number of questions which the 
present chapter has left unresolved. It falls to this concluding section to evaluate the 
significance of these remaining questions. 
As we have seen, the nihilistic crisis in values is rooted in the Platonic hierarchy 
of truth over art, where beauty is distinguished f rom art and linked to truth through the 
ontology of Forms. This ontology, which is established in order to ground Plato's 
fundamental project of the philosophic l ife, is also the foundation for the questions that 
are yielded by Plato's discourse on the way to the philosophic l ife. Reception of, and 
reflection upon, these questions that surround issues defined in terms of ethics, 
aesthetics, politics and metaphysics, has become so animated that the original context of 
the philosophic l ife as an essentially creative representation of being has been displaced. 
Instead, the context of a culture of science as truth has been accepted by the 
philosophical tradition as a replacement for the determining context provided by the 
philosophic life. Hence, where philosophy itself was the determinant of the philosophic 
l i fe in its relation to being, philosophy is now itself determined by science, and 
specifically by the factor of truth. Evidence of this is found in science's claim for 
cultural dominion, made on the grounds of its truth-status and of the beauty of its 
conceptual structure, and is mirrored by the modem process of aesthetic alienation 
within philosophical aesthetics, whereby art is perceived to have lost its tmth-function 
and to have become aesthetical in nature. Philosophy, fol lowing Richard Rorty's 
conception, has become increasingly captivated by the idea of the mind as a mirror; 
because of its determination by science, it therefore judges the mind as mirror in terms 
of the accuracy of its representations.''*^ 
Rorty argues that without this conception of the mind as mirror, the 
philosophical strategy of seeking more accurate representations by "inspecting, 
repairing, and polishing the mirror", common to both Descartes and Kant, would not 
have made s ense .Add i t i ona l l y , in the context of the analytic/Continental schism in 
modem philosophy, he identifies the key role of the later Wittgenstein in deconstmcting 
philosophy's predilection for such captivating pictures, which for Rorty grounds the 
'"^  Rorty, op. cit., note 24, p. 12. 
Ibid. As I noted in section 1.3, there is evidence to suggest that Kant suffers (similarly to Plato) from a 
methodological misappropriation within modern philosophy in which the significance of his 
epistemological aestheticisation is obscured by excessive sympathy for his transcendental analytic. 
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post-positivism of analytic philosophy.'"*^ Thirdly, Rorty notes the requirement for 
Wittgenstein's approach to be tempered by an awareness of the historical source of the 
"mirror-imagery" at work in philosophy; he credits Heidegger with bringing this factor 
into light in terms of the individual, and Dewey with doing the same within the context 
of society.''*^ But though he does mention Nietzsche in the same vein, it is chiefly as a 
progenitor of Heidegger; this does not give sufficient credit to Nietzsche, as I hope my 
discussion of Nietzsche in section 1.4 has indicated.''*^ 
Nietzsche's distinction between the critic and the authentic philosopher is a 
distinction between the learned or knowledgeable man, and the tmly educated man; i t is 
for this reason that, among the insults with which Nietzsche describes the merely 
leamed, is that of "mirror".''*^ The dominion of the idea of knowledge as a reflection of 
the way things are in the world is, as I have argued, a distinctive part of the continuing 
determination of much of modem philosophy by its desire to mirror the culture of 
science as tmth that is the driving force behind such dominion. Where this dominion has 
its source in Plato's ontology of Forms as a justification for his project of the 
philosophic l i fe , and the resulting expulsion of the poets f rom his Republic, so too does 
the crisis of value that constitutes the problem of nihilism for modem European culture. 
Nietzsche's critique of value distinguishes between the forces of an optimism of 
weakness, in which the culture of science as truth is held to be the optimum culture for 
humankind, and of a pessimism of strength that is characterised by the tragic. Since the 
expulsion of the poets, the pessimism of strength has become the victim of the slave-
revolt in morality, of which the optimism of weakness is descriptive. As I have 
suggested, Nietzsche's remedy for the cultural crisis of nihilism which has been 
provoked by the unchecked optimism of weakness is therefore the restoration of the 
tragic disposition. 
In order to be coherent, however, Nietzsche must achieve an appropriate balance 
between his therapy for nihilism, and its grounding ontology of w i l l to power. What is 
meant by balance here is that the restoration of the tragic disposition may be dependent 
upon the w i l l to power, but both it and the doctrine of w i l l to power must take care to 
distinguish themselves f rom any dependence upon the Platonic ontology of Forms. 
Without such a distinction, Nietzsche's philosophical project would ultimately be 
'"'^  Rorty, op. cit., note 24, p. 12. 
Indeed in Dewey's ideal society, as Rorty notes, culture would not be dominated by the objective 
cognition typical of science, but instead by aesthetic enhancement (ibid.). 
'""^  Rorty has amended this neglect of Nietzsche to a significant extent in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
Cooper, op. cit., note 112, p. 30. There is an obvious echo of Rorty's conception of philosophy here. 
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reducible to a reflection of the culture of science as truth, which as I have shown, is 
inadequate as a source of cultural value. In short, Nietzsche's ontology must be distinct 
f rom Plato, or both it and his remedy for nihilism fai l . The Archimedean point of 
reflection - or the paradigm - upon which these two aspects of Nietzsche's thought 
must turn, I propose, is what has been identified as his aestheticism. Briefly, this is the 
view that Nietzsche looks at the world as i f it were a sort of artwork.'^'' More 
specifically, I think that Nietzsche's aestheticist claim f rom BT, that " i t is only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified", is summative 
of the nature of the art/truth connection in Nietzsche (BT, §5). However, having seen 
that science determines philosophy, and that art has ended, it seems incongruous to 
charge Nietzsche with an aestheticist philosophy. The need to defend Nietzsche's 
aestheticist claim is paramount. 
On the basis of this contextualisation, the first point that requires further 
consideration is that of Nietzsche's perspectival critique of truth in its relation to the 
w i l l to power. The notion of sepulchral l iving in the prophet's speech from Z captures 
the essence of the nihilistic crisis of value to which Nietzsche has drawn our attention. 
This crisis is characterised, as we have seen, in a number of ways. First, it is the product 
of the history of nihilism and is descriptive of both the status of crisis in modem culture, 
and of the crisis in philosophy's desire to represent a culture of science as truth. The 
limitations of logic, the problem of science, the crisis in value, the need for destruction: 
all of these pertain to a question that Nietzsche asks, and which I shall echo here: 
Even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians sdll take our 
fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith 
which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine ... But what if 
this should become more and more incredible, i f nothing should prove to be divine any 
more unless it were error, blindness, the lie - i f God himself should prove to be our 
most enduring lie? (GS 5, §344).'^' 
Nietzsche turns away f rom the Platonic, and more latteriy the Christian, faith in truth as 
divine. I have already discussed some of the consequences of this volte face in this 
chapter. However, the question that Nietzsche asks here brings into focus the 
aestheticist connection between his critique of value and his conception of truth. In 
Nietzsche's view, truth as a cultural/scientific value has become more and more 
"° Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 3. 
Hence in Allan Megill's supporting definition, aestheticism is the phenomenon of extending the aesthetic 
to embrace the whole of reality. Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, 
(University of California Press, 1985), p. 2. See Chapter 2 for a more complete definition and discussion. 
See also GiW 3, §24. 
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incredible. Plato's strategic ontology of Forms has become the source of our modem 
conception of tmth as representation of the natural world in the absence of its 
contextualising project of the philosophic l ife. This means that the modem culture of 
science as truth is alienated f rom a clear ontological source of value. As a result of this 
genealogical method, it becomes possible to claim that the restoration of the tragic 
disposition as a therapy for nihilism must be commensurate with Nietzsche's wider 
ontology of the w i l l to power. The problem of science, and the tragic l imit of critique as 
such, have been articulated; however, as we saw, the only possibility for such 
recognition is on the ground of art. This invokes the question of the relation between 
perspectivism as an interpretative theory of tmth, and a creative ontology of w i l l to 
power. 
This leads on to the second point requiring further clarification. On the one 
hand, Nietzsche seems to argue that we need art in order to survive, that art is a 
mechanism of self-preservation. He invokes art as a paradigm in which to recognise the 
problem of science, in as far as this cannot be recognised within the context of science. 
On the other hand, he also seems to think that science as a representative of tmth is 
necessary and important; that we should understand the significance of reading correctly 
and of drawing correct conclusions without falsification through interpretation (A, §52). 
Yet it is diff icul t to identify the notion of a nonphilosophical space in which philosophy 
can reflect upon itself as art, because as we have already seen, while art ended with 
Plato, it is rebom in modernity in order to provide the ontological foundation for the 
property of beauty. What is required is a clearer idea of the nature of the art/truth 
relation, in the form of an ontological relationship between art and beauty, and 
Nietzsche's conception of tmth. In addition to the requirement for a clearer 
understanding of Nietzsche's perspectivism in relation to the w i l l to power, therefore, a 
reading of the w i l l to power in relation to art is also necessary. 
Having contextualised my discussion of the art/tmth relation in Nietzsche in the 
terms of the history of that relation within philosophy, I shall therefore move on to 
address the more specific questions that this contextualisation has raised. In addition to 
the question of the relation between perspectivism and the w i l l to power, as this section 
has shown, the question of the relation between art and the w i l l to power must also be 
addressed. I shall consider each of these in tum in the chapters to fol low, with a view to 
defending Nietzsche's aestheticist claim. 
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Chapter 2: Perspectivism, Aestheticism and the Will to Power^  
The aim of Chapter 1 was to contextualise my general claim for a connection between 
art and tmth in Nietzsche in the light of the history of the art/tmth relation in 
philosophy. In the present chapter, I shall retain an emphasis upon context in both 
historical and in critical terms. Where the previous chapter dealt with contextualisation 
in the broad terms of general philosophical history, the present chapter is concemed 
with the narrower context of the art/truth relation in Nietzsche studies. However, the 
chapter w i l l also develop an approach to the problem raised by my historical discussion 
in the previous chapter. As we saw, this problem may be summarised in the form of a 
question: how can what has been proposed as Nietzsche's aestheticist philosophy be 
considered coherent by modem philosophy? It may help to briefly reconsider the 
genesis of this question. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the impossibility of an authentic culture of science as 
tmth constitutes the source of the nihilistic crisis in value within modem European 
culture. The source of the culture of science as tmth is the ontological genesis of the 
art/tmth dichotomy by Plato. I located Nietzsche's broad philosophical concems within 
the context of the problem of nihilism generated by that dichotomy, and argued that the 
success of Nietzsche's therapy for nihilism is contingent upon his development of a 
supporting ontology for that therapy. This 'new' ontology must be distinct f rom the 
grounding ontology of the culture of science as tmth: Plato's theory of Forms. I f 
Nietzsche's ontology cannot adequately distinguish itself f rom Plato, then as a theory, it 
risks being no more than an unmediated reflection of the culture of science as tmth. It is 
this conceptual mirror-imagery, evoked most strongly by a metaphysics of 
conespondence between proposition and reality, f rom which Nietzsche must be shown 
to liberate himself. As well as having a number of repercussions for specific issues 
within modem philosophy, however, the possibility of such liberation also entails 
certain consequences for philosophy itself. 
Hence, in this chapter I shall explore the consequences of Nietzsche's therapy 
for nihilism both within his thought and with reference to the extemal context of 
modem philosophy. The guiding principle of the chapter is that the restoration of the 
tragic disposition is symptomatic of something that is fundamental to Nietzsche's entire 
' An earlier version of some of the ideas expressed in this chapter has been published in S. R. Bamford, 
"Nietzsche's Aestheticism and the Value of Suffering", Paul Bishop & R. H. Stephenson (eds.), Cultural 
Studies and the Symbolic, (Leeds: Northern Universities Press, 2003 - in press). 
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philosophy: his aestheticism. We have seen that the doubt which may be cast upon the 
coherence of Nietzsche's aestheticism is generated methodologically as well as 
conceptually. As such, my enquiry must consider the critical methodology of 
Nietzsche's wider project in tandem with the claims that Nietzsche makes in the course 
of that project. This means that the following discussion w i l l consist of two main 
aspects. First, an account of Nietzsche's aestheticism w i l l be provided. This w i l l include 
an identification of the chief elements of aestheticism as the interpretative 'artist's 
metaphysics' to which perspectivism and the w i l l to power belong, and an analysis of 
how these elements are unified within the execution of his wider project. Second, some 
consideration of the effect of aestheticism upon philosophical methodology w i l l also be 
offered, with reference to Nietzsche's own appreciation of that effect. M y key claim in 
this chapter is that a 'standard account' of Nietzsche's aestheticism is both possible and 
defensible. 
As Nietzsche himself does not coin the term 'aestheticism', I draw on the 
available critical literature in order to provide a suitable genealogy for this term in 
section 2.1. Two arguments by Allan Megil l and Alexander Nehamas are taken as the 
key progenitors of a possible 'standard account' of aestheticism.^ I discuss how Megil l 
and Nehamas develop the notion of aestheticism with reference to its key constitutive 
elements: Nietzsche's perspectivism and his doctrine of w i l l to power. Although I note 
some differences between their readings, I argue that their accounts are largely 
concordant with respect to the significance of aestheticism within Nietzsche. I discuss 
how this concord enables the identification of the key features of what I propose as a 
standard account of Nietzsche's aestheticism. M y reading therefore constitutes a break 
with the received view of aestheticism, in as far as I stress that Megil l and Nehamas are 
not, as is commonly thought, apologists for a complete account of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism. Rather, their contribution consists in the raising of aestheticism as a 
question for contemporary Nietzsche scholarship: and this question has been neglected 
of late within the available literature. However, as we w i l l see, the concept of 
aestheticism has been problematised on several counts in the few cases where 
aestheticism has been considered as a viable explanation of Nietzsche's wider 
^ Discussion of Nietzsche's aestheticism also appears in James J. Winchester, Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn: 
Reading Nietzsche After Heidegger and Derrida, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 
where it is defined as a general emphasis on aesthetic criteria and a form of "aesthetic understanding" (p. 
124), and in Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart and Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and 
Literature, (London: Routledge, 1993), where the discussion is broadly conceived as a complement to 
Nehamas' 'life as literature' thesis, albeit within the context of a more Megillian sense of the crisis in the 
humanities, and specifically between philosophy and literature (p. 137). 
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philosophy. At the end of this section, I set out an overview of the three main problems 
with these key features with a view to overcoming these difficulties and thereby 
establishing a fu l ly defensible standard account of Nietzsche's aestheticism. 
The rest of the chapter is devoted to consideration of one of the three significant 
problems that I identify with the key features of the proposed standard account. In 
section 2.2,1 consider the metaphysical problem for aestheticism as an intemal problem 
of Nietzsche's philosophy. This refers to Nietzsche's acknowledged confrontation with 
'two world ' metaphysics, and consists in two more specific problems for the 
interpretative aspect of aestheticism. First, the act of positing Nietzsche's distinctive 
ontology invites a problem of reconciliation.^ M y initial concern is to show that 
aestheticism is able to evince a clear and coherent link between perspectivism and the 
w i l l to power, and one that is significant for Nietzsche's therapy for nihilism. Second, 
and more fundamental, is the question of whether Nietzsche's doctrine of w i l l to power 
is in fact metaphysical in nature."* I consider how Nietzsche's claim for an ontology of 
w i l l to power does not constitute an ontological thesis in the tme metaphysical sense, 
thereby avoiding the charge of contradiction. I also suggest that these ontological 
difficulties are not in fact intemal problems of Nietzsche's philosophy, as is often taken 
to be the case, and that no little clarity can be injected into our appreciation of these 
issues by reading them as extemal problems of methodological determination. This 
theme w i l l lead us into the second aspect of the chapter, which concems the question of 
methodology. I consider a distinction made by Nietzsche between two modes of 
philosophy, and suggest that this distinction stands as evidence of Nietzsche's 
anticipation of the metaphysical problem for aestheticism. 
In section 2.3, I examine the broader methodological genesis and consequences 
of the metaphysical problem, which speak to Nietzsche's aestheticist project of restoring 
the tragic disposition. I begin by considering a distinction which Nietzsche draws 
between two distinct modes, or aspects, of philosophy: the metaphysical and the 
historical. I consider that both Megill and Nehamas, and proponents of metaphysical 
objections to aestheticism such as Maudemarie Clark, adopt different sides to the 
methodological dichotomy between metaphysical and historical modes.' I suggest that 
by virtue of his methodological distinction, Nietzsche anticipated the metaphysical 
^ Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation, (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1999), p. 3. 
Ibid., p. 214. For a more detailed formulation of this dilemma, see Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on 
Truth and Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 205-212. 
' In Clark, ibid. 
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objections considered in the previous section, and that as a result of such incorporation, 
his aestheticism remains unscathed. His distinction is also considered in terms of its 
possible consequences for philosophical scholarship. 
In section 2.4, with the metaphysical objection to aestheticism having been 
shown not to apply, my discussion reviews the remaining problems for a defence of 
aestheticism. I suggest that overcoming the problems of ethics and of common 
ontological ground would allow my standard account of Nietzsche's aestheticism to be 
put forward as fully defensible. I briefly outline the approach which I intend to take 
towards each of these problems, thereby setting out the structure of the remaining two 
main chapters of the thesis. 
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2.1: Towards a standard account of Nietzsche's aestheticism 
I shall begin my discussion in this section by giving a brief overview of both Megill's 
and Nehamas' wider arguments, before moving on to a more detailed examination of 
the specific aspects which are important for my own discussion. I show that Megill's 
and Nehamas' accounts of aestheticism share two important factors: first, an 
understanding of the primacy of interpretation to aestheticism; second, a sense of the 
limits of aestheticism. Critically, their accounts do not constitute an apology for 
Nietzsche's aestheticism. Neither Megill nor Nehamas are entirely convinced by the 
prospect of Nietzsche as an aestheticist philosopher, and as I show, both of them stop 
short of a ful l defence of Nietzsche's aestheticism. On the basis of this analysis, I 
provide an overview of the key features of a 'standard account' of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism, and indicate the problems that my proposed defence of this account must 
face. 
Although Alexander Nehamas' account of Nietzsche's aestheticism is by far the 
better-known within Nietzsche studies, Allan Megill was in fact first to use the term in 
specific and distinct application to Nietzsche's thought.^ Therefore it seems only fair to 
begin with an examination of Megill's version of aestheticism. Megill's contribution is 
to develop an extension theory of Nietzsche's aestheticism, which does not refer to a 
particular term coined by Nietzsche.^ Neither does Megill's account of aestheticism 
involve the more common understanding of aestheticism which we know, broadly 
speaking, as enthusiasm for, and interest in, works of art and objects of natural beauty.* 
As Megill notes, such non-Nietzschean aestheticism is generally employed in a manner 
that denotes enclosure within a self-contained realm of aesthetic objects and sensations. 
In so doing, non-Nietzschean aestheticism signifies a separation from the "real world" 
* Megill's paper "Nietzsche as Aestheticist" (henceforth NA in citations) appeared in Philosophy and 
Literature, Vol. 5, No. 2, Fall 1981. The account presented in the paper is developed in Prophets of 
Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) 
(henceforth PE in citations). Alexander Nehamas gives his account of aestheticism in Nietzsche: Life as 
Literature, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) (henceforth LL in citations). 
' Megill, PE, p. 2. Brian Leiter objects to the description of Nietzsche as an aestheticist philosopher on 
this ground in his article "Nietzsche and Aestheticism", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 30:2, April 
1992, p. 276. My exegetical account in Chapters 3 and 4 will contradict Leiter on this point, over and 
above the evidence of the aestheticist claim in BT, §5. 
^ See Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche's kind of philosophy", Bernd Magnus & Kathleen M. Higgins (eds.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 164-166. 
Schacht objects to the description of Nietzsche as aestheticist on this ground, arguing that the artistic-
aesthetic domain provides Nietzsche with only one source from which to draw his models and metaphors, 
and citing the biological sciences as another case in point. Thus for Schacht, little remains of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism beyond the observation that he uses the artistic-aesthetic domain as a resource. However, 
Schacht's analysis fails to realise that the biological sciences are in fact subsumed by aestheticist 
interpretation, as we will see later in this section. See also Philip Pothen, Nietzsche and the Fate of Art, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2002), pp. 7-8. 
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of everyday, practical concerns and objects: this constitutes the alienation of works of 
art from considerations of truth.^ In contrast, Nietzschean aestheticism is applied via 
extension: Megill's central claim is that Nietzschean aestheticism is constituted in the 
deliberate application of aesthetic concerns to nonaesthetic situations and arenas, 
resulting in the expansion of the aesthetic to "embrace the whole of reality"."' Hence the 
extension theory label: in viewing Nietzsche as aestheticist, Megill is claiming that 
"notions generally seen as proper to the aesthetic play in [Nietzsche's] thought as a 
whole"." 
Alexander Nehamas' attempt to reclaim aestheticism from its original and 
somewhat frivolous association with the idea of art for art's sake is widely renowned 
within contemporary Nietzsche studies, and is generally considered to be the leading 
exposition of Nietzsche's aestheticism. Nehamas' styling of aestheticism takes a 
broadly similar view to that of Megill in as far as Nietzsche is argued to "look at the 
world as i f it were a sort of artwork".'^ Though similar in this respect, Nehamas does 
not share Megill's additional concern with the intellectual history of aestheticism, 
preferring to consider aestheticism as an internal product of Nietzsche's thought.'^ The 
key innovation of Nehamas' reading is to specify a particular kind of artwork, the 
literary text, as the kind of work to which Nietzsche analogises the world and being as a 
whole. This results in a 'life as literature' thesis, which is summative of his approach to 
aestheticism: Nietzsche looks at the world, Nehamas thinks, as i f it were a work of 
literature. While Nietzsche takes the literary text as a model on which to base his 
reflection, his resulting output is also literary in nature.''* Hence Nehamas views 
aestheticism as an attempt to turn life into literature, and argues that this is effected by 
Nietzsche in both an ad hominem and in a more strictly conceptual sense. 
Having outhned both Megill's and Nehamas' accounts, I shall now turn to the 
specific areas of their arguments which are significant for my discussion in this chapter. 
As we shall see, both Megill and Nehamas are well aware of the constituent elements of 
Nietzsche's wider philosophy upon which his aestheticism is chiefly dependent: 
Nietzsche's perspectivism, and his doctrine of will to power. The factor of interpretation 
is key to both perspectivism and the will to power, and in both cases is the determinant 
' See J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), for a discussion of the 
phenomenon of aesthetic alienation in modernity. See also Chapter 1. 
Megill, PE, p. 2. 
"ibid., p. 34. 
Nehamas, LL, p. 3. 
PE includes a discussion of Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida as beneficiaries of Nietzsche's aestheticist 
legacy. 
Nehamas, LL, pp- 3-6. 
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of Nietzsche's aestheticism. However before I proceed, some clarification of 
terminology is required. In the following section, I consider perspectivism and the will 
to power in more critical detail; for the moment, however, we shall consider Megill's 
and Nehamas' views on these themes in exegetical terms. Perspectivism should be 
broadly understood as Nietzsche's view that there are no uninterpreted facts or truths.'^ 
A definition of the doctrine of will to power is more complex: any answer to the 
question of what will to power is depends upon the descriptive approach taken.So for 
exegetical purposes at this point in my discussion, the will to power should be 
understood as Nietzsche's distinctive response to the general metaphysical concern with 
the question of the fundamental nature of being.'' 
I shall turn first to the case of Megill, whose extension theory of aestheticism 
focuses on one key factor: interpretation. For Megill's Nietzsche, "all interpretation is 
of the aesthetic sort".'^ Megill distinguishes between aesthetic and nonaesthetic 
interpretation in order to develop this claim. In nonaesthetic interpretation, he argues 
that we approach an ordinary object or "mere thing" with reference to the "utilitarian 
contexts" that dominate most of our lives in modem Western culture.'^ By virtue of 
these dominating utilitarian contexts, we seem to have little freedom of choice about 
how to render an interpretation of an object.^° By contrast, Megill claims, when we 
approach a work of art, we experience a much greater degree of freedom of 
interpretation. The utilitarian context pares away the possibility of additional meaning 
from an object, so that a Brillo box, say, or a passport photograph are merely objects 
related to certain mundane functions such as cleaning or proof of identification. Within 
aesthetic interpretation, however, "we see a richness of meaning" in the work of art; the 
increased sense of freedom is a freedom to choose, from amongst a multiplicity of 
" Alan D. Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction, (New York & London: Routledge, 1990), p. 151. 
" "We would like to ask of Nietzsche: what is meant by the will to power? What is meant by saying that 
life is will to power? What are the powers of life? What does it mean to say that the will to power is the 
basis of all that is? Thus we would put to Nietzsche the familiar form of the philosophical question. It 
asks after the essence of the Will to Power." As Lingis goes on to argue, the philosophical question 'what 
is ... ?' is answered by supplying the essence, telos and meaning of the referent. In asking the question 
'what is ... ?', the philosopher is invoking an underlying hypokeimenon to the world of appearances, and 
consequently is making inevitable the problem of ontology with regard to Nietzsche's critique of 
metaphysics, in respect of Nietzsche's denial of such a hypokeimenon, or indeed the world of appearances 
itself Alphonso Lingis, 'The Will to Power", The New Nietzsche, David B. Allison (ed.), (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1985), p. 37. 
For the purposes of this section 1 shall treat the will to power as an ontological doctrine. However, as 
we will see in the next section there are certain difficulties inherent to considering the will to power as an 
ontology, and to consider it as such requires a dispensation from metaphysical authority. 
Megill, A^ A, p. 215. 
Megill, NA, p. 214 & PE, p. 89. 
°^ Megill, PE, p. 89. 
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possible meanings, the specific meaning that the work of art will have for us. '^ And as 
Megill points out, the freedom of a choice of meaning that is inherent to aesthetic 
interpretation means that when taken as works of art, Brillo boxes or passport 
photographs can have multifarious meanings above and beyond their everyday 
functions.^^ Megill's extension theory thus identifies Nietzsche as aestheticist in as far 
as Nietzsche is taken as applying aesthetic interpretation to the whole of being. 
Nietzsche's universalisation of aesthetic interpretation is identified as the distinguishing 
factor of his aestheticism. 
Megill thereby claims that Nietzsche himself dispenses with the possibility of 
nonaesthetic interpretation, allowing for a full unity between art and truth.Nietzsche, 
argues Megill, "stands as the founder of what became the aesthetic metacritique of 
'truth', wherein 'the work of art,' or 'the text', or 'language' is seen as establishing the 
grounds for truth's possibility".^'^ However, Megill also reads perspectivism as a 
problem of interpretation, arguing that it remains unclear as to how radically 
Nietzsche's perspectivist statements should be rendered.^ ^ He considers Nietzsche to be 
articulating two distinct versions of perspectivism: first, that there is no single correct 
interpretation but rather a variety of correct interpretations; and second, that there is no 
such thing as correct interpretation.^^ This amounts to a dual claim: on the one hand, the 
perspectival Nietzsche is a demystifier "whose aim is to clear away symbols and masks 
and illusions" in order to reach the true reality of things; on the other hand he is a 
27 
"remystifier", who does not believe there is any true reality of things. 
'^ Megill, PE, p. 89, & NA, pp. 214-215. 
Ibid. Megill is making reference to Andy Warhol's Brillo Box. This raises the question of the 
ontological status of the work of art, which has received a great deal of attention within modern 
aesthetics. What art really is - whether or not there really are distinct aesthetic qualities, or there is in fact 
a definable point at which the aesthetic sphere ends and the nonaesthetic begins, are not issues that can 
properly be dealt with in this chapter. Mention of these issues, however, underlines Nietzsche's 
continuing relevance to contemporary aesthetics, and focuses attention upon the ontological significance 
of the aestheticist claim, and its potential impact if shown to be properly coherent and defensible. I shall 
return to consider this point in my Conclusion. 
Recalling my discussion of Kant in the previous chapter, it is important to note Megill's care in 
acknowledging the aestheticist's debt to Kant in PE. On the one hand, Megill locates Nietzsche's 
aestheticism as a full working out of Kant's attempt at epistemological aestheticisation. On the other 
hand, however, he underlines the importance of the Kantian notion of beauty as a symbol of morality as a 
complement to epistemological aestheticisation, reaching back towards the Platonic ontological triptych 
of beauty, truth and the good. Thus for Megill, Kant's is an ambivalent philosophy, paving the way for 
Nietzsche's aestheticism by broaching the possibility of epistemological aestheticisation while 
simultaneously reflecting a distinction between the aesthetic and the nonaesthetic {PE, pp. 12, 264). 
'Epistemological aestheticisation' is of course Wolfgang Welsch's description of this Kantian process. 
See Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics, Andrew Inkpin (trans.), (London: Sage Publications, 1997). 
Megill, PE, p. 33. Megill's wider discussion in PE is concerned to develop a history of aestheticism 
from Nietzsche, through Heidegger and Foucault, to Derrida. 
" Megill, PE, pp. 84-85. 
Megill, yv>i, pp. 204-205. 
" Megill, PE, pp. 84-85. 
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This dual claim notwithstanding, Megill adheres to the view that Nietzsche's 
attention is fixed upon the process of interpretation itself, rather than upon any 
presumed reality to which an interpretation is directed. But this does not amount to a 
conclusion on his part with regard to perspectivism as a problem of interpretation, 
which raises an important point concerning the status of Megill's reading. His account 
is not concerned to face the metaphysical consequences of this dual claim; it is rather an 
historical approach to understanding aestheticism.^^ A sense of Nietzsche's conflict with 
'two world' metaphysics (such as might be propounded by Kant or Descartes) is 
retained but is not developed within his analysis, and this is further reflected in his 
neglect of the ontological side of the metaphysical issues surrounding aestheticism. 
Megill has little to say of the role of will to power in relation to aestheticism, although 
his view of Nietzsche as holding to an aesthetic self-creation of the world is, as we will 
see, not at all incompatible with will to power as ontology. The problem for Megill is 
that he finds no proper explanation of the will to power in Nietzsche; though Megill 
recognises its importance to the deep structure and argument of Z in particular, he 
cannot move past what he sees as the uncertainty of the nature of will to power .This 
uncertainty is also reflected in the dual claim for Nietzsche as both demystifier and 
remystifier, as we saw earlier. The nearest that Megill comes to acknowledging the 
significance of the will to power is in equating it to the notion of self-overcoming.^'' But 
the dismissal of the will to power notwithstanding, Megill does make some important 
points with regard to the notion of self-overcoming and self-creation which it would not 
do for us to overlook. 
For Megill, Nietzsche's whole conception of interpretation is "determined by his 
underlying aesthetic perspective".^' Aestheticism is the sign of Nietzsche's vocation as 
an "artist-philosopher": he looks at the work of art as i f it were a "self-justifying 
recreation of the world", and in parallel, looks at the world in aesthetic terms.^ ^ It is 
therefore significant to him that Nietzsche describes his vocation by recourse to the 
paradigm of music, which is "the most self-contained and abstract of all the arts" by 
virtue of the fact that the "quantum of invention" would outweigh the "quantum of 
Leiter dismisses Megill's discussion of aestheticism almost out of hand on this basis, describing it as 
less relentless and less artful than that of Nehamas (op. cit., note 7, p. 275). 
'^ Megill is unsure of whether or not is it possible to read the doctrine of will to power as ontology; he is 
aware of the incipient debate on this issue (which I shall turn to consider in section 2.2), but finds on the 
basis of the available evidence that no conclusion is possible. 
Megill, P£, p. 61. 
'^ Megill, PE, p. 90. 
Ibid. 
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'pure' representation" even if such representation were possible.Through the adoption 
of the aesthetic context, interpretation is to be understood in a uniquely creative sense 
precisely in the terms of its extension to both self and world. Megill couches the force 
of aestheticist interpretation in terms of the relationship between phenomenal 
experience and the mind's interpretation of such experience. Though he acknowledges a 
normative distinction between interpretation and direct sensory experience, citing the 
example of experiential difference between an interpretation of being hit by a truck and 
actually being hit by a truck, he claims that the aestheticist equation of the two is 
justifiable from an aesthetic perspective.^ "* In terms of Megill's extension theory of 
aestheticism, there is no difference between the interpretation of being hit by a truck and 
'really' being hit by a truck, because both are reducible to interpretation.''^ The aesthetic 
is distinguished by the individual's willing suspension of disbelief: acting as i f the 
events in a novel or a play are real, we render the nonaesthetic world irrelevant by 
entering a state in which "we know and at the same time do not know that the illusion is 
an illusion".^^ The same case applies to the aestheticist conception of the world: we act 
as i f the events are real and suspend our capacity for metaphysical scepticism. By 
extending the paradigm of the aesthetic to cover the whole of reality, Megill's Nietzsche 
establishes a state in which we both know and do not know that the illusion is an 
illusion. He thereby renders the question of the nature of the nonaesthetic world 
irrelevant, not merely for the time it takes to read a novel or watch a play as in the 
purely aesthetic context, but infinitely.^' 
" Ibid. 
Megill, PE, p. 42. 
•'^  Nietzsche's similarity on these points to Spinoza (and conceivably to Berkeley) is worth noting. For a 
discussion of Nietzsche and Spinoza, see for example Yirmiyahu Yovel, "Nietzsche and Spinoza: Amor 
Fati and Amor Dei", in Yirmiyahu Yovel (ed.), Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker, (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1986), pp. 183-203. In the context of will to power, see Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as 
Philosopher, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 96. Danto shows that like the thing in 
itself, the Spinozistic notion of substance is frozen: it is repeatedly exposed to Nietzsche's critical 
accusations of "fiction" and of "invention", and, more interestingly, as a Verdinglichung of grammar, 
where the grammatical subject of our sentences is converted, through the mythopoetic working of the 
primitive mentality of man, into the substance of the world. C f GS, §109. 
Megill, PE, p. 42. 
I mentioned in footnote 28 that Brian Leiter has criticised Megill's lack of relentlessness in his account 
of Nietzsche's aestheticism (op. cit., note 7, p. 275). Though this criticism is not developed further by 
Leiter, I suspect that, on the basis of his extended argument against Nietzsche as aestheticist, that his chief 
concern with Megill's account would be the lack of engagement with the will to power. I suggest in 
response to this that the point on irrelevance is the key to understanding Megill's apparent failure to 
engage more than superficially with the metaphysical concerns raised by aestheticism. It seems harsh to 
criticise Megill for not doing more with this point when he holds that (1) a conclusion is not possible 
anyway, and that (2) Nietzsche himself rendered the question of the nature of the external world 
redundant. However, in as far as my standard account of aestheticism adopts Megill's extension theory, it 
will become necessary to explain the role of will to power in more detail in section 2.2. 
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Having considered Megill's views with respect to Nietzsche's perspectivism and 
his doctrine of will to power, we shall now move on to Nehamas' responses to these 
questions. Nehamas' view of Nietzsche as attempting to turn life into literature is not 
quite the same as Megill's extension-theory reading of Nietzsche's universalisation of 
aesthetic interpretation, though this might seem to be the case at first glance. The 
significant difference is that while Megill does draw on examples of works of art such 
as the novel or Warhol's Brillo Box, his fundamental context is, as we have seen, the 
•JO 
concept of the aesthetic as a whole. By contrast, although Nehamas does acknowledge 
the wider aesthetic context, the more specific 'life as literature' thesis takes 
precedence.^ ^ Al l the same, we should not overlook the fact that Nehamas does give 
some consideration to other artistic models. He uses Alain Resnais' f i lm Mon Oncle 
d'Amerique as a model for Nietzsche's perspectivism, analogising the question of 
perspective provoked by the visual distortion effect produced by the camera in the f i lm 
to Nietzsche's perspectival question in BGE which asks why we value truth over 
untruth.'*" The point on perspectivism is extended by an appeal to Ernst Gombrich's 
account of representation as never 'pure' representation, in as far as even simple 
representation by an artist involves an element of interpretation, whether technical 
(choice of materials) or purely creative (style)."*' But the literary models are more fully 
developed, as is clear in the case of Nehamas' use of Moby-Dick as a model through 
which to read the doctrine of will to power."*^  Additionally, even the non-literary 
examples are strongly visual; there is very little direct engagement with music as a 
model for aestheticism, for example."*^ This is in no small part due to the significance of 
narrative to Nehamas' reading, as we shall see. 
Nehamas' account of Nietzsche's aestheticism is divided into two parts, which I 
shall consider in turn. The first part develops the 'life as literature' thesis by exploring 
Nietzsche's use of the literary text as a model, showing how elements of Nietzsche's 
wider philosophy are developed as a result of his application of the literary model. This 
results in an emphasis upon the notion of the external worid, with Nehamas developing 
•'^  This obviously fits well with his acknowledgement of Kant's epistemological aestheticisation of 
knowledge. 
Like Megill, Nehamas appreciates the Derridean reading of Nietzsche through the emphasis that it 
places upon the text (see especially pp. 92-95). See also Magnus, Stewart & Mileur, who add Harold 
Bloom's voice to the 'life as literature' thesis as a mediation between Derrida and Nietzsche (op. cit., note 
2, p. 133). 
^ Nehamas, LL, pp. 51-52. 
Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
Ibid., pp. 89-92. 
Schacht, op. cit., note 8, p. 165. Here, Schacht rightly points out that music and the plastic arts are key 
for an understanding of aestheticism. 
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much of his characterisation of aestheticism by looking at Nietzsche's metaphysical, 
ontological and epistemological writing and tracing a common aestheticist thread 
between them. Two elements are given particular emphasis with regard to the external 
world: Nietzsche's perspectivism, and as a result of this, his doctrine of will to power. 
As with Megill, the key factor at work is taken to be interpretation. However, Nehamas 
engages much more deeply with the metaphysical issues surrounding these two factors 
than does Megill, and it is worth considering the main points of his engagement in more 
detail. 
Nehamas gives perspectivism as the view that "every view is only one among 
many possible interpretations".'*^ Aestheticism provides part of the motivation for 
perspectivism through the factor of interpretation. Considering the self-refutation 
objection to perspectivism, Nehamas argues that the view that an interpretation is a 
'mere' interpretation is rooted in a view of interpretation as a "second-best mode of 
understanding".'*^ The similarity of this view to aesthetic alienation in modernity is 
obvious. The self-refutation objection is supposedly a version of Epimenides' Liar 
Paradox, which if it were the case, would create serious semantic and logical problems 
for perspectivism. But in response to this, Nehamas claims that perspectivism is not 
troubled by self-refutation on the ground that perspectivism simply does not count as a 
version of the paradox.'*^ His claim is that the self-referential falsity of perspectivism 
does not follow from the view that there are no uninterpreted facts or truths. This is so 
for Nehamas in as far as "the view that all views are interpretations may be false", but 
"this is in itself not an objection to perspectivism" because while it may be false, the 
possibility of falsehood is not the same as an actual falsehood.'*^ Hence Nehamas 
concludes that the general problem with both positive and negative approaches to 
perspectivism is that they are all too eager to equate "possible with actual falsehood", 
and "interpretation with mere interpretation"."** Without these value judgements in 
application, perspectivism is "a refusal to grade people and views along a single scale"; 
hence Nehamas is able to sustain Nietzsche's claim against the exclusive claim of 
science to truth and correctness, and also to deny the claim that there could ever be a 
complete theory or interpretation of anything which would account for "all the facts": as 
Nehamas, LL, p. 1. 




he states, "we must deny the claim that the notion of 'all the facts' is sensible in the first 
place".^' 
This leads on to Nehamas' views on will to power. Nehamas relies on WP to a 
considerable extent in forming his views on the will to power, and his views are distinct 
from Megill's in as far as he does think that the will to power is given expression within 
the texts, even i f it remains "unflinchingly obscure".^" The obscurity is tied to the way 
in which the concept of will as activity is extended into a doctrine of will to power. As 
Nehamas explains, Nietzsche's conception of the activity of willing is nonteleological 
in as far as the activity of willing does not have an aim that is distinct from it.^' If 
willing aims at anything at all, Nehamas thinks, then it is at its own continuation; 
willing is an activity which lends itself to its own perpetuation, and as such is common 
to both organic and inorganic aspects of the world. The will to power is conceived of by 
Nietzsche in terms of force on Nehamas' reading, and as such, necessarily requires 
resistance; therefore Nehamas is able to conclude that everything in the world is, on the 
ground of will to power, connected to everything else.^ ^ This includes the relationship 
between the world and the self, as we shall see. 
With the external aspect of aestheticism in mind, Nehamas uses the second part 
of his account to explore the relationship between Nietzsche's methodology, identified 
as the use of a literary model through which to analyse conceptual input, and the literary 
nature of his philosophical product.^^ Turning from his observation of Nietzsche's 
application of a literary model to consideration of the external world, Nehamas 
therefore explores the internal world of aestheticist self-creation. The product of 
Nietzsche's aestheticism is identified in terms of the internal world, with Nehamas 
linking Nietzsche's authorial style and his insistence on the importance of personal style 
in self-determination and creation.^ "* An internal aestheticist self-creation thus reflects 
Nehamas' claim for interpretative creation of the external world. This explains the 
significance of literature to his reading by incorporating the notion of narrative into his 
view of Nietzsche's aestheticism as interpretation-dependent. Handing the significance 
Nehamas, LL, pp. 64-68. Hence perspectivism is not a relativism for Nehamas; his conception of 
perspectivism is that one's own views are best for oneself without the implication that they are 
necessarily good for anyone else (p. 72). 
Ibid., p. 79. Nehamas acknowledges a paradox of articulation which he shows is recognised by both 
Jacques Derrida and by Arthur Danto, whereby the content of the will to power defeats the form of its 
expression; where the will to power denies objects and essences, these denials are expressed through a 
language which incorporates such possibilities as a part of its own conditions of existence (pp. 92-93). 
''Ibid., p. 79. 
''Ibid. 
Nehamas, LL, p. 6. 
Ibid., pp. 4-6, 171. 
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of narrative on to a discussion of eternal recurrence, Nehamas claims that first, the 
process of self-examination and thence self-creation may have no end, and that 
therefore second, such reinterpretation is an acceptable consequence of aestheticism.'' 
Continual reinterpretation holds for Nehamas if Nietzsche can be shown to model his 
ideal case of this in practice on the conception of the perfect narrative. The perfect 
narrative model would render all events and thoughts relevant to the ongoing story; in a 
perfect narrative: 
no detail is inconsequential, nothing is out of place, capricious, haphazard, or 
accidental. Every 'Why?' has an answer better than 'Why not?' - which is not an 
answer at all.^* 
Within the context of the perfect narrative, the creation and interpretation of literary 
characters and their varying perspectives, viewed as a model for Nietzsche's 
perspectival critique of truth, lends sense to the multiplicity of interpretation which for 
Nehamas is characteristic of both Nietzsche's perspectivism and his doctrine of will to 
power. 
But perhaps the most important point concerning these two readings of 
Nietzsche's aestheticism remains to be observed. It would be wrong to maintain the 
common assumption that Megill and Nehamas are unmediated apologists for 
Nietzsche's aestheticism.'' Megill is certainly clear about his reservations. He admits 
that aestheticism is by no means the only explanation behind Nietzsche's wider 
thought.'^ He concludes that the appropriate attitude towards Nietzsche's aestheticism is 
one of "sympathetic skepticism" in which the therapeutic intent of aestheticist assertions 
of an ontology of fiction is remembered in conjunction with its negative consequences. 
For Megill, these consequences are of serious moral concern; as he writes, " i f one 
adopts, in a cavalier and single-minded fashion, the view that everything is discourse of 
" Nehamas, LL, pp. 163-164. 
Ibid., p. 163. Nehamas gives the example of Marcel Proust's Remembrance of Things Past as an 
example of the perfect narrative. See also Nehamas, "The Eternal Recurrence", John Richardson & Brian 
Leiter (eds.), Nietzsche, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) (originally published in Philosophical 
Review, 89, 1980). 
" Leiter's critique of Nietzsche as aestheticist falls short of acknowledging this point (op. cit., note 7). 
PE, p. 3. See also NA, where Megill emphasises that he does not find a single conclusive doctrine in 
Nietzsche (p. 217). Moreover, in the earlier paper, Megill expresses some doubt as to whether 
aestheticism is the 'best' Nietzsche interpretation available, given that some of the texts appear not to 
support it, and that Nietzsche can perhaps be more convincingly explained as a naturalist (ibid.). Cox does 
in fact provide a full account of Nietzsche as a naturalist (op. cit., note 3). However, Megill qualifies this 
doubt with the assertion that the aestheticist Nietzsche is the "crucially original Nietzsche" (ibid.). 
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text or fiction, the realia are trivialized."^^ Nehamas' account responds to the question 
of whether truth is discovered or created with a final analysis of equivocation, rather 
than refutation, by means of an acknowledgement of interpretation, directly linked to a 
notion of the organic, as the key phenomenon in understanding the art/truth relation in 
Nietzsche.^" Given the available evidence, there simply cannot be an ultimate answer to 
this question of truth, according to Nehamas; what he interprets as an attempt by 
Nietzsche to turn his life into literature presupposes the necessarily equivocal nature of 
any response to this question of truth.^' Thus while Nehamas acknowledges that there is 
some sort of direct, aestheticist connection between art and truth in Nietzsche, he 
concludes that determination of the precise nature of this connection is neither possible 
nor impossible. As such, aestheticism remains an awkward and unlikely description of 
the fundamental way in which Nietzsche's thought works, rather than a proper account 
of it. Nehamas' conclusion is marked by his failure to recognise the Nietzschean unity 
of 'existence and the world' as it appears in Nietzsche's own key formulation of the 
aestheticist claim: "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world 
are eternally justified" {BT, §5).^^ 
Thus even Megill's and Nehamas' accounts of Nietzsche's aestheticism 
conclude that aestheticism is unlikely and impossible to put forward, and that it should 
be regarded with a 'healthy' degree of skepticism. While aspects of Nehamas' account 
in particular have gone on to influence discussion within Nietzsche studies surrounding 
issues such as the status of Nietzsche's perspectivism, his and Megill's uncertain 
attitude also goes a long way towards explaining the relative neglect of aestheticism 
within contemporary Nietzsche studies. Both accounts are characterised by a double-
edged quality: on the one hand, they clearly identify the most original and most 
significant elements of Nietzsche's thought and suggest how these elements constitute 
an aestheticism which describes Nietzsche's broader philosophical attitude; on the other 
Megill takes his example from the Holocaust: for him, an unmediated aestheticism involves that real 
people who died at Auschwitz become so much discourse {PE, p. 345). I shall respond to the ethical 
problem raised by this point in Chapter 3. 
Nehamas, LL. 
" Nehamas, LL, p. 234. 
The fundamental problem with Nehamas' view as Leiter reads it is as follows. In his development of an 
aestheticist interpretation, Nehamas fails "to adduce a single passage from Nietzsche" that testifies to his 
aestheticism. Nehamas claims that Nietzsche's aestheticism informs all of his philosophical work, and he 
claims to show evidence of explicit textual support that backs up this claim. Leiter thinks we should 
expect nothing less: if aestheticism is central to Nietzsche, then "we should expect him to say so -
somewhere" (op. cit., note 7, p. 276). However, Leiter's objections to the passages used by Nehamas 
notwithstanding, it is clear that the aestheticist claim from BT does stand as evidence of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism. Therefore, the defence of aestheticism which I propose to conduct here should also be read 
as an attempt to trace the influence of the aestheticist claim upon Nietzsche's wider thought. 
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hand, however, they hold that this defining attitude would be beset by problems, were it 
even possible to put it forward in a coherent manner. However, I would suggest that in 
terms of this double-edged quality, Megill and Nehamas are proceeding in the shadow 
of an earlier critique belonging to Martin Heidegger.^^ 
Both accounts also acknowledge a basic principle with respect to the possibility 
of putting forward aestheticism. This is the requirement for common ontological ground 
to be found to exist between the work of art and being, which provides Nehamas and 
Megill with a significant part of their rationale for not defending Nietzsche's 
aestheticism and for treating it as equivocal. Equivocation, however, yields a 
profoundly unsatisfying account of the relation between art and truth in Nietzsche. 
Nehamas' reading leaves the question of the relation of art and truth in Nietzsche 
essentially open to question: 
so long as Nietzsche's writing is being read, the question of whether truth is created or 
discovered will continue to receive the essentially equivocal reading presupposed, as I 
have argued here, by his very effort to turn life into literature.^ 
Nehamas' conclusion is couched in the terms of self- and world-creation within the 
context of philosophical enquiry. The question of the art/truth relation is ultimately 
reducible to a question of philosophical method, in as far as what he finds most 
significant about aestheticism is the possibility of infinite readings which it allows.^^ 
But while for Megill the ethical problem seems insuperable, there remains one 
possibility in which skepticism concerning aestheticism could be abandoned: 
There is only one condition under which we would be compelled to adopt Nietzsche's 
position, or any position resembling it, for our own. If it could be shown that there is an 
ontological parallel between the world and the work of art, between the world and the 
'being' of language, then we could inhabit the latter knowing that they correspond to 
See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volumes 1-2, David Farrell Krell (trans. & ed.), (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1991). Heidegger's key innovation is to appreciate the ontological significance of the 
art/truth relation in Nietzsche. However, even while Heidegger appreciates the ontological significance of 
Nietzsche's thought, for him, Nietzsche remains a metaphysical philosopher in as far as Nietzsche's 
perspectival critique of truth is ultimately exposed as a vestigial Platonism (Heidegger, op. cit., note 1). 
The ontological significance does not result in a connection between art and truth; Heidegger claims that 
they remain distinct within Nietzsche's wider philosophical project. It is insufficient simply to dismiss 
this reading as the result of reliance upon the Nachlafi material, as Heidegger's view of the art/truth 
relation in Nietzsche is reflected in his conclusion to the first lecture. However, any sustained 
consideration of his Nietzsche interpretation ought to remain cognisant of Heidegger's prioritisation of 
the Nachlafi. 
" Nehamas, LL, p. 234. 
Although for Nehamas and in his view, for Nietzsche, some interpretations are better than others and 
we can know sometimes that this is the case {LL, p. 3). 
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the former. If it could be shown that the world really is an aesthetic phenomenon, then 
we would have to concede that in his essentials, Nietzsche was right 66 
Having seen that Nietzsche's aestheticism remains incomplete and undefended, the 
groundwork for a defence of aestheticism, including a rationale for such a defence, has 
been laid. 
In the light of these last considerations, we can finally grasp two things: what the 
key features of a standard account of Nietzsche's aestheticism might include, and the 
problems that such an account would have to overcome. In the remainder of this 
section, I shall consider each of these in turn. Megill's idea of the extension of the 
aesthetic to the nonaesthetic would play a key part in the standard account of 
aestheticism. As I showed, Megillian extension involves that the nonaesthetic world 
would become an irrelevance in as far as all experience within being would be reducible 
to interpretation. Coupled with this, Nehamas' claim concerning the nature of output 
would also be important. In rendering the nonaesthetic world irrelevant and in 
expressing this through a literary (aesthetic) medium, Nietzsche's aestheticism already 
raises profound questions for contemporary philosophy and for culture as a whole. 
Reducible to interpretation, the two cultures of art and science would have to 
acknowledge one another, and to begin an authentic dialogue; similarly, the desire of 
philosophy to represent a culture of science as truth would, without its twin idols of 
truth and scientific method, be forced to return to its original project of the philosophic 
life, interpretation of which is, as we have seen, linked to culture. 
What we can take from Megill and Nehamas to form a standard account would 
define Nietzsche's aestheticism as both an attitude and a product. The attitudinal 
component would consist in the interpretative factor of Nietzsche's perspectivism. This 
results from adopting Megillian extension of the aesthetic to the nonaesthetic, reflected 
both in Megill's focus on interpretation, and in Nehamas' more detailed analysis, 
through his literary model, of interpretation as a key element of Nietzsche's perspectival 
critique of truth and his doctrine of will to power. Nehamas' conception of the 
aestheticist outlook as typified by Nietzsche's looking on the world as a work of art is 
clearly parallel to Megill's idea of extension. The product component is given by 
Nehamas, whose literary model allows that the output which is yielded from aestheticist 
input - i.e., what Nietzsche writes as a direct result of taking an aestheticist stance 
towards the world - is also literary. But as we saw above, there are grounds for thinking 
that the 'life as literature' thesis is exclusionary and misleading, in as far as it overlooks 
Nehamas, LL, p. 102. 
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the importance that Nietzsche accords to music.*"' Hence Nehamas' 'literary' model 
/TO 
requires the mediation of Megill's recognition of the significance of music. 
To summarise, the key features of a standard account of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism would hold the following: 
1. Nietzsche extends the aesthetic to encompass the whole of being; 
2. Extension is dependent upon interpretation and is effected both attitudinally 
and productively by Nietzsche in a consistent manner throughout his works; 
3. Aestheticism is thus the key feature of Nietzsche's philosophy. 
But to adopt this standard account and hold it to be defensible requires that certain 
objections must be overcome. I shall consider three issues as the main problems facing 
the standard account. Two of these objections have already been touched upon in the 
preceding discussion. First, the possibility of defending aestheticism depends upon 
finding evidence of common ontological ground between art and being. Finding such 
common ground requires some consideration of Nietzsche's views on art in addition to 
his conception of being. Second, Megill's claim that aestheticism trivialises the realia 
of suffering poses a significant ethical problem for the aestheticist claim. The first two 
objections to aestheticism will be considered in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
However, the third problem arises from the dependence of extension upon the 
factor of interpretation, and is of more immediate concern. As we have seen, the 
standard account of aestheticism incorporates a claim for the primacy of interpretation. 
This is a result of a collusion between Megill's extension theory and Nehamas' analysis 
of perspectivism in his 'life as literature thesis'. Broadly speaking, as all human activity 
is viewed as perspectival and thus interpretative, this involves that all human activity 
falls under the aestheticist category, including the sciences as well as the arts.^ ^ This 
poses a distinct problem for metaphysics, in its guise as the exemplar of modem 
philosophy's desire to act as a representative of a culture of truth. The problem is 
evident on two levels of analysis. First, it poses a straight metaphysical difficulty. 
" Schacht, op. cit., note 8, p. 166. 
Megill, PE, p. 90. 
Schacht's objection to aestheticism on the ground that that the aesthetic is just one of several sources of 
Nietzsche's models and metaphors does not stand up to the standard account (op. cit., p. 166). However, 
we should not overlook Schacht's more positive point on the subject of diverse models: by engaging in 
the use of a range of metaphors from the aesthetic to the scientific, Schacht argues convincingly that 
Nietzsche's intention in the light of his perspectivism, is to "play them off against each other", in order to 
avoid becoming locked into any one metaphor/associated mode of thought (ibid.). This hints at a 
concordance between Schacht's broader Nietzsche interpretation and my implicit claim for continuity. 
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Aestheticism must account for its dependence upon interpretation with recourse to a 
supporting ontology. The ontology of 'two world' metaphysics, historically Platonic as 
we saw in Chapter 1, is clearly insufficient here. However, as we shall see in what 
follows, there is a problem of interaction between perspectivism and the will to power 
as ontology, and a problem in claiming that will to power is an ontological theory. 
Second, a methodological difficulty is evident in the cultural divergence between 
aestheticism as the context for Nietzsche's therapy for nihilism discussed in Chapter 1, 
and between metaphysical issues in philosophy more generally. 
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2.2: Metaphysics as objection to the standard account 
Aestheticism is dependent upon Nietzsche's development of an ontology of will to 
power in which its interpretative, perspectival nature may be grounded. In this section, I 
consider the metaphysical objections to perspectivism and the will to power as 
objections to aestheticism, drawing on a number of recent discussions of Nietzsche's 
metaphysics. As we shall see, Nietzsche's aestheticism stands in an apparently awkward 
relation to traditional 'two world' metaphysical theories, which distinguish between the 
phenomenal appearances of things that are encountered in everyday life, and the 
ultimate reality of things-in-themselves. His perspectival critique of truth stands in 
direct contrast to traditional truth theory by virtue of its emphasis upon the primacy of 
interpretation. This is linked to Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power, which has been 
variously described, with varying degrees of accuracy, within the history of Nietzsche 
studies.^ *^  However, the most important description is of the doctrine as an ontological 
theory. I propose in what follows to accept the will to power as an ontological theory, 
but in a special sense, given the problem that I will show to be raised by the nature of 
ontological classification in itself. I shall begin with a brief exegesis of perspectivism 
and the will to power as key aspects of Nietzsche's metaphysics, contrasting these with 
the more typical definitions of truth theory and ontology in order to clarify why these 
are problematic from a metaphysical perspective. The question of whether Nietzsche's 
doctrine of will to power is authentically intended as an ontological, and thereby 
metaphysical, theory will then be raised, and possible objections to this classification 
will be considered. 
The first point to consider is Nietzsche's perspectivism. We saw earlier that 
perspectivism is acknowledged as Nietzsche's claim that there are no uninterpreted facts 
or truths.^' In applying interpretation to the notion of truth, the first effect of Nietzsche's 
perspectivism is to shift the possible location of truth and knowledge from an absolute, 
to a subjective, or rather a "perspectival", perspective. The most clear exposition of this 
shift in perspective occurs in GM, where Nietzsche styles the "pure will-less, painless, 
timeless knowing subject", and its corollary, the absolute perspective, in the terms of a 
™ These include the justifications of Third Reich politics and of the ethics behind programmes in 
eugenics. See Cox, op. cit., note 3, p. 213. 
'^ Schrift, op. cit., note 15, p. 151. Two passages from WP are illustrative here. Nietzsche's most 
frequently cited formulation of perspectivism from WP is that "Against positivism, which halts at 
phenomena - 'there are only facts' - I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only 
interpretations. We cannot establish any fact 'in itself: perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing" (WP, 
§481) . The significance of interpretation is more clearly defined in the subsequent passage in which 
Nietzsche states that: 'There are no 'facts-in-themselves', for a sense must always be projected into them 
before they can be 'facts'" (WP, §561) . 
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warning against this "dangerous old conceptual fable" (GM 3, §12). Nietzsche's claim is 
that concepts such as pure reason, absolute spirituality and knowledge in itself are 
contradictory, in as far as: 
these always ask us to imagine an eye which is impossible to imagine, an eye which 
supposedly looks out in no particular direction, an eye which supposedly either restrains 
or altogether lacks the active powers of interpretation which first make seeing into seeing 
something - for here, then, a nonsense and non-concept is demanded of the eye (GM 3, 
§12). 
In claiming that concepts such as pure reason are contradictory, Nietzsche is 
acknowledging what he sees as an illusion that has been culturally prominent since 
Plato. The illusion, put simply, is that of truth itself; what perspectivism does is to deny 
the existence of truth, and the world to which such truth is supposed to correspond.^^ By 
contrast, what is generally understood by the term 'truth' is usually anything but 
interpretative. Traditional theories of truth work on a correspondence model, in which 
for example the proposition that snow is white is true by virtue of its correspondence to 
a feature of the external world, namely the whiteness of snow.^ ^ Correspondence truth 
theory is perhaps the most natural and popular account of truth, according to which a 
proposition is true "just in case there exists a fact corresponding to it".^"* 
The distinction between perspectivism and a more traditional understanding of 
truth can therefore be made on two grounds: alienation between truth and interpretation, 
and consequently, truth as representation.^^ Nietzsche's perspectivism therefore sets 
itself against the traditional correspondence model of truth in two ways. First, and 
perhaps obviously, it connects the concept of truth with the concept of interpretation, 
thus changing the received nature of truth from a representative to an interpretative type. 
Ken Gemes' argument that Nietzsche's denials of the existence of truth cannot be dismissed as 
hyperbolic because such denials are made repeatedly throughout Nietzsche's works is worth mentioning 
here, in order to dispel any initial impression of the denial of truth as misconceived. See Ken Gemes, 
"Nietzsche's Critique of Truth", Nietzsche, John Richardson & Brian Leiter (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 40. 
Paul Norwich, "Theories of Truth", A Companion to Metaphysics, Jaegwon K i m & Ernest Sosa (eds.), 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 492. 
Historically, correspondence truth needs to be supplemented with accounts of what facts are, and how 
propositions actually correspond to facts. The best example of this to date is widely acknowledged to be 
conducted by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Horwich, ibid.). 
In a more formal sense, the distinction between truth and interpretation is often made in terms of 
language, as is the case in truth-conditional semantics. Max Kolbel provides a helpful summary of this in 
his recent monograph Truth Without Objectivity, (London: Routledge, 2002). K5lbel explains the idea as 
the meaning of a sentence is its "truth condition", in as far as "the meaning of a sentence can be specified 
by giving the condition under which it would be true" (p. ix). According to Kolbel, truth-conditional 
semantics presupposes that all possible sentences are evaluable as true or false. Hence it faces the 
problem that not all sentences, especially non-objective sentences, are candidates for such evaluation 
(ibid.). 
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What is accepted, and what must be emphasised, is the human factor in all of this: the 
phenomenon of interpretation itselfJ^ Second, in so doing, perspectivism takes a stand 
not only against the correspondence model of truth, but also against the tradition of 'two 
world' metaphysics. In claiming that there are no uninterpreted facts or truths, Nietzsche 
is not simply claiming that facts are interpreted, but is arguing in a deeper sense that 
only the interpretion is 'real' - the fact itself does not exist. This is to differentiate 
between philosophy conducted from a perspective committed to an underlying 
assumption of there being a 'real world' of which statements can be true or false, and 
philosophy conducted from a perspective without such a commitment. In the latter, 
Nietzschean, case the fact does not exist because facts require a commitment to a 'real 
world', the existence of which is also denied. To understand this point, we need to look 
at the doctrine of will to power. 
The doctrine receives its first direct mention in Z, where the voice of the will to 
power is identified as the table of overcomings of the table of values that "hangs over 
every people" (Z 1, 'Of the Thousand and One Goals').''^ Note the distinction that 
Nietzsche holds between contemporaneous and future values, and the significance of the 
will to power for his project of revaluing all values. The notion of value is linked once 
again with will to power in a later section of Z, in which Zarathustra describes the "roots 
of the heart of life" as follows: 
Where I found a living creature, there I found the will to power; and even in the will of 
the servant I found the will to be master. 
The will of the weaker persuades it to serve the stronger; its will wants to be master 
over those weaker still: this delight alone it is unwilling to forgo. 
And as the lesser surrenders to the greater, that it may have delight and power over the 
least of all, so the greatest, too, surrenders and for the sake of power stakes - life (Z 2, 
'Of Self-Overcoming').^^ 
It is for this reason that Reg Holiingdale describes Nietzsche's philosophy as being, at heart, a 
phenomenalism (although he acknowledges that it is arguable whether Nietzsche is entirely classifiable as 
a phenomenalist, owing to the questions that the factor of interpretation raises about the metaphysical 
status of his perspectivism). See R. J . Holiingdale, "Theories and Innovations in Nietzsche", Peter R. 
Sedgwick (ed.), Nietzsche: A Critical Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995), pp. 117-118. 
This initial mention of the doctrine of will to power is noted by Walter Kaufmann in his Nietzsche: 
Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 200. The 
first mention of the will to power in the unpublished works occurs in the notes from the late 1870s (ibid., 
p. 179). Maudemarie Clark notes that the first mention of the will to power in the published works in 
Nietzsche's "own" voice, as distinct from Zarathustra's, occurs in BGE (in §9, in fact; op. cit., note 4, p. 
212). 
For comparable passages from the Nachlafi, see especially WP, §582: "Being - we have no idea of it 
apart from the idea of 'living.' - How can anything dead 'be'?", and WP, §254: "What are our evaluations 
and moral tables really worth? What is the outcome of their rule? For whom? In relation to what? -
Answer: for life. But what is life? Here, we need a new, more definite formulation of the concept 'life'. 
My formula for it is: Life is will to power." The power relation between weaker and stronger types is 
taken up in greater detail in chapter 3. 
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As such, the connection between Nietzsche's genealogy of value and his doctrine of will 
to power is made clear by Zarathustra's genealogical focus upon the "roots" of life. The 
genealogical method that produced Nietzsche's critique of morality also yields the 
doctrine of will to power. Nietzsche is concerned to develop an account of the will to 
power as it relates to human life, and to culture as the common ground between 
individual human beings.^' As he writes, "a living thing desires above all to vent its 
strength - life as such is will to power" (BGE, §13). The will to power incarnate is the 
desire to "grow, expand, draw to itself, gain ascendancy" because "life is will to power" 
{BGE, §259). In addition to the notion of the will to power as life in a distinct, human 
sense, however, we should also consider what Nietzsche has to say of it in a more 
universal sense.^° 
There is some basic textual evidence to support Nietzsche's extension of the 
notion of will to power as descriptive of human life to the broader question of the nature 
of being. Perhaps the most clear example of this is provided in BGE. Taking as the 
"given" of reality the position I have outlined above, in which the will to power is 
summative of the forces at work in being, Nietzsche asks whether it is not permissible 
to "make the experiment and ask the question whether this which is given does not 
suffice for an understanding even of the so-called mechanical (or 'material') world" 
{BGE, §36). The consequences of such an experiment would reveal the nature of being 
to be describable in what sound like monistic terms. The reason for this is that the 
" ' w i l l ' can of course operate only on 'wi l l ' - and not on 'matter' (not on 'nerves' for 
example - ) " {BGE, §36). As will can only operate upon will , Nietzsche surmises that it 
is possible to extend the doctrine of will to power to encompass all interactions of cause 
and effect. This means that the basic unit of reality should be identifiable as will to 
power.^' Hence in addition to human interaction, the claim is that the will to power can 
describe mechanical or inorganic occurrences as well, in as far as "a force is active in 
these"; mechanical occurrences, like human interaction, are "force of wil l , effects of 
™ As we saw in Chapter 1, the creation of Christian mythology as a justification of the codification of 
societal rules into moral laws is a prime example of this. This is particularly evident upon consideration 
of the interpretative aspect of perspectivism in its relation to the will to power. 
John Richardson, "Nietzsche's Power Ontology", Brian Leiter & John Richardson (eds.), Nietzsche, 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 150. Richardson argues that this is to invoke a distinction 
between the will to power as psychobiological as it relates to human being, and as ontological in its 
relation to being as a whole; however, as he also acknowledges, it is dear that Nietzsche extends the 
psychobiological to the ontological. This mirrors the extension of the aesthetic to the nonaesthetic in 
terms of traditional subjectivity. 
'^ This is Walter Kaufmann's view; he writes that it "is certainly true that the will to power is proclaimed 
the one and only basic force of the cosmos" (op. cit., note 77, p. 199). 
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wil l" (BGE, §36).^^ As a result of this extension of his description of human being to all 
of being, Nietzsche appears to make a claim for the will to power as a theory of 
ontology. This is an interpretative ontology because, as we have already seen, human 
being is interpretative. Nietzsche places two conditions upon the claim for the will to 
power as ontology: first, that one succeeds in explaining instinctual life as will to 
power, and second, that one can trace all organic functions back to will to power {BGE, 
§36). With these two conditions fulfilled, Nietzsche claims, one would gain the right to 
define all "efficient force" as will to power (BGE, §36). The first condition is fulfilled, 
in as far as we have seen the genealogical method to yield the will to power as an 
explanation for instinctual life. Nietzsche also seems to have shown the validity of the 
second condition, that all organic functions can be traced back to will to power, by 
arguing that will can only operate on wil l , and that nothing is "'given' as real" except 
for "the reality of our drives" (BGE, §36). 
Nietzsche's frustration with the common faith in the 'real world' is evident in his 
discussion of the problem of the 'real world' for philosophers, which, he argues in 77, 
lies in their identification of the "immoral" senses as deceiving them about the nature of 
this 'real world' (77 m, §1). They believe "to the point of despair, in that which is", he 
argues, but are unable to grasp its essence, and, as a result, convince themselves that 
S I 
some factor must be responsible for withholding access to the 'real world' (TI I I I , §1). 
This idea, that "a thing exists, therefore it is legitimate", is a product of concluding 
functionality from viability and legitimacy from functionality - and Nietzsche charges 
that this is to be guilty of "bad habits in making conclusions" (HA, §30). For him, the 
richness of the interpreted (and thus erroneous) world leads to the entirely "logical 
denial of the world", which can combine either with a "practical affirmation of the 
world" or with its opposite (HA, §31). Both of these possibilities, as Nietzsche realises, 
are dependent upon perspective; and his own reading, as will be shown, is a positive 
one. Removing the possibility of the 'real world' recognises that those characteristics 
previously assigned to that world "are the characteristics of non-being, of nothingness"; 
hence the illusion of the 'real world' is revealed and talk about another world becomes 
nonsensical (TI I I I , §6). '^* 
In terms of his relinquishment of the notion of a real world, therefore, Nietzsche 
See also WP, §675: "All 'purposes', 'aims', 'meaning' are only modes of expression and 
metamorphoses of one will that is inherent in all events: the will to power." 
The reference to despair hints at the advent of nihilism in Western culture. 
On this basis, Nietzsche also points out the futility of talk about the "apparent world", arguing that such 
talk is "only a suggestion of decadence" (TI I I I , §6). 
conceives of the "perspective character of existence" in terms of a new and foundational 
"infinite" {GS, §374). The positive character of this new, interpretative infinite is in its 
connection to the organic, in as far as the human perspective is both embodied and, on 
an individual level, therefore, requisite. Considering the extent of what he calls "the 
perspective character of existence", Nietzsche questions whether existence in fact has 
any character other than the perspectival {GS, §374). On the one hand, he speculates 
whether "existence without interpretation, without 'sense', does not become 
'nonsense'", affirming the inherent lack of meaning to the notion of an uninterpreted or 
'real' world, although it is obvious that Nietzsche can do no more than offer such an 
affirmation since to claim this as truth would contradict the interpretative aspect of 
perspectivism {GS, §374). But on the other hand, the corresponding claim as to 
whether "all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation" is similariy 
bounded, in as far as Nietzsche argues that this claim cannot be decided upon, "even by 
the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination 
of the intellect". The reason for these limitations is the location of interpretation within 
the human perspective: 
for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own 
perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own comer: it is a hopeless 
curiosity that wants to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there might 
be...(G5, §374). 
The sentiment expressed in the above, that "we cannot look around our own comer", is 
reminiscent of an eariier claim from HA, in which Nietzsche argues, rather more 
viscerally, that "we behold all things through the human head and cannot cut off this 
head" {HA, §27). The human perspective is thus defined in terms of the link between 
interpretation and the organic, and this is extended to the notion of an external worid, 
which is irreducible to a perspective other than the human, interpretative one. Thus it is 
for Nietzsche that "perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival 
'knowing' the only kind of 'knowing'" {GM 3, §12). The anthropomorphic error that 
gives rise to the notion of a real, external world, is revealed as an indivisible part of life 
in the second of two senses: the ongoing need for error as a part of the continued 
functioning of the organic interpretative (human) perspective. However, perspectivism 
may be identified not merely as organic, but as ecophysiological, in as far as the 
plausibility of perspectivism is determined not only by the physiological or physical 
This idea of existence without interpretation is particularly significant for the discussion of Nietzsche's 
critique of pity in Chapter 3. 
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constitution of the interpreting perspective, but also by its relative, ecological, position 
in the world or the cosmos.^ ^ This connection between ecology and physiology is 
significant in that it makes clear the context in which the interpretative and the organic 
aspects of perspectivism are developed. Perspectivism is developed "under the lens of 
life", in the terms of Nietzsche's fundamental ontology of the will to power {BT, 
'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', §2). 
The designation of something as a fact integrally involves the imposition of value; 
this reflects once again the move that perspectivism makes from an absolute to a human 
perspective. The idea is that we cannot separate that which is construed as 'fact' from 
interpretation - we cannot subtract the human element from the determination of the 
fact. The chief difficulty for a perspectivist account is an inability to speak of a fact -
what Danto refers to as "i t" - other than from a perspective. Yet precisely what is the 
folly in wanting to establish a fact 'in itself? Schrift believes the physiological (or 
organic) perspective to be the most "pervasive". The implication of this assessment is 
that we cannot divorce evaluative judgements from our various physiological 
perspectives: 
What will mankind have come to know at the end of all their knowledge? - their organs! 
And that perhaps means: the impossibility of knowledge! (D, §483). 
However, these aspects of Nietzsche's metaphysics are not without problems. I shall 
consider three main difficulties with Nietzsche's metaphysical views as these relate to 
his aestheticism: self-contradiction, reconciliation and will to power as ontology. 
Self-contradiction is intended in the sense of self-reference. The problem of self-
reference as it refers to Nietzsche's perspectivism is most clearly summarised by Arthur 
Danto's question as to whether perspectivism entails that perspectivism itself is but a 
perspective, or in other words, whether the truth of the perspectival doctrine entails that 
it is false.^^ This question of the truth of perspectivism speaks directly to its 
interpretative aspect, demanding that Nietzsche's claim that there are only 
interpretations must be considered to be in doubt, i f perspectivism itself is but one 
amongst many such interpretations.*^ For Danto, the self-referential paradox of 
perspectivism is paradigmatic of the inherent difficulty of Nietzsche's writing, a 
difficulty which he ascribes to Nietzsche's troubled relationship with language. 
See Babette E . Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and 
Life, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 84. 
Danto, op. cit., note 35, p. 80. 
Ibid., p. 97. 
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Nietzsche remained dependent on ordinary language as a means of expression, despite 
his acceptance of the inability of this language to fully articulate his ideas without 
distortion.*^ Danto speculates that what he describes as Nietzsche's "frenzied" 
indulgence in poetic diction emerges from his perennial dissatisfaction with ordinary 
language. But as we saw in my earlier discussion of Nehamas, what is important here is 
interpretative attitude rather than metaphysical status; Nehamas' claim that 
perspectivism is "a refusal to grade people and views along a single scale" follows 
Derrida's approach in denying that the language problem is necessarily one which ought 
to be overcome.^" 
The second problem to consider is one of reconciliation.^' On the one hand, the 
will to power (depending on the nature of its description) may be conceived of as a 
normative/metaphysical doctrine that holds to the notion of an absolute conception of 
the world. On the other hand, in line with his genealogical method, Nietzsche's 
perspectivism seems to reject the possibility of an absolute conception of the world. Yet 
these two aspects are strongly linked in Nietzsche's thought, raising the question of 
whether or not they can be reconciled.^^ We saw in Chapter 1 that Nietzsche's 
preoccupation with the question of nihilism in modem European culture led him to 
develop a genealogical approach to the question of value. Nietzsche's genealogy of 
value, taken as a methodological model, has an interesting application for truth theory; 
if moral values are products of fear, as Nietzsche successfully argues, then it becomes 
conceivable that all values, as temporally-transformed codifications of survival-based 
societal regulations, are similar products of fear.^ ^ When an evaluation of the 
interpretative aspect of perspectivism is made with reference to metaphysical criteria, 
the degree of problematisation is determined on the ground of the interpretative aspect. 
Simply, i f perspectivism is determined by its relation to the ontology of will to power, 
then methodologically speaking, perspectivism is determined ontologically and is thus a 
part of metaphysical enquiry, whether or not it is successful. This raises the question of 
whether perspectivism is in fact metaphysically engaged. 
The claim for the will to power as an ontological theory has also been suggested 
to be deeply problematic. This second problem is the question of whether Nietzsche's 
^' See also Magnus, Stewart & Mileur, op. cit., note 2, pp. 133, 270, and Jacques Derrida, Spurs: 
Nietzsche's Styles, Barbara Harlow (trans.), (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979). 
^ Nehamas, LL, p. 93. 
" Cox, op. cit., note 3, p. 3. 
'^Ibid. 
" See David E . Cooper, Authenticity and Learning, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 93. 
Additionally, the genealogical method has an application for the history of philosophy, in as far as it 
allows us to question, as does Nietzsche, the need for the will to truth. 
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doctrine of will to power is in fact metaphysical in nature. I f it were shown conclusively 
to be a metaphysical doctrine, Nietzsche's denial of metaphysics would thereby 
contradict itself. Before the precise nature of the metaphysical problem of will to power 
as ontology can be defined, a distinction between what Nietzsche seems to be proposing 
as an ontology of will to power and a more general notion of ontology within 
philosophical enquiry is required. A broad definition of ontology within philosophy 
may be given as the study of being, where being is shared by possible material and 
immaterial entities.^ "* As such, ontology is closely related to metaphysics, and indeed is 
taken as a branch of metaphysical enquiry in as far as metaphysics is directed at the 
ultimate nature of the world.^^ There is also a second and more specific sense of 
metaphysics as the philosophy of "two world theories" such as Plato or Kant might put 
forward.^^ Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power as presented above repudiates such 
'two world' theories. As a result, it sets itself up in competition with such theories, and 
must therefore be shown to defeat them in order to be seen as convincing.^^ 
In considering this question, we ought not to overlook the point that an 
interpretation cannot be said to be true in the same way that an uninterpreted fact can be 
said to be true. Maudemarie Clark's reading of Nietzsche's metaphysics takes up the 
interpretative aspect of perspectivism in terms of it posing a problem for the possibility 
of metaphysical truth. For Clark, "perspectivism is the claim that all knowledge is 
Barry Smith, "Ontology", A Companion to Metaphysics, Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa (eds.), (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), p. 373. The first thing to note is the difficult distinction to be made between material 
and immaterial substance as this corresponds to the distinction between the metaphysical and the 
empirical. Smith gives the example of the distinction between Aristotle's Physics and his Metaphysics as 
illustrative of this distinction; the former text deals with material entities and the latter deals with what is 
beyond or 'behind' the physical world (ibid.). However, as Smith notes, Aristotle holds that all being as 
such is the subject matter of metaphysics, which thus becomes the first philosophy in that it deals with the 
principles on which all other sciences are founded (ibid.). Note the close connection between science and 
metaphysics, which is held alongside a 'two world' ontology. 
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, Metaphysics Without Truth: On the Importance of Consistency within 
Nietzsche's Philosophy, (MUnchen: Herbert Utz Verlag, 1999), pp. 12, 70. For Sorgner, Nietzsche's is a 
metaphysics without truth, in which the will to power corresponds to the content of being, and 
Nietzsche's theory of the eternal return corresponds to the form of being (ibid.). 
Ibid. As we saw in Chapter 1, Plato's ontology of Forms holds that the perfect Form of a thing (such as 
a chair) constitutes an ultimate level of existence, of which things in the phenomenal world of 
appearances (many chairs) are but imperfect copies. In the case of Kant, this "two world theory" 
corresponds to a phenomenal world of change and action, upon which our experiences are based, and a 
noumenal world of which we cannot have direct knowledge or experience. Hence the will to power as 
ontology contrasts sharply with the dualism of 'two world' ontologies. 
" See Cox, op. cit., note 3, p. 214, and Clark, op. cit., note 4, pp. 204-207. 
There are two reasons to deny that perspectivism is relativistic; first, there are reasons for thinking that 
perspectivism is not metaphysically active as we shall see, and second, the pejorative accounts of 
perspectivism as relativistic rely on an inadequate understanding of relativism as a theory of truth. This 
latter can be countered by recourse to Max Kolbel's recent defence of metaphysical relativism. Kolbel 
argues persuasively in defence of a relativist theory of truth, claiming that the notion of truth involved in 
semantics ought to be construed as relative to perspectives, and showing that the typical objections to 
relativistic truth cannot be made to stick, as they are either misconceived or inappropriate (op. cit., note 
75). 
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perspectival", which entails that human knowledge "distorts or falsifies" reality.^^ Clark 
reads Nietzsche as rejecting the metaphysical correspondence theory in as far as this can 
be loosely applied to his remarks on metaphysics in order to reflect what Clark thinks is 
not a theory in any strong sense.""' Thus Clark shows that Nietzsche rejects the 
possibility of an absolute conception of the world on the ground of his perspectivism.'"' 
This involves a separation of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics and his denial of truth: 
for Clark, although Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysics is successful, he nevertheless 
"ultimately affirms the existence of truths" and thus does not undermine himself when 
he claims truth for his own posi t ions.This view is supported by Peter Poellner, who 
argues that the real problem with Nietzsche's perspectivism is in fact the inconsistency 
between his claim that there is no truth, and his additional claim that true statements 
about human beliefs, desires and intentions can be made.'°^ 
If we consider the following example, the claim for distinction between the 
critique of metaphysics and the ultimate retention of truth seems feasible: 
the more feelings about a matter which we allow to come to expression, the more eyes, 
different eyes through which we are able to view this same matter, the more complete 
our 'concepdon' of it, our 'objecdvity', will be (GM 3, §12). 
But does this kind of example constitute evidence of such a distinction? More 
specifically, does Nietzsche really believe that what he says is 'true' even while he 
rejects metaphysical truth? Comparing Clark's definidon of perspecdvism as the view 
that all knowledge is perspectival with Schrift's formulation of perspectivism 
mentioned earlier, that there are no uninterpreted facts or truths, the displacement of 
interpretation by knowledge as the significant factor for the metaphysical approach is 
immediately evident.'°'* A recent monograph by Christoph Cox allows for a solution to 
this problem, by arguing for the identificadon of both perspectivism and the will to 
power in terms of interpretation."'^ I f both are fundamentally interpretative, as Cox 
^ Clark, op. cit., note 4, p. 127. 
Clark agrees that Nietzsche rejects idealism, and that as such he cannot move from a correspondence 
to a coherence model of truth (ibid., p. 40). 
For an attempt at rejecting perspectivism through a defence of absolute representations, see A. W. 
Moore, Points of View, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 103-107. Moore rejects the self-reference 
charge, but claims that as absolute representations are possible on the ground that they represent the 
external world as it is "anyway" (i.e.: regardless of interpretation), perspectivism is inadequate in 
comparison. 
Clark, op. cit., p. 21. Cf. Babette E . Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on 
the Ground of Art and Life, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 79-80. 
'"^  See Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 294. 
'"••Schrift, op. cit., note 15. 
Cox, op. cit., note 3, especially pp. 241-245. 
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shows, then it seems obvious that the problems of reconciliation and of metaphysical 
engagement do not apply. First, the reconciliation problem is solved by rendering 
perspectivism and will to power ontologically identical via interpretation. Second, the 
identification of will to power as interpretation enables Nietzsche to put the doctrine 
forward as a reactive ontological theory to metaphysical questions concerning the nature 
of reality, while not making any strong claims about the precise nature of reality. As 
Cox shows, will to power is not a matter of fact, but of war; Nietzsche's interpretation is 
victorious, but does not signify peace because of the imminent possibility of a 
competing interpretation.'"^ As such, will to power is only a "move in the game", the 
rules of which are grammatical."'^ 
Perspectivism is interpretatively connected to the will to power through language. 
Language is chiefly symbolic of both interpretative and organic aspects of 
perspectivism understood as developed "through the lens of life", and therefore as an 
"artist's metaphysics" (BT, 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism, §2). Appreciation of the role of 
language in Nietzsche's development of perspectivism is both to understand how 
perspectivism operates as a part of the ontology of will to power, and to recognise that 
this operating method is in essence creative. The ephemeral notion of life, or of being, is 
captured by Nietzsche's interpretative ontology of will to power. This point is defended 
by Jean Granier, who claims that for Nietzsche thought is never "external to Being"; 
rather, "thought participates in Being" in that while it is integrated with reality, thought 
is not the cause, the principle or the measure of reality."'* The means of participation is 
language. 
Nietzsche's genealogy of language consists in two aspects: an analysis of the 
formation of concepts over time, and a reinterpretation of this analysis in the terms of 
faith. Returning to the theme of the 'real' versus the 'apparent' world, Nietzsche 
contends that the importance of language to culture lies in the fact that through it, man 
juxtaposes a "world of his own" to the "one world" of phenomena (HA, §11). On the 
one hand, Nietzsche is making a claim for the active and ongoing humanisation of the 
world from an organic perspective via interpretation. Evidence of this is provided by the 
phenomenon of language. On the other hand, however, he is recognising that the 
persistence of the notion that there really are 'things in themselves' arises precisely 
from this juxtaposition of the phenomenal and the linguistic worlds. Here, too, the claim 
'•"^  Ibid., p. 245. 
""Ibid. 
See Granier, 'Terspectivism and Interpretation", David B . Allison (ed.). The New Nietzsche, 
(Cambridge, MA: M I T Press, 1985), pp. 190. 
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is put forward on the basis of language. What Nietzsche is describing is the first aspect 
of the link between perspectivism and the will to power. 
Nietzsche's historical, or genealogical, analysis of truth yields the history of an 
error. The world of language was thought so secure that man believed himself able to 
"move the rest of the world from its foundations and make himself lord over i t" {HA, 
§11). This is to say that man's belief in knowledge of the world rests to a significant 
extent upon his development of language: 
The shaper of language was not so modest as to think that he was only giving things 
labels; rather, he imagined that he was expressing the highest knowledge of things with 
words ... (//A, §11) 
The contrast to be observed here is that between an understanding of language as 
representing things of which man has knowledge, and of language as representative 
only of itself.'"^ Nietzsche claims that the origin of knowledge is not based in the 
uncovering of facts, but rather, is founded upon error; this is so in that "over immense 
periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors" (G5, § 110). As he goes on to 
argue, some of these errors "proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species", 
and as such, were "continually inherited" to the point where they became almost "part 
of the basic endowment of the species", or what Nietzsche more aptly describes as 
"erroneous articles of faith" (G5, §110). These include the propositions of equal and 
enduring things, things in themselves, substances, bodies, and free will {GS, §110). But 
while the species-preserving consequences of these propositions are cleariy beneficial, 
their truth is a more recent phenomenon: 
It was only very late that such propositions were denied and doubted; it was only very 
late that truth emerged - as the weakest form of knowledge. It seemed that one was 
unable to live without it: our organism was prepared for the opposite; all its higher 
functions, sense perception and every kind of sensation worked with those basic errors 
which had been incorporated since time immemorial. Indeed, even in the realm of 
109 In OTL, Nietzsche argues that concepts are formed linguistically through "making equivalent that 
which is non-equivalent" (p. 145). His point is that words are required to describe countless experiences 
and as such, they demand of the language user a conamitment to a system of generalisation. The 
uniqueness of each one of our experiences is obscured through our use of language; as we gain the facility 
to identify loose similarities between experiences and correspondingly to quantify each experience in 
relation to another, the novelty of each individual experience is lost. Nietzsche uses the example of the 
leaf to illustrate this: "Just as it is certain that no leaf is ever exactly the same as any other leaf, it is 
equally certain that the concept 'leaf is formed by dropping these individual differences arbitrarily, by 
forgetting those features which differentiate one thing from another, so that the concept then gives rise to 
the notion that something other than leaves exists in nature, something which would be 'leaf, a primal 
form, say, from which all leaves were perhaps woven, drawn, delineated, dyed, curled, painted - but by a 
clumsy pair of hands, so that no single example turned out to be a faithful, correct, and reliable copy of 
the primal form" (ibid.). 
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knowledge these propositions became the norms according to which 'true' and 'untrue' 
were determined - down to the most remote regions of logic (GS, § 1 1 0 ) . 
As a result of this, Nietzsche concludes that the strength of knowledge is dependent 
upon the age of that knowledge rather than upon its truth. The notion of truth is a 
product of what he describes as our mythological behaviour, in and through which we 
"falsely introduce this world of symbols into things and mingle it with them as though 
this symbol-world were an 'in-itself'" (BGE, §21)."" 
The notion of language as a system of symbolic representation is therefore 
unmasked by Nietzsche's genealogical reading, as the mythology of a special kind of 
translation. Nietzsche takes a great deal of trouble to link the erroneous faith in truth 
that he identifies through his genealogical reading of truth, with another kind of faith: 
Christianity. This connection is made through the terms of the 'real' and 'apparent' 
worlds; Nietzsche argues that whether this is done in the style of Christianity or Kant -
"a crafty Christian, when all's said and done" - it remains an indication of "decadence'' 
and of declining life (TI HI, §6). The decline of which he is speaking is that of the 
ascetic ideal, which is cast in terms of the provision of meaning and as such is integrally 
tied to the notion of language: 
'Reason' in language: oh, what a deceitful old woman! I fear we are not getting rid of 
111 God because we sdll believe in grammar ... (TI 111, §5) 
The ascetic ideal operates on the basis that existence is meaningless in itself; thus in the 
face of the meaninglessness of his own existence, Nietzsche argues that man "suffered 
from the problem of his meaning" (GM 3, §28)."^ In order to exist, Nietzsche thinks 
that man needs horizons in the form of unconditional beliefs that give meaning to life." ' ' 
As I mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, Nietzsche conceives of a 
confrontation between man and himself, in terms of the necessity of translating man 
C f OTL. Nietzsche argues that truth only has value as truth within the sphere of truth: "If someone 
hides something behind a bush, looks for it in the same place and then finds it there, his seeking and 
finding is nothing much to boast about; but this is exactly how things are as far as the seeking and finding 
of 'truth' within the territory of reason is concerned" (p. 147). Thus in OTL, the language of concepts is 
only intelligible in its own context; put in simpler terms, logic is only meaningful as logic, within its own 
boundaries. 
Hence Duncan Large can claim that this pronouncement is, like all our language, 'theological'. Large, 
"Nietzsche's Use of Biblical Language", Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 22, Autumn 2001. 
A more complete reading of the relation between meaning, asceticism and suffering is given in 
Chapter 3. 
See Nancy S. Love, Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity, (New York/Guildford: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), pp. 3-4. Love identifies a common thread between Marx and Nietzsche in that they both 
acknowledge that the conditions (respectively, capitalism and nihilism) frustrating man's creative powers 
are themselves products of those powers. 
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back into nature {BGE, §230). The task, he argues, is to penetrate the "flattering colours 
and varnish" of the "beaudful, glittering, jingling, festive words: honesty, love of truth, 
love of wisdom, sacrifice for the sake of knowledge, heroism of the truthful", and in so 
doing, to discern "the terrible basic text homo natura" {BGE, §230). This task is linked 
in the same secdon of BGE to what Nietzsche calls the "will of the spirit", which he 
characterises in terms of two andthedcal drives: appropriadon and denial. On the one 
hand, the appropriadve drive encompasses the power of the spirit to "assimilate the new 
to the old, to simplify the complex" and to overlook contradictions, in the same way that 
it "emphasises, extracts and falsifies" aspects of the external world to suit itself {BGE, 
§230). This appropriadve drive signifies growth and thereby increased power.'"^ On the 
other hand, the drive of denial serves the same will of the spirit by opdng to take acdons 
that lead to ignorance. Nietzsche describes this drive as "a kind of defensive posture 
against much that can be known, a contentment with the dark" {BGE, §230). Where the 
appropriative drive allows the will of the spirit to dominate and to "bind together" and 
tame phenomenal experience, rendering simplicity from a muldplicity of phenomena, 
the denial drive affords the will of the spirit the reassurance and safety of "the 
muldplicity and cunning of its masks", and also an "exultant enjoyment" of power 
expressed as joy in uncertainty and ambiguity {BGE, §230). The claim that all 
interpretation is aesthetic is distinguished from conventional or non-Nietzschean 
scholarly interpretation in Megill's reading. Non-Nietzschean scholarship is not 
aesthetic in character, even when the object of its concern are works of art."^ This 
recalls Nietzsche's complaint mentioned in the previous chapter, that modem 
scholarship reflects the nihilistic crisis in values precisely because it is not 
interpretative. Nietzsche's aestheticism includes scholarship, and particularly modem 
philosophy, as part of its extension of the aesthetic to the whole of reality. Thus we can 
see that there are two kinds of nihilism with which Nietzsche is concemed: a passive 
and an active nihilism.'"^ 
Nietzsche does not use the precise term "perspectivism" until GS; nevertheless, it 
should be noted that there is a case to be made for the presence of perspectivism 
throughout his works. The continuity is first perceptible in terms of the interpretative 
"'' Power is intended here in the sense of Nietzsche's wider ontology of will to power, in which notions 
of substance and of individuated selfhood are rejected in favour of an ontology of interpretative force, 
interacting with other forces. See for example WP §§481 , 484 & 485, for rejections of the notions of 
substance and of selfhood in terms of an ontology of will to power. 
Megill, P £ , p. 89. 
Ibid., p. 33-34. 
" ^ C f OTL. 
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nature of perspectivism, in as far as this is distinct from the more traditional 
understanding of truth and knowledge as uninterpreted. In BT, for instance, Nietzsche 
considers the case of Socrates as the archetype of the theoretical optimist, whose faith in 
"the explicability of the nature of things" enables him to differentiate between "error as 
the embodiment of evil" and knowledge and science as having, contrastingly, "the 
power of a panacea" (BT, §15). The seductive nature of theoretical optimism is apparent 
to Nietzsche. Arguing that for Socrates, the noble deeds desirable in an individual such 
as pity, sacrifice, heroism and sophrosyne (which is defined as spiritual calm) are 
derived from knowledge and are thus teachable, he describes the appeal of the Platonic 
Socrates in terms of the teleology of the Socratic enterprise: 
No one who has experienced the delight of Socratic knowledge, and sensed how, in ever-
wider circles, it seeks to encompass the whole phenomenal world, will ever again find a 
stimulus to existence more compelling than the desire to complete that conquest, and 
weave the net to an impenetrable density (BT, §15). 
However, the allure of Socrates notwithstanding, Nietzsche is able to provide the 
contrast of the limitation of logic, in which logic and science is understood in terms of a 
boundary, rather than in terms of teleology. Where logic has previously been 
understood as an end in itself, Nietzsche introduces a sense of logic as self-limiting. 
This in itself is an interpretative act: Nietzsche effectively sets up a new perspective 
from which to examine the notion of truth. The perspective that is afforded by 
Nietzsche's image of a logic that "twists around itself and finally bites itself in the tail", 
is that of a new, tragic knowledge, in which the need for art "as both protection and 
remedy" in the face of such knowledge is itself fully acknowledged (BT, §15). 
This difference between the types of knowledge of which Socratism and tragedy 
are characteristic, is given a similar emphasis in subsequent works such as BGE, in 
which the value of science and truth as constituents of knowledge is challenged in a 
much more specific manner: 
It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that physics too is only an interpretation 
and arrangement of the world (according to our own requirements, if I may say so!) and 
not an explanation of the world: but in so far as it is founded on belief in the senses it 
passes for more than that and must continue to do so for a long time to come (BGE, 
§14)."' 
C f WP, §636, in which Nietzsche argues similarly that physicists believe in a true world, but are in 
error, because "[t]he atom they posit is inferred according to the logic of the perspectivism of 
consciousness - and is therefore itself a subjective fiction." Other examples of this sentiment are readily 
discernible; e.g. in WP, §§618, 619, 625, and in GS, §246. Note that the statement on physics from BGE 
is indicative of Nietzsche's attitude towards the "'Realist' assumptions of science" within the context of 
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The explanation of the obvious through science is, Nietzsche thinks, an explanation of 
what can be observed through the senses. He speculates that a greater triumph may have 
lain in the Platonic mastery of "the mob of the senses" by means of "cold, grey 
conceptual nets" thrown over them (BGE, §14)."^ But this is not to argue that the 
Platonic project as a whole is laudable; nor is it to argue that Plato's understanding of 
the senses in relation to knowledge is in any sense correct, for example on the basis of 
their correspondence to the 'real world' that for Plato is the world of the Forms. What 
Nietzsche speculatively commends in Plato's mastery of the senses is the phenomenon 
of the judicious lie itself, and not the specific product of that lie.'^° In this case, the 
Nietzschean phenomenon of the judicious lie corresponds to the interpretative aspect of 
perspectivism.This was shown in my earlier discussion of perspectivism and 
language. 
However, it should be noted that the perpetuation of methodology also plays a 
motivating role in Nietzsche's critique of truth. Science is, as Nietzsche allows more 
specifically in G5, more than an interpretation: it is a prejudice. Equating the faiths of 
natural scientists (in evolution) and of the "spiritual middle class of scholars" such as 
Herbert Spencer, described as aspiring to the reconciliation of "egoism and altruism", 
Nietzsche rejects the unquestioning acceptance of the scientific justification of the 
world by the academic forum, on the basis of its self-servitude (GS, §373). Arguing that 
the "world of truth" degrades existence to the status of "a mere exercise for a calculator 
and an indoor diversion for mathematicians", he contends that the scholarly justification 
of the world by the materialist is "a crudity and a naivete, assuming that it is not a 
mental illness, an idiocy" (G5, §373). This argument is made on the ground of taste, and 
as such clearly reflects the sentiment of the aestheticist claim from BT, that "it is only as 
an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified" (BT, §5). 
his analysis of truth (as distinct from Nietzsche's genealogy, and his reconstruction, of truth). Cooper, op. 
cit., note 93, pp. 74-75. 
This juxtaposition of perspectivism and Platonic Socratism will be returned to in subsequent chapters; 
but it is important even at this early stage to note the significance of art, and especially the tragic, to 
Nietzsche's project. 
Robert M. Helm, "Plato in the Thought of Nietzsche and Augustine", James C . O'Flaherty, Timothy F . 
Sellner & Robert M. Helm (eds.). Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition, (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 23-24. 
Helm, ibid. It is worth noting a complementary distinction drawn by Nietzsche between the rejection 
by the "rest of the philosopher crowd" of sensory evidence on the grounds that it showed plurality and 
change, and Heraclitus' rejection of such evidence because it suggested that things possessed duration and 
unity. Just as the Eleatics were wrong to consider the senses in terms of lies, so too, Nietzsche claims, was 
Heraclitus wrong; the senses do not lie at all. Nietzsche's argument from interpretation is, in an anti-
Socratic vein, rather that "[wjhat we make of their evidence is what gives rise to the lie, for example the 
lie of unity, the lie of materiality, of substance, of duration . . . 'Reason' is what causes us to falsify the 
evidence of the senses." (77 I I I , §2). Cf. G5, § 111. 
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Nietzsche, speaking to the materialist (or, as he claims later in the same section of GS, 
the mechanist), argues that: 
Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity: that is a dictate of 
good taste, gentlemen, the taste of reverence for everything that lies beyond your horizon 
{GS, §373). 
The scientific interpretation of the world would therefore count as one of the "most 
stupid" interpretations of the world, Nietzsche thinks, in that such an interpretation 
would be one of the poorest in meaning (GS, §373). An essentially mechanical world 
would be an essentially meaningless world; and Nietzsche directs this assessment to the 
"ears and consciences of our mechanists who nowadays like to pass as philosophers and 
insist that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and last laws on which all existence 
must be based" {GS, §373). The parodic use of "first and last" laws in this section 
returns the discussion to the context of faith in itself as the alpha and omega of the 
mechanical approach to existence. This is, ironically, a blind faith, in that it precludes 
recognition of the ambiguity of existence that Nietzsche identifies as being such a rich 
source of meaning.'^^ Where ambiguity requires an interpretative, perspectival 
approach, an unambiguous view of existence requires only adequate explanation as a 
basis for the identification of fact and hence, truth.'^^ 
Explanation is, in the context of an uninterpreted science, therefore, actually 
description; but "how should explanation even be possible", Nietzsche questions, when, 
operating with nothing but things that do not exist ("lines, planes, bodies, atoms, 
divisible time, divisible space") we make everything "into an image, into our own 
image!" {GS, §112). Where it is sufficient to regard science as the most "fruitful 
possible humanisation of things" (GS, §112), Nietzsche claims, it is also possible to 
disregard the notion of there being an objective reality independent of the human 
perspective: 
That mountain there! That cloud there! What is 'real' in that? Subtract the phantasm and 
every human contribution from it, my sober friends! If you can! If you can forget your 
descent, your past, your training - all of your humanity and animality. There is no 
'reality' for us ... {GS, §57) 
Nietzsche clearly espouses a view of the interpretative factor of perspectivism as deeply 
'^ ^ The significance of meaning for the human response to the phenomenon of existence will be 
considered in greater detail in Chapter 3, specifically in relation to suffering. 
'^ ^ The new kind of tragic knowledge that Nietzsche proposes. 
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significant; it is on the basis of perspectival interpretation that for him, the notion of the 
'real world' loses its significance. The human contribution of which Nietzsche speaks in 
the above passage simply is the (itself interpreted/interpreting) 'fact' of interpretation.'^'* 
The power intrinsic to the activity of interpretation is constitutionally aestheticist, as 
David E . Cooper shows: 
Just as the power the artist derives from painting or composing is not an effect or 
product like money or station, but resides in the work, in the creative activity, so the 
sublime power of interpretation, adopting new perspectives, forging new concepts is 
intrinsic to these. 
It is on this basis that Cooper suggests a new sense can be given to Nietzsche's claim 
from BT, that "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are 
eternally justified' {BT, §5).'^^ The aestheticist worldview is bom and is sustained from 
out of Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysics. 
Cf. Henry Staten, Nietzsche's Voice, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 6. Staten claims, on 
the ground of tonality, that Nietzsche's privileging of the perspective from which he renders this 
interpretation exemplifies the essential question of perspectivism, by which it cannot be taken to explain 
anything. Perspectivism quite literally "explains nothing", but in the non-reductive sense of interpretation, 
in which "we have merely perfected the image of becoming without reaching beyond the image or behind 
it" (G5, §112). 
Cooper, op. cit., note 93, p. 83. 
Ibid. 
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2.3: Aestheticism and methodology: philosophy and power 
My exegesis of Megill's and Nehamas' accounts of Nietzsche's aestheticism in section 
2.1 showed that ultimately, while they identify the key elements of aestheticism, neither 
Megill nor Nehamas affirm it as a fully-developed theory. In attempting a defence of the 
standard account of aestheticism, I explored the metaphysical difficulties with key 
aspects of Nietzsche's aestheticism: perspectivism and the will to power. In this section, 
I shall examine the genesis and consequences of the metaphysical problem, which speak 
to Nietzsche's aestheticist project of restoring the tragic disposition. I shall begin by 
considering a distinction which Nietzsche draws between two distinct modes, or 
aspects, of philosophy: the metaphysical and the historical. I consider that both Megill 
and Nehamas, and proponents of metaphysical objections to aestheticism such as Clark, 
adopt different sides to the methodological dichotomy between metaphysical and 
historical modes.'^^ I suggest that by virtue of his methodological distinction, Nietzsche 
anticipated the metaphysical objections considered in the previous section, and that as a 
result of such incorporation, his aestheticism remains unscathed. His distinction is also 
considered in terms of its possible consequences for philosophical scholarship. 
We have seen that the problem of ontology, which challenges the possibility of 
describing the will to power as an ontological theory, is based on the methodological 
premise of knowledge as reflection. However, there is some evidence to suggest that 
Nietzsche may have anticipated the genesis of this problem. Referring to the "chemistry 
of concepts and feelings" by which philosophy is characterised, Nietzsche questions 
that: 
In almost all respects, philosophical problems today are again formulated as they were 
two thousand years ago: how can something arise from its opposite - for example, reason 
from unreason, sensation from the lifeless, logic from the illogical, disinterested 
contemplation from covetous desire, altruism from egoism, truth from error? {HA, §1) 
On the basis of this question, Nietzsche proceeds to identify two different approaches to 
what he calls the "faith in antithetical values" which is characteristic of 'two world' 
ontological thought {BGE, §2). For him, this faith is only a problem for what he calls 
metaphysical philosophy, which addresses the emergence of truth from error by 
A sustained reading would show that both of these aspects are present in Martin Heidegger's reading 
of Nietzsche, especially in the first lecture entitled 'The Will to Power as Art". Heidegger's reading is 
thus to be considered a curious one, and its legacy to subsequent accounts of aestheticism should be 
identified in terms of duality. On Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche see Babette E . Babich, "Heidegger's 
Relation to Nietzsche's Thinking: On Connivance, Nihilism and Value", New Nietzsche Studies, 3:1/2, 
FallAVinter 1999. 
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"denying the origin of the one from the other, and by assuming for the more highly 
valued things some miraculous origin, directly from out of the heart and essence of the 
'thing in itself" {HA, §1). Reflection of the truth is the evaluative criterion of this drive, 
in the sense of what Nietzsche calls the 'will to truth' (Z 2, 'Of Self-Overcoming'). This 
will to truth is translated by Zarathustra as "will to the conceivability of all being"; the 
wisest of men doubt whether being is conceivable, but want to make it conceivable all 
the same (Z 2, 'Of Self-Overcoming'). As a result, being must "bend and accommodate 
itself to them: 
It must become smooth and subject to the mind as the mind's mirror and reflection. 
That is your entire will, you wisest men; it is a will to power; and that is so even when 
you talk of good and evil and of the assessment of values (Z 2, 'Of Self-Overcoming'). 
The wisest men want to "create the worid before which you can kneel"; their will to 
truth translates as the desire to create the nature of being through the formation of 
descriptive concepts and truths, and then to reify this conceptual world through the 
process of evaluation, in as far as "evaluation is creation" (Z 2, 'Of Self-Overcoming', 
& Z 1, 'Of the Thousand and One Goals'). 
In contrast, what Nietzsche terms "historical philosophy" is unencumbered by 
faith in antithetical values, and thus offers a potential way of explaining the emergence 
of truth from error: 
Historical philosophy, on the other hand, the very youngest of all philosophical methods, 
which can no longer be even conceived of as separate from the natural sciences, has 
determined in isolated cases (and will probably conclude in all of them) that they are not 
opposites, only exaggerated to be so by the popular or metaphysical view, and that this 
opposidon is based on an error of reason {HA, §1). 
So Nietzsche's distinction between a 'metaphysical' and a 'historical' approach to truth 
may be clearly observed .Where the metaphysical approach is characterised by its 
dependence upon the notion of a thing in itself and the consequent distinction between 
truth and error, the historical approach does not see truth and error to be distinct at all. 
As may be inferred from the description of the metaphysical view as "popular", 
and of the historical view as the "youngest of all philosophical methods", the remarks in 
this passage speak to the difference between the continuing metaphysical influence of 
Plato's ontology of Forms, and of Nietzsche's ontology of the will to power.^ ^^ This 
Nietzsche's connection between the historical approach and the natural sciences should also be noted. 
In line with my claim for continuity across the texts, there is an additional sense in which the pro-
metaphysical arguments given by Clark and Poellner are deficient. Both rely upon the periodisation 
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distinction is clarified by the following passage from BGE, where Nietzsche has been 
discussing the Stoic tendency to view nature "falsely, namely Stoically": 
What formerly happened with the Stoics still happens today as soon as a philosophy 
begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image, it cannot do 
otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to 
creation of the world, to causa prima (BGE, §9). 
In the self-tyranny of Stoicism, the Stoic as a piece of nature is tyrannised over by 
his/her own Stoic desire for "nature to be nature 'according to the Stoa"'(fiG£', §9). 
Plato's ontology of Forms is a product of Plato's own desire and pride which, as in the 
case of the Stoics, seeks to prescribe his morality, his ideal, to nature and to 
"incorporate them in it" (BGE, §9). With this in mind, it is interesting to consider the 
potential for the distinction between metaphysical and historical philosophy to 
contribute to the differing approaches taken by contemporary scholarly treatments of 
Nietzsche's perspectivism. In effect, this is to afford Nietzsche the opportunity to 
address his modem critics. In the terms of Nietzsche's distinction, it is therefore 
proposed that two broad approaches to perspectivism may be observed within 
contemporary Nietzsche studies: a 'metaphysical' approach and an 'historical' 
approach. 
Let me contextualise these in the terms of our discussion in preceding sections 
of this chapter. The metaphysical approach is exemplified by Poellner and Clark's 
respective critiques of Nietzsche's own critique of metaphysics. Both of them treat 
perspectivism and the doctrine of will to power in terms of metaphysical philosophy, 
evaluating it as such without recourse to the aestheticist project. As such, Nietzsche's 
thoughts are doomed to metaphysical inadequacy. As Poellner concludes, Nietzsche's 
"anti-metaphysical fervour" means that he ignores the fact that metaphysical 
assumptions may be involved in the adequate phenomenological description of "non-
reactive and 'natural' desires", rather than simply being manifestations of the will to 
tmth that asceticism manifests.'^" Clark's view is plagued by an attempt to combine 
technique to make their objections, in a manner that is (somewhat ironically) consonant with those 
scholars who claim canonical supremacy for Nietzsche's unpublished works. In both cases, the emphasis 
is placed on Nietzsche's later thought. However, there is evidence to suggest that as Nietzsche's 
awareness of the problem of science and thence the problem of philosophy was in evidence from BT 
onwards, his awareness of the need for a new ontology (i.e., an escape from Platonism) was also present. 
Poellner, op. cit., note 103, p. 305. 
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what she calls "traditionalist" and "nontraditionalist" readings of Nietzsche; although 
she allows that we need a "new ideal" to combat the conamitment to truth which 
exemplifies the "latest expression of the ascetic ideal", this is coupled with an 
interpretation of Nietzsche's early denials of truth as themselves asceticist.'^' This 
retains a similar sense of the correctness of broader metaphysical concerns: "the 
Nietzschean ideal of affirmation does not require us to abandon logic, argument, or the 
commitment to truth."'^^ As Nietzsche might have responded, "there has been no 
philosopher in whose hands philosophy has not become an apology for knowledge"; all 
philosophers, he says, are tyrannised by logic, which by its nature is "optimism" {HA, 
§6). 
However, in the future, metaphysics will be harmless; freed from the questions 
of the thing in itself and appearance, "physiology and the ontogeny of organisms and 
concepts" will determine our image of the world {HA, §10). This accords with the 
connection between historical philosophy and the natural sciences as instances of 
interpretation. The historical approach is exemplified by Megill and Nehamas, and 
considers that perspectivism does have the potential to succeed. But it must be 
emphasised that Megill and Nehamas do not find perspectivism successful or otherwise 
in metaphysical terms. The metaphysical approach may well identify fatal flaws either 
with perspectivism or with Nietzsche's views on truth outside of his critique of 
metaphysics, but as has been shown, this approach operates on the basis that 
metaphysics is the criterion by which Nietzsche's writing ought to be evaluated. The 
historical approach provides an alternative criterion of evaluation by identifying the 
function of perspectivism as divorced from metaphysical intent, and by locating 
perspectivism within a wider, continuous project, identified here as the aestheticist 
project. The claim here is that Nietzsche has only one, aestheticist, framework guiding 
and informing his thought. This is so in the sense described by a fragment from 
Archilochus, in which "the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big 
thing". The sentiment of this fragment, taken figuratively, marks the division between 
two kinds of thinker: those who adopt a "single, universal, organising principle in terms 
of which alone all that they are and say has significance", and those whose thought 
pursues many ends, and is "scattered or diffused". Nietzsche's thought, likened to the 
hedgehog, is not specific knowledge of one thing, but is constituted by the phenomenon 
of the aestheticist claim. His aestheticism is therefore not a fact-based or 
Clark, op. cit., note 4, pp. 23-25. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p. 23. Clark's analysis does not acknowledge the possible significance of aestheticism. 
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metaphysically-engaged philosophy, but a unified way of responding to the 
phenomenon of life.'^^ 
In the light of Nietzsche's distinction, it is also necessary to consider the effect of 
the will to power upon philosophy's desire to represent a culture of science as truth, 
which is raised by the attempt to describe the doctrine of will to power as an ontological 
theory. Following Richard Rorty's view of modem philosophy as transfixed by the 
notion of the mind as mirror, it becomes possible to understand how the doctrine of will 
to power affects the philosophical state of transfiguration.'^'* Nietzsche certainly does 
share this view of philosophy's transfiguration by the mind as mirror. He discusses this 
idea on a number of occasions. In D, for example, he specifically describes the intellect 
as a mirror; but while this might at first glance give the impression that Nietzsche has 
fallen under the same transfigurative spell as the rest of philosophy, this impression is 
quickly dispelled (D, §121). His description of the intellect as a mirror occurs in the 
same passage as his warning on mistaking cause and effect, thus locating the description 
firmly within Nietzsche's critique of knowledge: 
'Cause and effect'. - In this mirror - and our intellect is a mirror - something is taking 
place that exhibits regularity, a certain thing always succeeds another certain thing - this 
we call, when we perceive it and want to call it something, cause and effect - we fools! 
As though we had here understood something or other, or could understand it! For we 
have seen nothing but pictures of 'causes and effects'! (D, §121). 
As Nietzsche understands, it is precisely the pictorialness of our understanding that 
makes a more significant insight than that of the succession of a cause by an effect 
impossible (D, §121). It is helpful to contrast this denial of the mechanism of cause and 
effect with Nietzsche's more fundamental denial of teleological principles in BGE; as he 
notes there, such principles are superfluous on the ground of the will to power {BGE, 
§13). Specifically, the mistake that is made by physiologists when considering the 
cardinal drive of organic beings is precisely this confusion of cause and effect; the being 
See Isaiah Berlin's remarks from The Hedgehog and the Fox reproduced in Tolstoy and History, 
(London: Phoenix, 1996), pp. 1-2. The method of this engagement is discernible through a brief 
consideration of Heidegger's response to Nietzsche's aestheticist view of the art/truth relation. Martin 
Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche must be acknowledged as a special case in relation to the metaphysical 
and historical approaches to perspectivism in its two aspects. While Heidegger's approach can clearly be 
shown to be a major factor in the development of the historical approach to perspectivism, his conclusions 
are more in line with the metaphysical approach. Heidegger's response to the art/truth relation in 
Nietzsche is couched in terms of Platonism (op. cit., note 1, p. 151). His analysis shows that Nietzsche's 
aestheticism must be shown to be free of any ontological dependence on Plato's ontology of forms. Thus 
the overturning of Platonism must become a "twisting free of it" for the purpose of changing the entire 
ordering structure of the relation between the sensuous and the nonsensuous (ibid., pp. 209-210). 
Richard Rorty, The Mirror of Nature, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 12. 
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is supposed to will its own survival and therefore to engage in a drive for power {BGE, 
§13). In fact, Nietzsche shows, the living being desires to vent its strength and therefore 
produces the consequence of a drive towards self-preservation {BGE, §13).'^^ However, 
we should also note that the notion of self-preservation is, as a product of the will to 
power, hardly definitive; Nietzsche claim in OS that the "wish to preserve oneself is the 
symptom of a condition of distress", in which the fundamental life-instinct of expanding 
power is constrained {OS, §349). That is to say, as Nietzsche does in GM, that self-
preservation is acceptable within the context of nihilism, when it speaks to the 
safeguarding of the will; the "will to nothingness" of the ascetic ideal is justifiable in as 
far as it enabled man to will something, or rather, to "will nothingness": 
It did not matter at first to what end, why, and with what means he exercised his will: the 
will itself was saved {GM 3, §28). 
Self-preservation, on the other hand, becomes unacceptable when it is removed from the 
context of nihilism. As Nietzsche claims, the desire for the expansion of power 
"frequently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation" {GS, §349). Contrary to the 
effect of Darwinism, which, Nietzsche thinks, suggests to modem natural sciences that 
life is about the "struggle for existence", this struggle is the exception to the rule of 
"will to life" {GS, §349). 
Additionally, the pictorial nature of the transfiguration of philosophy by the image 
of the mind as mirror is deeply ironic, as Nietzsche shows. Where philosophy is 
captivated by this image by virtue of its determination by science, in that it wishes to 
reflect a culture of science as truth, it is in this state because it idealises the possibility 
of knowledge as accurate reflection of the nature of the world. However, the notion of 
the intellect as mirror within the history of knowledge is irreducible: 
The two directions. - When we try to examine the mirror in itself we discover in the end 
nothing but things upon it. If we want to grasp the things we finally get hold of nothing 
but the mirror. - This, in the most general terms, is the history of knowledge {D, §243).'^* 
Recalling my discussion of the optimism of weakness and the pessimism of strength 
from Chapter 1, which observe the same pattern as the relation between the mind and 
knowledge, we can observe the full genealogical import of the history of knowledge. 
Cf. r / I X , §§9,24. 
This is not to say that Nietzsche has no theory of mind, but merely to point to the difficulty of fully 
describing the nature of mind from within an ontology of will to power. 
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Nietzsche is able to produce the perspectival analysis regarding the "ultimate skepsis", 
that man's truths are ultimately "his irrefiitable errors", on the basis of his genealogical 
method (GS, §265). 
As discussed earlier, in his discussion of the metaphysical and historical modes of 
philosophy in relation to the emergence of tmth from error, Nietzsche's claim is that 
metaphysical philosophy is flawed on the ground of its continuing belief in a world 
independent of the human perspective that acts as a "miraculous origin" for highly 
valued things {HA, §1). He sets aside the metaphysicians' resulting faith in antithetical 
values, and places his confidence in the future of what he terms 'historical' philosophy 
to show that such things as "selfless acts" or "completely disinterested observations" do 
not exist. Instead of these, Nietzsche proposes "a chemistry of moral, religious, aesthetic 
ideas and feelings, a chemistry of all those impulses that we ourselves experience in the 
great and small interactions of culture and society" {HA, §1). But it is integral to this 
proposal that this is all that is possible at the time of writing, given "the various sciences 
at their present level of achievement" {HA, §1). So in appropriately perspectival mode, 
Nietzsche is not proposing any kind of final answer, but is providing an interpretation -
and he is fully aware of the need for further interpretation: 
everything has evolved; there are no eternal facts, nor are there any absolute tmths. Thus 
historical philosophizing is necessary henceforth ... {HA, §2). 
Nietzsche's genealogical approach to value grounds the claim that metaphysical 
philosophy is determined by the objectivity inherent to science as value-free in 
modemity. However, it is Nietzsche's genealogical method that enables a problem with 
this notion of value-free determination to be seen. Philosophy treats science as a cultural 
value in allowing itself to be determined by science. Representing a culture of science 
as truth just is, irreducibly, an exercise in the application of evaluation.'^^ As a result, 
Nietzsche's analysis not only raises the problem of science and through it the problem 
of tmth; it also raises the problem of philosophy itself, in terms of the need for a 
nonphilosophical space in which philosophy may authentically reflect upon itself.'^* By 
treating science as a value, philosophy poses the problem of science's self-stultification 
as a culture. But it also incorporates the possibility of applying Nietzsche's genealogical 
method in order to question science and tmth. This returns us to the problem of nihilism 
Hence, as we saw in the previous chapter, science is impossible as a culture because of this self-
stultification, whereby it uses its value-freedom to act as the defining value of culture. 
'^ ^ Jacques De 
1984), p. 108. 
rrida, Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
101 
discussed in the previous chapter. If Nietzsche's therapy for nihilism is successful, the 
current age of nihilism must end. Recall that for Nietzsche the current age "gives the 
impression of being an interim", which impression in turn gives rise to the sense of 
fragmentation of culture into chaos: "the old dying out, the new not worth much and 
growing ever weaker" {HA, §248). We are told that there is no option but to support the 
new; "we cannot go back to the old system" because "we have burned our bridges 
behind us" (HA, §248). His thought is firmly directed towards the future. And yet the 
future is necessarily unknown; as such, Nietzsche's optimism is mediated by the 
possibility that "his descendants will suffer from the past as he does" {HA, §249). 
Nietzsche may have anticipated the genesis of the ontological problems of 
aestheticism, in as far as his genealogical method not only reveals the determination of 
modem philosophy by science, but also anticipates the historical turn taken by modem 
metaphysical philosophy as the bankmptcy of the cultural value of science as truth 
becomes increasingly evident.'^^ From an aestheticist perspective, metaphysical and 
historical modes of philosophy are unified in and through their engagement in a power 
relation that is typical of an ontology of will to power. Thus my suggestion is that, far 
from remaining an inverse Platonist in Heidegger's sense, Nietzsche's aestheticist 
philosophy is liberated from the metaphysical allure of the ontology of Forms. 
"Understanding and ontology are linked. Inquiring, searching, understanding are, as AristoUe said in 
the Metaphysics, of the defining essence of being human. The domain of this activity is traditionally 
called Being ... Being is all there is and can be and human life is ultimately concerned with nothing but 
this." Patrick A. Heelan, "An Anti-Epistemological or Ontological Interpretation of the Quantum Theory 
and Theories Like It", Babette E. Babich, Debra B. Bergoffen & Simon V. Glynn (eds.), Continental and 
Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), p. 61. 
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2.4: Conclusion 
I have shown that the two pre-eminent accounts of Nietzsche's aestheticism given by 
Megill and Nehamas do not constitute a defence of aestheticism. As such, a full defence 
of aestheticism remains to be seen. I argued that the reasons given for treating 
aestheticism sceptically provide us with a starting point in undertaking such a defence. 
The first step in defending aestheticism showed that the metaphysical objections to 
aestheticism fail. This is so on the ground that while aestheticism may approach 
metaphysical concerns, its dependence upon the intrinsic power of interpretation does 
not actually make any strong descriptive claims about the nature of reality and as such, 
does not constitute an authentic metaphysics. However, other objections to aestheticism 
remain; the purpose of this concluding section is to outline these as the next stage in the 
defence of Nietzsche's aestheticism. 
The first such objection is that there is a lack of common ontological ground 
between art and being that would confirm the validity of aestheticism. Even one 
instance of such coirrmon ground would be sufficient to show that aestheticism is valid. 
One of the tasks ahead is clearly to provide evidence of such common ground, but what 
must also be understood is the form such common ground might take. We have seen 
that aestheticism does allow for a unity between art and truth on the ground that both 
are reducible to interpretation; this reduction is a part of Nietzsche's project identified in 
my introduction, which was to translate the "terrible, basic texf' of man back into nature 
{BGE, §230). We have also seen that Nietzsche's task is a therapy for the cultural 
problem of nihilism. Nietzsche's appreciation of the natural context of the basic text of 
mankind is best summarised by the following claim from BT that, taken in the spirit of 
the aesthetic, may be described as one panel of an aestheticist diptych that serves as 
symbolic of the character of Nietzsche's wider project: 
to see science under the lens of the artist, but art under the lens of life {BT, 'Attempt', 
§2). 
If this claim is but one conceptual panel of the painting to which one can liken 
Nietzsche's thought, then the other can only be the 'aestheticist' claim: 
it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are etemally justified 
{BT §5)."° 
The claim is reprised in §24 of BT, in which Nietzsche argues that "music alone, placed next to the 
world, can give us an idea of what we might understand by 'the justification of the world as an aesthetic 
phenomenon'." 
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I suspect that the force of these parallel claims not only suffuses BT, but also informs 
and directs Nietzsche's subsequent writings. But this suspicion requires proof; these 
remarks serve to suggest that the required evidence of common ground between art and 
being is to be found in BT, within Nietzsche's critique of tragedy. To a significant 
extent, the question we need to ask is whether it is possible to read BT as evidence of 
common ontological ground between art and being.''*' 
In his introductory essay to his edition of Nietzsche's BT, Michael Tanner 
introduces us to a way in which this might be possible.''*^ Tanner thinks that the best 
way to begin to assess BT is to see it as a premonitory comment on the following lines 
from the first of Rilke's Duino Elegies: 
For beauty is nothing 
but the beginning of terror, which we are still just able to endure, 
and we are so awed by it because it serenely disdains 
to annihilate us.'''^  
The connection that Rilke allows between the polarised concepts of beauty and terror 
prompt Tanner to question that, although we all do need to address suffering in the 
world, the solution that Nietzsche appears to present in BT - that one mustn't try to 
alleviate it, but rather attempt to see it as beautiful - seems, at first glance, to be rather 
monstrous.''''* Tanner thinks it would be crass to equate Nietzsche's views with 
callousness, and emphasises that for Nietzsche, it is beauty that enables our endurance 
of the horror of existence; however, he seems resigned to a certain lack of satisfaction in 
this answer to his question.''*' My contention here, however, is that it is possible to find 
a satisfactory response to the questions that the issue of Nietzsche's aestheticism raises. 
What is of immediate interest is the point that not only must the Nietzschean aestheticist 
not attempt to alleviate the suffering inherent to life, but also, he/she must attempt to see 
suffering as beautiful. In a broad sense, the Nietzschean attempt to see the beauty in 
Nehamas denies that the rhetoric of S r overcomes the distinction between appearance and reality that 
he thinks is central to its explicit argument {LL, p. 250). This is to contradict Paul de Man's reading of BT 
in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust, (New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1979). The status of BT with respect to aestheticism and 
metaphysics will be considered in Chapter 4. 
'''^  Michael Tanner, "Introduction" to Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, Shaun Whiteside 
(trans.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), pp. vii-xxx. 
Tanner cites these lines of Rilke in his introductory essay to BT (pp. xxviii-xxix). Rainer Maria Rilke, 
Duino Elegies, J. B. Leishman & Stephen Spender (eds.), (London: The Hogarth Press, 1939), p. 25. See 
also Rainer Maria Rilke, Samtliche Werke 1, Ernst Zinn (ed.), (Insel-Verlag, 1955), p. 685. 
Tanner, op. cit., p. xxiii. 
'""^  Ibid., pp. xxii-xxix. Perhaps Tanner's lack of satisfaction stems, at least in part, from a failure to fully 
appreciate the degree of commitment necessary to accept the aestheticist's requirement of non-selectivity 
of phenomenal experience. 
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suffering is to perceive suffering as transfigured. This transfiguration occurs in and 
through the individual; but I have no ordinary individual in mind. This is the point of 
view that Nietzsche ultimately expects to be embodied in the complex figure of the 
tibermensch, who would occupy the many perspectives from which it would be 
possible to claim that being is only justifiable as an aesthetic phenomenon. 
This leads us to a more pressing problem: would such a perspective be desirable, 
even if we could show it to be the case? Should suffering be beautiful? If we heed 
Megill's claim mentioned in section 2.1, then accepting aestheticism mns the risk of 
trivialising the realia of suffering. Tanner's claim that it would be crass to accuse 
Nietzsche of callousness seems off-beam when we consider experiences of pain and 
terror which are, on the face of it, somewhat difficult to justify aesthetically. In addition 
to the problem of common ontological ground between art and being, then, there is an 
ethical problem for aestheticism to face. It seems practical to deal with this first as there 
is little point in continuing to defend a theory which is beset by insuperable ethical 
problems. Regardless of the potential formal success of Nietzsche's arguments, we have 
to be able to live with them in a practical sense if they are to be considered genuinely 
persuasive. Hence I shall turn to the ethical problem for aestheticism in Chapter 3, and 
following a satisfactory conclusion, I shall move on to the problem of common 
ontological ground in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3: Aestheticism, suffering and the critique of pity' 
In the previous chapter, I investigated the possibility of a standard account of 
Nietzsche's aestheticism. As we saw, the standard account presents us with three main 
problems, which must be overcome if such an account of aestheticism is to be 
successfully defended. I discussed the group of difficulties raised with aestheticism by 
metaphysics, classifying this group as one basic problem. However, the metaphysical 
objection to aestheticism was rejected: Nietzsche's thoughts on will to power were 
shown to be fully reconcilable with his wider project. Yet this evidence of the coherence 
of aestheticism notwithstanding, two further problems for the standard account of 
aestheticism identified in Chapter 2 remain. The general aim of this chapter is to work 
towards a solution to these closely interrelated problems, and to work in tandem with 
Chapter 4 in order to complete my argument. 
The two remaining problems for aestheticism, recall, are those of ethics and the 
lack of common ontological ground between art and being. The ethical problem 
demands that we consider the wider moral consequences of aestheticism. In the light of 
the defining aestheticist claim, we saw that all experiences within being understood as 
becoming must be justifiable on aesthetic grounds: not merely the beautiful, the 
gratifying and the appealing, but the humiliating, the terrible and the painful. It is one 
thing to claim that a pleasant experience is justifiable on aesthetic ground, but it is quite 
another to claim that an horrific experience, resulting in extreme suffering, is similarly 
justifiable. The aestheticist's claim to justify the horrific and the painful thus gives rise 
to the moral objection that aestheticism trivialises the realia? From a moral perspective, 
while it would be acceptable to justify an experience such as listening to music on 
aesthetic grounds, it would be unacceptable to justify the experiences of a Holocaust 
survivor in Auschwitz on these grounds.^ One of the main tasks of the chapter will 
therefore be to give an account of how aestheticism can evade the ethical charge of 
trivialisation. This will be achieved by considering how Nietzsche responds to the issue 
of suffering. Through an analysis of his critique of pity, Nietzsche will be shown not to 
' An earlier version of some of the ideas expressed in this chapter has been published in S. R. Bamford, 
"Nietzsche's Aestheticism and the Value of Suffering", Paul Bishop & R. H. Stephenson (eds.), Cultural 
Studies and the Symbolic, (Leeds: Northern Universities Press, 2003 - in press). 
^ Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985), p. 345 (henceforth PE in citations). 
^ Ibid. Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich have edited a collection of essays on the theme of Nietzsche 
and the Third Reich. See Golomb & Wistrich, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses 
of a Philosophy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
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trivialise suffering, but instead to make an alternative evaluation of it that fits with his 
wider aestheticist project. 
The second problem concerns the possibility of the standard account of 
aestheticism, and thence its full defensibility. We saw in Chapter 2 that, to date, the 
conditions for setting out a standard account of aestheticism which is fully defensible 
have never been met, owing to a perceived lack of common ontological ground between 
being and art. This problem is especially significant for the modem sensibility, which as 
we saw in Chapter 1 is accustomed to a basic alienation between works of art and 
questions of truth or morality. The solution to this second problem is obvious: to 
identify common ontological ground between being, the world and the work of art. In 
the spirit of the aestheticist claim, this is to show precisely how it is that being and the 
world can be justified as aesthetic phenomena. In the course of dealing with the ethical 
problem, therefore, the second main task of this chapter is to begin to tease out evidence 
of ontological relationships between being, the world and the work of art. This will be 
developed into a full account in Chapter 4. 
I begin in section 3.1 by considering the ethical problem for aestheticism in 
greater detail. I consider the full extent of the aestheticist claim, and explain how the 
ethical difficulty arises from its justification of the terrible and the painful as aesthetic 
phenomena. Hence I settle on suffering as a paradigm case through which to test for the 
defensibility of Nietzsche's aestheticism. I explore the idea of suffering as a moral 
problem, taking utilitarianism as an example. I note the distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative modes of utilitarian moral response to suffering, and identify the ethical 
problem as being a product of quantitative analysis. The basic quantitative assumption 
is that although suffering may have beneficial consequences for an individual, it is not 
in our best interests. It follows from this assumption that the morally-concemed 
individual should try to avoid the experience of suffering, and to avoid causing 
experiences of suffering in others. However, an emphasis upon the role of the 
qualitative consciousness in utilitarian theory yields a competing qualitative analysis, 
which shows that the functional quantitative analysis is inadequate as a basis for the 
moral view of suffering. As a result, the way is paved for a reconsideration of 
Nietzsche's own views on suffering. 
Section 3.2 considers the broadly qualitative nature of Nietzsche's denial of 
suffering in greater detail. I explore Nietzsche's views on suffering through a 
consideration of his critique of pity, which tums on the view that pity and not suffering 
is dangerous. I adopt Henry Staten's analysis of the power relationship between 
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individuals within Nietzsche's critique of pity. Staten's analysis puts the concept of the 
mirror to work in order to explain how pity can result in the appropriation of being, and 
thereby a reversal in power between the unfortunate, suffering individual and the non-
sufferer who pities such an individual. Staten's analysis reads this power-relationship of 
mirroring in terms of practical cmelty. I concur that Nietzsche's critique of pity is made 
on a practical basis. However, I question whether Nietzsche's intentions are more 
innocent than Staten imagines, thus divorcing Nietzsche's practicality with regard to 
pity from the notion of cmelty. This reading of the critique of pity yields what will 
become the key aspect of my argument in defence of the aestheticist claim: a mirroring 
power-relationship between individuals within a wider ontology of will to power. 
In section 3.3, I show how Nietzsche approaches the phenomenon of suffering 
through the critique of pity in accordance with his wider ontology of will to power, and 
thereby consider how his claims of pity as dangerous and of suffering as noble might in 
fact be justifiable. I demonstrate this through an exegesis of Nietzsche's remarks in a 
passage from Z entitled 'The Ugliest Man', where Zarathustra overcomes the test of 
pity. Zarathustra and the character of the Ugliest Man are interpreted in the light of the 
mirroring power-relationship identified in the previous section, and while Zarathustra's 
vulnerability to being-appropriation is revealed, the creative dynamism of his character 
is shown ultimately to lead him out of the danger posed by pity. As a corollary, I 
consider the problem of Socrates, in order to reveal the related fallacy that Nietzsche 
sees in making value judgements about life. As I show, Nietzsche sees pity as the 
product of the ascetic ideal, which is itself the product of the alienation of the 
individual. Such alienation is made manifest to the individual in two ways: through the 
realisation that others do not share our pain or our experiences of suffering, and through 
the realisation that our individual pain and suffering is itself meaningless. For 
Nietzsche, in a creative sense that is characteristic of the aestheticist outlook, we create 
a meaning for our pain through the ascetic ideal in order to safeguard the will in the face 
of the meaninglessness of suffering. However, in so doing, we come to believe the 
meaning we have created in the form of the ascetic ideal; pity thus proves to be a 
dangerous ally of nihihsm by virtue of its anti-life consequences. Thus in Nietzsche's 
view, pity provides an opportunity for the weaker individual to appropriate the being of 
the stronger type. 
I therefore conclude in section 3.4 that Nietzsche thinks we ought not to seek to 
alleviate suffering in order not to fall victim to pity and its consequence of 
powerlessness. But while the preceding sections give us reason to think that Nietzsche's 
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critique of pity is internally coherent and that it evades the charge of trivialisation, they 
do not adequately explain the mechanism by which pain and terror can be justified in 
aesthetic terms. Turning to a positive account of Nietzsche's views on suffering, the 
possibility of a mirroring power-relation within tragedy comes to the fore. Nietzsche's 
claim that suffering is heroic in that it is tragic thus provides us with an important clue 
with respect to the link between being and art which constitutes the common ontological 
ground required for a successful defence of aestheticism. 
109 
3.1: The idea of suffering as a moral problem 
In this section, I consider the ethical problem for aestheticism. I begin by outlining the 
significance of the scope of the aestheticist claim. Taking the utilitarian analysis of 
suffering as a case in point, I show how suffering counts as a moral problem for 
aestheticism. I identify the basic assumption of such analysis to be dependent upon a 
quantitative methodology. The quantitative assumption is that although suffering may 
turn out to have beneficial consequences for an individual, it is not generally in our best 
interests, and hence should be avoided wherever possible. However, in turning to the 
possibility of a qualitative analysis of suffering, I consider that where for some 
individuals the quantitative assumption may hold, for other individuals it does not, on 
the ground of possible difference between qualitative experience of suffering. Any view 
of suffering ought to appreciate the significance of the qualitative consciousness which 
undergoes the experience of suffering. As such, the quantitative assumption is 
inadequate as a basis for the moral view of suffering as problematic. I thus move to 
consider a view of the qualitative analysis and its relationship to the question of taste, 
anticipating to some extent the move that Nietzsche makes in his critique of pity. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, one of the key factors of aestheticism is the dynamism 
which it attributes to interpretation. This involves a direct link between interpretation 
and the organic in terms of the embodiment of experience: 
Let the attentive friend call to mind the effect of a true musical tragedy in a pure and 
unadulterated way, in terms of his own experiences (BT, §22). 
And yet the distance between truth and art within the modem perspective misleads us 
into thinking there really is a distinction between experiential and aesthetic 
interpretation. As such, it would be more than possible to cite instances where 'life is 
beautiful' or 'life is like a work of art' as a simple means of defending the principle of 
the aestheticist claim. But this would lead us to underestimate the full impact of the 
commitment demanded from us by the claim. At first glance, in fact, it is easy to 
understand why the requisite level of commitment is almost sufficient to damn a full 
defence of the claim out of hand. The difficulty is simple, but far-reaching: the claim is 
not selective. Al l of our experiences, all aspects of life and existence, are subject to the 
aestheticist claim, no matter how painful or unpleasant. It might seem that there is no 
real difficulty in considering the aestheticist claim defensible in the light of certain 
examples of intense pain and suffering, such as the pain of childbirth, which is 
redeemed by the birth of a healthy child. But consider a less favourable outcome, in 
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which the child is stillborn, or suffering from a congenital disease. The question of 
whether the pain and suffering is justified in this case is far more difficult to answer. 
More to the point, does the aestheticist claim still seem defensible in the light of such an 
example? There is something intuitively uncomfortable, even morally dubious, about 
defending the aestheticist claim in the light of examples in which pain and suffering 
seem to be unjustifiable.'* And this means that the phenomenon of suffering poses a 
significant ethical problem for my proposed defence of the aestheticist claim. 
Suffering is widely thought of as a problem, and is specifically treated as a 
problem within the majority of moral theory. Some consideration of the moralist's 
perspective on suffering is therefore necessary. In formal terms, the characterisation of 
something as a problem requires that a solution be found. Translating this into ethical 
terms, treating suffering as a problem demands that either a complete or a partial 
solution to the problem must be found. At best, the moralist hopes for a way to solve the 
problem by eradicating suffering. I f this is not possible, then the moralist sets out to find 
a meaning for the phenomenon of suffering, and hence an amelioration of the problem. 
In Nietzschean terms, the problematisation of suffering from within the moralist's 
perspective means that the claim that we ought not to alleviate suffering, but should 
instead try to see it as beautiful, is readily classifiable either as inappropriate or as 
morally bankrupt. But let us consider the moralist's perspective in a little more detail. 
An example of the ethical inappropriacy of suffering that is useful for my purposes here 
is furnished by utilitarianism.^ 
Suffering is usually taken by the utilitarian to be quantifiable as a veritable bete 
noire, by virtue of its incompatibility with the ethical imperative of the Benthamite 
pleasure/pain principle, and equally with later and more moderate principles of utility.^ 
Yet even despite the undesirability of suffering, the utilitarian attaches a great deal of 
importance to suffering, counting it as the criterion for establishing an individual's 
moral category. Moral category here refers not only to the question of whether or not it 
** This refers to Allan Megill's claim that aestheticism trivialises realia. See Megill, PE, p. 345. Megill 
counts the Holocaust as an example of pain and suffering that would be trivialised via aestheticism, 
although he stops short of a detailed examination. For a discussion of moral issues concerning the 
Holocaust and the Third Reich, see Geoffrey Scarre, "Understanding the Moral Phenomenology of the 
Third Reich", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1, 1998, pp. 423-445. 
' Utilitarianism provides us with a good example here, but this is not to overlook other aspects of moral 
theory that are equally opposed to the idea of suffering, such as the Kantian (deontological) imperative 
which may be invoked against any instance of suffering. 
* For example, Geoffrey Scarre's unpublished paper "Mill and Nietzsche on the value of suffering" 
argues that in spite of having acknowledged the positive power of suffering to a greater extent than 
Nietzsche allowed, Mill holds to a hedonistic view of pain as potentially destructive (p. 2). See GM 1, §1, 
for Nietzsche's views on the "English psychologists", which include Darwin and Bentham as well as 
Mill. See also H'Pl, §30. 
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is wrong to inflict pain upon an individual, but more generally to the question of 
whether or not they are to be included in a shared moral stance towards the world that 
is, or should be, effected by each individual.^ Although the ability to suffer is thus to 
some extent the defining principle for inclusion within the category of moral concern 
for the utilitarian, somewhat ironically, suffering is also what the utilitarian wishes to 
counter through the practical exercise of his/her moral theory. For the utilitarian, 
suffering is, in terms of our status as the objects of moral concern, simply not in our best 
interests. This concern can be captured by the following formulation: 
If a human is tormented, why is it wrong? Because he suffers.^ 
However, this is not inevitably the case for the utilitarian. As a counter to the view that 
suffering is just not in our best interests, we might consider a case where suffering goes 
to diminish greater or more widespread suffering. For instance, having toothache 
sometimes serves as a warning to visit a dentist before the tooth's condition worsens. 
The consequence of suffering in such a case is ultimately quantifiable as beneficial -
despite some inconvenience, the warning is heeded, a trip to the dentist ensues, and the 
tooth gets better following treatment. But this simple analysis via quantification is 
inadequate; some account should also be taken of the qualitative approach to utilitarian 
moral concerns. 
Defending J. S. Mill 's claim that pleasure and pain differ qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively. Rem B. Edwards distinguishes between the qualitative hedonist and the 
psychological/quantitative hedonist.^ For such a qualitative hedonist, pain behaviour in 
the case of a toothache such as holding one's jaw or wincing is not intrinsically bad, just 
as no material object is intrinsically good.'° Edwards emphasises the importance of the 
qualitative consciousness, in which our understanding and experience of pain does not 
simply equate to pain behaviour but instead is defined by a quality of inner feeling." 
Returning to the example of toothache, we can observe a clear distinction between the 
qualitative and the quantitative analyses. In quantitative terms, the experience of 
^ Both Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill adopted versions of this argument. James Rachels, The Elements of 
Moral Philosophy, (London: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993), p. 98. 
^ Ibid. It should also be noted that the same principle is applied by Rachels to all those capable of 
suffering, including animals. 
' Rem B. Edwards, Pleasures and Pains, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 27, 35. 
'"Ibid. 
" In rejecting Henry Sidgwick's argument contra Mill that qualitative comparisons of pleasures must 
resolve into quantitative ones, Edwards cites as evidence the quantitative naivety of assuming, in a post-
Wittgensteinian age, that by virtue of their common names the 'family concepts' of pleasure and pain are 
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toothache is ultimately beneficial: we exhibit pain behaviour, are warned by it to care 
for our well-being, receive treatment and cease to exhibit pain-behaviour. However, the 
potential benefit to one's overall health notwithstanding, in qualitative terms, it is 
possible for the suffering caused by intense anxiety about a visit to the dentist and by 
the deeply unpleasant experience of dental treatment to eclipse the original pain. In 
some cases this may actually be more damaging to the general well-being of the 
individual than simply putting up with the toothache. In the light of Edwards' point 
concerning the primary role of the qualitative consciousness, the notion of any course of 
action as being necessarily the correct one in terms of our best interests is displaced: 
what is right for a person with no fear of the dentist may not be so for a different person 
who does fear the dentist. 
From a qualitative perspective, therefore, the quantitative analysis is inadequate 
as a simple basis upon which to make the claim that suffering is not in our best interests. 
In terms of our example, the qualitative position shows that the fact that a trip to the 
dentist might benefit the individual's dental health must also be weighed against the 
variable possibility of benefit or detriment to the individual's mental health. The 
question of whether or not the individual who prefers to avoid the dentist is acting 
reasonably is inconsequential from the perspective of the qualitative hedonist. I f the 
qualitative consciousness receives priority, then all that is required is a pleasurable 
outcome for the particular individual, whose own evaluation of the outcome is key: a 
pleasurable outcome is not necessarily inconsistent with toothache. This is not to make 
any specific claim concerning the nature of qualitative consciousness, nor is it to 
attribute a conception of self to Nietzsche. The point is simply that in failing to take the 
qualitative consciousness into consideration, the quantitative analysis overlooks the 
possibility of diverse responses to suffering by focusing on the functional correction of 
'problematic' pain-behaviour. In the light of this possibility, the quantitative account 
cannot make a defensible claim for knowledge of what is in our best interests: its view 
of suffering is revealed as incomplete. 
With Edwards' point in mind, we can appreciate how a move towards the 
qualitative develops the moral point on suffering into a question of taste. The 
significance of taste and the aesthetic as a part of qualitative experience in such matters 
is evoked by Junichiro Tanizaki's praise of the 'sheen of antiquity', which refers to a 
polish that "comes of being touched over and over again, a sheen produced by the oils 
in fact 'common property' concepts (Edwards, op. cit., note 9, p. 35). Note the connection here to 
contemporary discussion within the philosophy of mind of the importance of qualia. 
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that naturally permeate an object over long years of handling".'^ Arguing on this basis 
for the possible filth of elegance as well as acknowledging its frigidity, Tanizaki 
contrasts the humanising effect of this sheen (otherwise known as 'grime') with the 
alienation effect of ultra-modem medicine and its environs. Hence to continue with the 
example of toothache, although we hate to visit the dentist because of the "scream of his 
drill", "the excessive glitter of glass and metal is equally intimidating".'^ Tanizaki's 
conclusion that in general, "we find it hard to be really at home with things that shine 
and glitter", is an expression of the deep significance of the aesthetic when qualitative 
considerations are given to moral issues. Nietzsche might have concurred with 
Tanizaki's emphasis upon qualitative considerations in the case of the dentist: "What 
difference remains between a toothache and the ache (pity) evoked by the sight of a 
toothache?" {HA, §104). The question that remains is whether Nietzsche's wider 
concerns also reflect the significance of the qualitative consciousness. 
If we were sure that the experience of suffering is not in our best interests, then 
the notion of suffering as desirable would, according to the quantitative hedonist, 
constitute moral idiosyncrasy at the very least.''^  In as far as Nietzsche stands as an 
exception to this evaluation of suffering, his view is counted as idiosyncratic from a 
quantitative perspective. But as we have seen, the quantitative analysis is inadequate as 
a basis for the moral view of suffering because it fails to take sufficient account of 
qualitative consciousness. Nietzsche himself gives far greater weight to the uniquely 
perspectival nature of the qualitative feel of experience, in spite of his denial that there 
are such things as selves, subjects, egos, individuals or persons.'^ The qualitative 
hedonist would certainly find more in common with Nietzsche's view through the 
emphasis on the significance of the qualitative consciousness, although this is by no 
Junichiro Tanizaki, In Praise of Shadows, Thomas J. Harper & Edward G. Seidensticker (trans.), 
(London: Vintage, 2001), p. 20. 
'Mbid.,p. 21. 
Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 
123. Nehamas shows that the ascetic ideal promises that suffering may indeed decrease if the sufferer 
distances him/herself as far as possible from the conditions that asceticism holds responsible for such 
suffering. 
See David E . Cooper, "Self and Morality in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche", Christopher Janaway (ed.), 
Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's educator, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp. 196-197, 216. For Cooper, the point of such self-denial concerns the "opportunity for human 
beings" which is created in the form of the Nietzschean dictum to become who we are. This is in direct 
contrast to Schopenhauer's self-denial which retains the conviction of fixity of character, and which for 
Cooper allows only for the possibility of release from ourselves in which we "are no longer o/this world, 
but rather the world's 'undimmed mirror"'(p. 216). These divergent self-denials are at the root of the 
distinction between Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's equally distinct turns from metaphysics to ethics (p. 
197). On the theme of the self, see also Sarah Kofman, "Accessories {Ecce Homo, 'Why I Write Such 
Good Books', 'The Untimelies', 3)", Peter R. Sedgwick (ed.), Nietzsche: A Critical Reader, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995). 
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means to identify Nietzsche as a qualitative hedonist."^ What is required at this point in 
our discussion, therefore, is a more detailed consideration of Nietzsche's thinking on the 
theme of suffering. 
We should note that Edwards classifies Nietzsche as an antihedonist, even despite the similarity of their 
respective stances on judgement (op. cit., note 9, p. 20). I agree with Edwards that the qualitative 
consciousness is deeply significant for utilitarian moral theory. However, I consider attempts to discuss 
Nietzsche's views on suffering and pain in the specific terms of hedonism or antihedonism to be 
misleading. Detailed arguments for either case would involve the distancing of Nietzsche's remarks from 
their wider context - which, as I have been arguing, is the aestheticist context. If taken from this wider 
context then no matter what the range of possible interpretations, it becomes all too easy to lose sight of 
the overall unity of Nietzsche's writing. 
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3.2: Nietzsche's denial of the problem of suffering: the critique of pity 
The complaint of the moralist against Nietzsche seems to be made on quantitative, 
rather than qualitative grounds. With the quantitative objection to his aestheticism 
withdrawn on the ground that its evaluation overlooks the significance of the qualitative 
consciousness, we can begin to appreciate the significance of the aesthetic for suffering. 
Later in the chapter, Nietzsche's own views on suffering will be considered in this light. 
First, I want to look at what Nietzsche has to say on suffering in greater detail. As we 
will see, Nietzsche thinks that suffering is both necessary and desirable, and that it is 
inevitable. The claim that suffering is inevitable does not mean that Nietzsche simply 
resigns himself to a kind of fatalism with respect to the possibihty of future suffering. 
Instead, he seems inclined to relish the prospect of suffering, and to welcome it. This 
seems all the more idiosyncratic, given the chronic pain that Nietzsche suffered 
throughout his life, and the consistent efforts that he made to gain some measure of 
control over his health.'^ Rather than a problem of ethics, therefore, aestheticism is 
faced by a problem of internal incoherence. The role of this section is thus to examine 
Nietzsche's views on suffering with a view to establishing their coherence. 
Nietzsche interprets the phenomenological experience of suffering in terms of 
pity, as this is the only means by which he finds that one individual can authentically 
approach the pain or suffering of another individual.'^ This is so despite his 
acknowledgement that access to each other's qualitative pain-experience remains 
impossible: 
Our personal and profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost 
everyone; here we remain hidden from our neighbour, even if we eat from one pot (GS, 
§338)." 
" Pierre Klossowski offers a significant study of the interconnection between Nietzsche's ill health and 
his thinking in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, Daniel W. Smith (trans.), (London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group - Athlone Press, 2001). 
Citing HA, §§50, 103, D, §134, GS, §99 and BGE, §§201, 225 as textual evidence, Brian Leiter 
contends that a problem of translation obscures the context of Nietzsche's critique of pity. Leiter thinks 
that Nietzsche's polemics against Mitleid as a moral ideal are clearly directed at Schopenhauer's ethics; 
however, this point is obscured in English by the fact that most translators of Schopenhauer render 
Mitleid as "compassion", while most translators of Nietzsche render the same German word as "pity". See 
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 57. 
" A sustained comparison between Nietzsche's thoughts on our knowledge of the suffering of others and 
the contemporaneous ones of J. S. Mill in his consideration of the problem of other minds is not possible 
here, for reasons of space. However, brief consideration of this point seems justified. Consider 
Nietzsche's view that we "conclude by analogy that something hurts another, and through our memory 
and power of imagination we ourselves can feel ill at such a thought" {HA, §104). For Nietzsche, the 
creative power of memory and imagination within its ontological context of will to power is the key 
factor of analysis: we never know how painful an action is to another person, because we cannot have 
authentic knowledge of their mental state. However, Mill's attitude to pity stands in contrast to that of 
Nietzsche by virtue of his views on knowledge of other minds by analogy, which reflect differing 
ontological convictions: "the love of domineering over others...the egotism which thinks self and its 
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The impossibility of such access prompts Nietzsche's consideration of the question of 
whether it is good for us to be full of pity, and further, whether this is good for those 
who suffer {GS, §338). Nietzsche asks, "where are your greatest dangers?", and answers 
that they lie "in pity" (G^, §271). On the face of it, the view that pity, rather than 
suffering, is not in our best interests and that it is dangerous seems particularly counter-
intuitive. But this is cast into the shade by what is perhaps Nietzsche's most provocative 
statement on pity occurs in HA, where during his discussion of La Rochefoucauld's 
writing on pity Nietzsche remarks that "of course one ought to express pity, but one 
ought to guard against having i t" (HA, §50). 
This remark demands our careful consideration. At first glance, it seems to be a 
comment made in curiously bad faith - in which case, there is a charge to be levelled at 
Nietzsche of cynicism. However, note that Nietzsche does not say that we do not 
experience pity. Neither does he suggest directly that we should feign it - he limits 
himself to a warning against the having of pity, in the possessive sense. In order to lay 
the charge of cynicism to rest, it is helpful to compare this warning remark to a passage 
from GS: 
We benefit and show benevolence to those who are already dependent on us in some way 
(which means that they are used to thinking of us as causes); we want to increase their 
power because in that way we increase ours ... (OS, § 13) 
Interpreted in terms of power, the warning to express pity but to guard against having it 
can be viewed not as a cynical remark, but as a practical one.^ ^ Nietzsche had already 
explained in HA that the unfortunate man wrongly counts pity as the greatest good on 
earth.^' For Nietzsche, the stupidity of this notion is underlined by the guilty enjoyment 
of power by these unfortunates as they realise that despite their overall weakness, they 
still have one form of power left to them: "the power to hurt" (HA, §50). 
Developing this analysis further, Nietzsche compares the unfortunate man with 
"children who weep and cry, so that they will be pitied", and argues that expressions of 
concerns more important than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions in its own favour - these 
are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moral character". J. S. Mill, On Liberty, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 145. See also J. S. Mill, An Examination of Sir William 
Hamilton's Philosophy, J. M. Robson (ed.), (University of Toronto Press/London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1979), and Scarre, op. cit., note 6, p. 2. 
See Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 173-
174. Danto summarises Nietzsche's view that, simply by being alive, we are constantly involved in 
exercising our power over other persons and other things, and vice-versa. 
'^ Schopenhauer believed that pity was the source of every moral action. Thus Nietzsche is engaged in a 
polemic against "moral sympathy theorists", of whom Schopenhauer counts as one representative (Danto, 
ibid., pp. 184-185). See also Chapter 1 for a discussion of the genesis of moral values from out of fear. 
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pain and misfortune are basically aimed at hurting the spectators of this misfortune, in 
order that the unfortunate might quench the thirst for pity that is to be equated with the 
thirst for self-enjoyment (HA, §50).^^ Nietzsche's complaint is that "most people are too 
dishonest, and a few men are too good, to know anything about this source of shame" 
(HA, §50). Yet although he knows that the dishonest and the good may try to deny that 
it is a pleasure to inflict pain in such a way, Nietzsche concludes his analysis by siding 
with Prosper Merimee, who warns: 
Know that nothing is more common than to do harm for the pleasure of doing it (HA, 
§50). 
This passage from HA may be viewed productively alongside another passage from 
GM, in which Nietzsche comments that the slave revolt in morals begins when 
ressentiment itself becomes creative and ordains values (GM 1, §10). The noble 
morality that affirms itself is contrasted with the slave morality that, in rejecting "an 
'outside'", reveals its reversal of an evaluating gaze as a creative act characteristic of 
ressentiment (GM 1, §10). The reversal of the evaluating gaze is demonstrated 
particularly clearly in the passage from HA, in which our natural intuition that the weak 
and suffering unfortunate is powerless, is challenged by Nietzsche's interpretation of the 
unfortunate man as reviving his self-image through the very receipt of pity. 
Once again, Nietzsche's analysis has a practical basis, in which the investment in 
cruelty is shown to be a good one in as far as it promises to preserve the being of the 
one who is cruel.^^ However, I remain unconvinced that the link between cruelty and 
practicality is a necessary one. Part of the problem here is that the practicality Nietzsche 
is advocating is conceived of in active terms, and it is an active/passive dynamic which 
insinuates a teleology of cruelty as guiding action. Suffering is undoubtedly a part of 
being and of the world; as Arthur Danto puts it, there is always suffering as "this is the 
way that the world is", insofar as he thinks that in Nietzsche there is a passive sense of 
suffering that means to be acted upon, rather than being active oneself.'^ '* Danto 
consequently argues that Nietzsche affirms the practical nature of cruelty, using the 
example that "the wood must suffer i f the table is to be built"; but he couples this with 
an element of Schadenfreude in the sheer spectacle of suffering. However, any link to 
the notion of Schadenfreude through a sense of passivity in Nietzsche's view of 
This is a rare use of the figure of the child by Nietzsche to symbolise something negative, rather than 
positive or life-affirming. 
Henry Staten, Nietzsche's Voice, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 102. 
Danto, op. cit., note 20, pp. 173-174. 
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suffering can be called into question when the Nietzschean power-relation of mirroring 
is applied. As we will see, there is no authentic passivity in Nietzsche's critique of pity, 
and as such, there is no cruelty either. 
First it is necessary to consider what is meant by a 'power-relation of mirroring'. 
In his interpretation of Nietzsche's view of cruelty and pity, Henry Staten describes a 
process of human interaction using the idea of a mirror.Staten asks us to imagine two 
individuals, one inflicting suffering, and one who suffers: 
The one who inflicts suffering forces the sufferer to turn towards him and grant him an 
absolute recognition; he thus appropriates the substance of the sufferer as mirror of his 
own being, the sufferer reflects him back to himself with an intensity and inevitability 
which belong only to the being of the inflicter of pain.^ * 
Staten's idea of mirroring is a deeply significant one, as we shall see; as such, it is 
surprising that it has been neglected within the available literature. However, perhaps 
more surprising is the fact that mirroring is underdeveloped even in Staten's own 
reading of the critique of pity. This underdevelopment is owing at least in part to 
Staten's prefacing of his analysis by attributing the critique of pity to Nietzsche's 
reaction against Schopenhauerianism.^^ This results in a view of Nietzsche's practical 
critique as linked to cruelty. Staten does acknowledge some ambivalence of strength 
and power in the critique of pity; but I suspect that Nietzsche's view of receptivity to the 
being of others is not so polarised as he ultimately concludes. I shall consider Staten's 
view of mirroring as symptomatic of Nietzsche' practical cruelty in the critique of pity, 
and shall then turn to consider how Staten's account may be extended. 
Staten's view is that the pathos of distance and the distinction of rank order in 
Nietzsche are variants of the "striving to impress one's being violently on the substance 
of the other".'^ ^ The sufferer can only echo; he cannot authentically experience or truly 
understand the inflicter of pain's feelings and thus he remains alienated from his natural 
Staten, op. cit., note 23, pp. 102-103. 
Ibid. 
" This is a similar position to that of Danto described earlier, and is also found in Bernd Magnus, Stanley 
Stewart and Jean-Pierre Mileur in Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature, (London: Routledge, 
1993), pp. 195-196. In the sense that Nietzsche's break with Schopenhauer was undeniably influential, it 
seems reasonable to accept that the critique of pity may to some small extent be motivated by 
reactionism. Yet Staten casts this reactionism in the light of periodisation, arguing that the Nietzsche of 
BT, while enthralled by Schopenhauer, "had glorified an expansive, even cosmic, receptivity to the being 
of others and Promethean self-expenditure on their behalf, which was followed by an "upward 
revaluation" of cruelty following Nietzsche's rejection of Schopenhauerianism (p. 102). As we shall see 
in this section, the attribution of cruelty is questionable. But Staten also fails to take the innocence of 
becoming into proper account which, as I will argue in Chapter 4, is present both in Brand in the 'later' 
works such as Z. On the broader theme of continuity in Nietzsche, see my Conclusion. 
^'Ibid. 
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interpretative aestheticist freedom. Recalling the point made earlier that Nietzsche 
thinks that we cannot have access to one another's pain and suffering, Staten's idea of 
the mirror also seems to reflect the distance, or alienation, that persists between each 
individual in modem culture, even where individuals interact.^^ Staten's reading centres 
on Nietzsche's remarks on the striving for distinction, in which Nietzsche directly 
challenges the constitution of empathy as wholesome (D, §113). It is worth citing these 
remarks here: 
The striving for distinction keeps a constant eye on the next man and wants to know what 
his feelings are: but the empathy which this drive requires for its gratification is far from 
being harmless or sympathetic or kind. We want, rather, to perceive or divine how the 
next man outwardly or inwardly suffers from us, how he loses control over himself and 
surrenders to the impressions our hand or even merely the sight of us makes upon him; 
and even when he who strives after distinction makes and wants to make a joyful, 
elevating or cheering impression, he nonetheless enjoys this success not inasmuch as he 
has given joy to the next man or elevated or cheered him, but inasmuch as he has 
impressed himself on the soul of the other, changed its shape and ruled over it at his own 
sweet will (D, §113). 
For Staten, Nietzsche "recoils from the expansiveness of the Dionysian", his pity 
turning to nausea at the fear of "contamination and violation of his being" by the herd.^'' 
Staten is not unaware of Nietzsche's deep feeling for suffering of the "masses of 
humanity"; however for him, Nietzsche's response to this feeling is to fortify himself 
against it by affirming the ascendant life, which he thinks incorporates a tendency to 
become a "celebration of isolation, cruelty and appropriativeness".'" Thus Staten 
concludes that recognition is cruelly forced upon the passive sufferer by the person who 
is actively inflicting pain. But the mistake here is in thinking that the inherent violence 
of being-appropriation is a symptom of cruelty, rather than of will to power; violence is 
accurate only as a description of the energy and activity in the ongoing aestheticist 
interpretation of will to power.^ ^ 
If we take Nietzsche's warning remark on the expression of pity into account, we 
can see that the spectator who expresses pity but who does not "have pity" in the 
The awareness of individual human alienation within social interaction that is reflected by Staten's 
mirror critique recalls an image from OTL, in which Nietzsche describes the researcher's view of the 
universe as "the infinitely refracted echo of an original sound, that of humanity, and as the multiple copy 
of a single, original image, that of humanity" (p. 148). In the same passage, the researcher's project is 
directly linked to human suffering and happiness by analogy to the astrologer (ibid.). 
Staten, op. cit., note 23, p. 103. 
Ibid. 
This is also a key theme of Chapter 4. However, we should recall David Cooper's point that power can 
be intrinsic to an activity, which is characteristic of Nietzsche's aestheticism in that the power of 
aestheticist interpretation is intrinsic. See Cooper, Authenticity and Learning, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 82-83. 
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possessive sense, expresses pity as a show of benevolence, thereby increasing his/her 
own power and reinforcing identity.^^ With this in mind, recognition is no longer 
absolute in Staten's sense, but shared: the benevolent spectator is no longer appropriated 
but deliberately grants recognition to the unfortunate man, whose complaining is 
intended to force recognition. The ideas of benevolence and the intoxicating effect of 
suffering are also found together in a passage from GS, in which Nietzsche draws our 
attention to the direct connection between pain and power: 
Certainly the state in which we hurt others is rarely as agreeable, in an unadulterated way, 
as that in which we benefit others; it is a sign that we are still lacking in power, or it 
shows a sense of frustradon in the face of this poverty; it is accompanied by new dangers 
and uncertainties for what power we do possess, and clouds our horizon with the prospect 
of revenge, scom, punishment and failure (GS, §13). 
We should also note the similarity between this passage and the section from Part 4 of 
Z, entitled 'The Ugliest Man'. In the GS passage, the pitying state in which we hurt 
others "clouds our horizon" with revenge, in the same way that in the Z passage, the 
Ugliest Man recounts Zarathustra's teaching that "A great cloud emerges from pity, take 
care mankind!" back to him, and ironically notes his proficiency in "weather-omens" (Z, 
Part 4, 'The Ugliest Man'). This latter similarity hints at a connection between 
Nietzsche's critique of pity and the notion of time. The Ugliest Man's irony in the Z 
passage distinguishes Zarathustra's commitment to the future, which is (depending upon 
one's perspective) filled with possibility or dangerously uncertain. I shall return to the 
notion of time later in this section. Continuing with the point on cruelty, however, 
Nietzsche's acknowledgement that we cause pain to others is not a claim for practical 
cruelty, so much as the recognition that we are imperfect. Certainly, there are instances 
in which we hurt others when we want them to feel our power; Nietzsche admits that 
" C f Ruth Abbey, Nietzsche's Middle Period, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 55-67, 177-
178. Abbey argues that Nietzsche finds a role for benevolence that is not coupled with power, in that 
benevolence "does not subdue the other to affirm itself, and it can give without counting the cost" (p. 66). 
Pity, she thinks, can be genuine when it is expressed in a certain way between friends, citing Nietzsche's 
remark that "you will also wish to help - but only those whose distress you understand entirely because 
they share with you one suffering and one hope - your friends - and only in the manner in which you help 
yourself (G5, §338). Ultimately, Abbey is overly concerned to redeem Nietzsche from potential moral 
disgrace by showing that benevolence and power may be disassociated. In so doing, she ignores the 
possibility that becoming within the will to power can be read in terms of innocence, and that 
appropriation of the other is not necessarily sinister, but is an inevitable part of interaction within an 
ontology of will to power. On this reading, like-mindedness does not constitute the transcension of 
individuation, as Abbey claims (p. 67) - and it is worth noting here that, despite the remarks on like-
mindedness amongst friends that she cites, Nietzsche's idea of like-mindedness is ultimately coloured by 
his sense that no matter what the relationship, we cannot authentically know another's mind. Rather, the 
only possible transcension of individuation that Nietzsche allows, lies in the judicious lie of the unity of 
nature, which is the metaphysical consolation afforded us by tragedy. While consoling, this is of course 
illusory, in the sense that we cannot authentically know it to be the case. 
121 
pain is a "much more efficient means to that end than pleasure" (GS, §13). However, the 
way in which we understand this efficiency is critical. As Nietzsche argues, only "the 
most irritable and covetous devotees of the feeling of power" actually prefer to "imprint 
the seal of power on a recalcitrant brow" (GS, §13). Rather than a question of ethics, 
this comes down to a question of taste dependent upon individual temperament: for 
Nietzsche, what is most decisive is how one chooses to ''spice" one's life (GS, §13). 
We can therefore add an additional and significant facet to Staten's basic process 
of mirroring described above, in which the significance of alienation is altered. In 
Staten's model, the sufferer is appropriated, and in reflecting the substance of the cruel 
inflicter of pain's being, he is granted no recognition. Yet in the case of the unfortunate 
man, it is the spectator whose being is appropriated by the sufferer, or unfortunate man, 
and who must recognise him. The unfortunate man inflicts the cruelty of his "eloquent 
laments and whimpering" on the spectator, who responds with pity (HA, §50). The 
tables are turned, and where the spectator becomes the unfortunate, the unfortunate 
becomes the spectator/inflicter of pain. However, the original roles are also retained: 
being-appropriation continues as described in Staten's model even while the reversal 
takes place. In the light of this, we can see that there is no longer a clear 'passive' role 
to be ascribed to a spectator/inflicter of pain or to an unfortunate sufferer. The power-
relation of mirroring is not, as in Staten's account, the forced recognition of being-
appropriation within an active/passive dynamic. The presence of the passive in the 
power-relation is illusory; as we have seen, there is in fact no true passive role for either 
individual within the power-relation. Mirroring may thus be taken to describe the 
power-relation in a purely active sense, as multidirectional rather than as unidirectional. 
For Nietzsche, then, the danger of pity lies in the possibility of having one's being 
appropriated and thus in practical terms, losing the expressive freedom of one's 
aestheticist interpretative power. However, understanding this point requires the 
transfiguration of our perception. We simply cannot understand Nietzsche's point from 
the perspective of the herd, for when presented with the point in the "market-place" 
context of what we understand to be normative social interaction: 
the mob blink and say: "We are all equal." "You Higher Men" - thus the mob blink -
"there are no Higher Men, we are all equal, man is but man, before God - we are all 
equal!" (Z4, 'Of The Higher Man', §1).^" 
As well as the serious transfigurative point, there is a counterpoint to observe: a sense of parody is at 
work in this passage. This is best illustrated by comparison with the infamous line from the Monty Python 
film The Life of Brian, in which the mob quite literally blink and claim univocally that they "are all 
individuals". For Nietzsche, the absurdity of equality is akin to the logical absurdity of the collective 
claim for individuality expressed in the film. 
122 
In the case of the unfortunate man, the expression of pity constitutes evidence of 
recognition and thereby appropriation of being. As Arthur Danto puts it, for those with 
some awareness "to witness the suffering of others enhances, i f but for a moment, their 
own sense of power", and thus he reasons that the observation of suffering is always 
intoxicating - and it is even more intoxicating to cause suffering in another.^ ^ But 
critically, as has been shown, such intoxication is symptomatic of active and ongoing 
aestheticist interpretation, and not of power-crazed cruelty. 
The connection between pain, suffering and power has wider consequences for 
my defence of the aestheticist claim in two senses. First, there is a case to be made for 
the idea of the reversal of the evaluating gaze as tied to the process of mirroring by 
means of a relation of recognition through being-appropriation and identity. The 
reversal of the evaluating gaze is given as a characteristic of ressentiment, according to 
Nietzsche's overarching analysis in GM 1. For the slave morality, the creative act is 
constituted by the act of saying no to life, where identity - understood both in terms of 
the illusion of a fixed self and of defining action - is at least in part dependent upon a 
form of self-deception. The slave culture chooses the ascetic interpretation to explain 
the suffering inherent to life, and in so choosing, reveals an insidious awareness of the 
possibility of choice in this matter, and thereby the constructed nature of identi ty.The 
broader, life-affirming importance of identity-creation is expressed by the following 
declaration: 
We, however, want to become those we are - human beings who are new, unique, 
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves (G5, §335). 
As a characteristic of ressentiment, the reversal of the evaluating gaze constitutes a part 
of the rejection of the other by the unfortunate man, and thus speaks to the irreducibly 
negative denial of life that ressentiment shares with the proponent of asceticism.Both 
of these are capable of creating values, but the consequent values are quite literally bad 
for our health, and for the health of our culture, as they simply fail to affirm life. 
Danto, op. cit., note 20, pp. 173-174. 
On the theme of self-deception and the problem of consciousness, see for example GS §§354, 355, 357 
& 361. Nietzsche's views on self-deception are intriguing: he denies a fixed conception of the 
individuated self, but allows that a process of self-deception, ordinarily dependent upon a fixed 
conception of the individuated self, is necessary to the worldview of the ascetic. The higher type, 
however, is in a more complex situation: this type is considered to be aware of such self-deception, on the 
ground of this type's ability to acknowledge the force of the aestheticist claim. Yet at the same time, the 
higher type cannot avoid using the cultural products of self-deception. I suspect that a full analysis of 
Nietzsche's views on self-deception in relation to aestheticism and culture, impossible in the present 
study, would reveal Nietzsche to hold a unique and valuable aestheticist conception of mind. 
Asceticism will receive further attention below. 
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Furthermore, the failure to affirm life is reflected by the failure of the slave culture to 
produce the human beings to whom Nietzsche appeals: self-creating, unique beings. 
What has changed through this account of the mirroring power-relation - what 
has been transfigured - is our perception of the significance of power in the relationship 
between the unfortunate and the spectator. With the awareness of the power relation, 
Nietzsche's argument is strong enough to overturn the preconception of pity as a 
positive moral emotion within the wider context of his critique of value. Unless the 
spectator can overcome the drive to have pity, to suffer from it rather than simply to 
express it, he/she loses the dynamism of his/her own power and risks having his/her 
being appropriated.^^ Where pity is held and expressed, without the possibility of 
appropriating the substance of the other, the individual cannot be recognised and thus 
has no power. But where pity is merely expressed, rather than held, the individual 
retains power. Within Nietzsche's imagination, the possibility exists of a situation 
where all higher individuals consciously restrict themselves to expressing pity in a 
benevolent manner, rendering them immune to the attempts by the herd to appropriate 
their beings, in which a "lack of personality always takes revenge", and yet doing so 
without cruelty (GS, §345). 
Secondly, however, it is possible that the reversal of the evaluating gaze is also a 
characteristic of the philosopher who must perform the future task of solving the 
problem of value and who thereby will determine the hierarchy of values (GM 1, §17). 
This characteristic should be read not as a part of Nietzsche's analysis of morality as 
morality currently stands, but as belonging to the future to which he speaks. 
Considerations of the future converge upon Nietzsche's thoughts on time, and most 
significantly for my discussion, upon the theory of eternal recurrence. These two themes 
of value and eternal recurrence inform the discussion of section 3.3, to which I will now 
turn. 
This should not be understood in the sense of exercising one's free will, in line with Nietzsche's denial 
of the existence of free will. 
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3.3: Will to power and value in the light of the critique of pity 
The previous section showed that Nietzsche's critique of pity cannot be refuted on the 
ground of cruelty. However, the question remains as to whether the critique of pity is in 
accord with Nietzsche's wider project. Hence, in this section my concern is to show 
how the critique of pity is Hnked to Nietzsche's wider project through the context of 
nihihsm and its consequences for the concept of value. I conduct an exegetical reading 
of Z 4, 'The Ugliest Man', in the light of the mirroring power-relation identified in 
section 3.2. As I discuss, Zarathustra is faced with the danger of having pity for the 
Ugliest Man. At first he succumbs to having pity, but ultimately is able to overcome 
this. The way in which Zarathustra is able to overcome the test of pity is of critical 
importance to the aestheticist therapy for nihilism, which as we saw in Chapter 1 is the 
restoration of the tragic disposition. My reading in this section has two related 
consequences: the genealogical reason for Nietzsche's critique of pity is revealed, and a 
possible source of common ontological ground between being and art thus becomes 
identifiable. 
I shall begin by considering the relationship between Zarathustra and the Ugliest 
Man, which is integral to an explanation of Zarathustra's passing of the ultimate test of 
pity. The encounter takes place in a passage from Z 4, entitled 'The Ugliest Man'. In 
this passage, Zarathustra encounters an "unutterable" character sitting on the path that 
he is following. Before Zarathustra is even aware of this character's identity, he is 
"overcome by the great shame of having beheld such a thing". The character is singular: 
"shaped like a man, and yet hardly like a man". Before Zarathustra can move on, the 
character asks him a riddle: "What is the revenge on the witness!" This riddle is, like 
that of the Sphinx, one of identity: the character is asking Zarathustra to proclaim his 
identity. In a simple sense, this is a question of the character's identity. Zarathustra is 
able to identify him as the murderer of God, and as such, is overcome once again: but 
this time, he is wounded by the axe of pity. Translating this into the terms of my earlier 
discussion of the unfortunate man, Zarathustra is initially cast as the spectator in this 
section, while the Ugliest Man at first plays the role of the unfortunate man, the sufferer, 
who treads "all roads to death and destruction". 
Before proceeding further with this analysis, we should note that some of the 
surrounding symbolism explains the frequent classification of the mirroring power-
relation as one of activity/passivity. I have already shown that this active/passive 
description of the mirroring power-relation is erroneous; however, it is worth taking 
time to consider the relevant symbolism in order to appreciate why this is so, and how 
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the power-relation actually works. At the beginning of the passage Zarathustra's feet are 
running through forests and mountains, giving an impression of speed and urgency. But 
when he steps into the kingdom of death in which the Ugliest Man is lurking, he goes 
"slowly and ever slower and at last stopped" when faced with the Ugliest Man himself. 
Even his mood changes, from a state of rejoicing to a state of being "plunged into dark 
recollections". This descent is reflected by Zarathustra's being overcome first by shame, 
and then by pity. The Ugliest Man appropriates Zarathustra's being through the positing 
of his riddle of identity - and it is no accident that this is conceived of as a riddle of 
identity, which directly reflects the appropriative process of mirroring at work in the 
interaction of their respective beings. The Ugliest Man tells Zarathustra that he knows 
the axe that fells him, thus apparently confirming the analysis of the active/passive 
model of mirroring. I f this were the whole story, Zarathustra would be unable to regain 
his aestheticist interpretative freedom and overcome the test of pity. Indeed, at the end 
of the passage Zarathustra goes on his way "even more thoughtfully and slowly than 
before", which might lead to the premature conclusion that he does not overcome the 
test of pity, and that he has been rendered passive by the appropriation of his being 
through his having pity for the Ugliest Man. 
However, there is evidence within the passage to show that Zarathustra does 
overcome the test of pity. After Zarathustra has guessed who he is, the Ugliest Man tells 
him that he is not fleeing from persecution - as might easily be assumed of the murderer 
of God - but from pity: 
I escaped with difficulty from the importunate crowd of those who pity, that I might find 
the only one who today teaches "Pity is importunate" - you, O Zarathustra! (Z 4, 'The 
Ugliest Man') 
It is little people, according to the Ugliest Man, who call pity a virtue and who place it 
highly within a hierarchy of value. He thinks that this evaluation of pity is a result of a 
lack of reverence for his "great misfortune, great ugliness, great failure". The Ugliest 
Man pleads with Zarathustra, his "last refuge", to protect him as Zarathustra is the only 
one who has understood "how he feels who has killed God - how the murderer of God 
feels". This constitutes the Ugliest Man's final attempt to appropriate Zarathustra's 
being: the Ugliest Man attempts to reinforce the turn of Zarathustra's initial shame to 
pity by encouraging him to think of himself as benevolent. Where anyone else would 
have given him "alms, his pity, in glance and speech", the Ugliest Man notes that 
Zarathustra's initial shame honoured his wealth in "big things, in fearsome things, in the 
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ugliest things, in the most unutterable things". Zarathustra does not succumb to this 
tactic. In recommending his road to the Ugliest Man, and commanding that the Ugliest 
Man should speak with his animals, it seems as though Zarathustra is showing 
benevolence: 
'My cave is big and deep and possesses many comers; there the best hidden man can find 
his hiding place. And close by it are a hundred secret and slippery ways for creeping, 
fluttering and jumping beasts. 
'You outcast who cast yourself out, do you not wish to live among men and the pity of 
men? Very well, do as I do. Thus you will also learn from me; only the doer leams (Z 4, 
'The Ugliest Man'). 
Benevolence points to the expression of pity but not to the having of pity, in as far as 
benevolence is linked to the notion of fair trade: the Ugliest Man warned Zarathustra 
against his road, and it is in return for this that Zarathustra recommends the Ugliest Man 
his own path. 
Zarathustra's revulsion for God's murderer stems not from his understanding 
and experience of those feelings, but from their mutual alienation from one another. 
Within their power-relation, Zarathustra's being is saved from appropriation by his 
shame.^ ^ In his horror, "chilled to his very marrow", Zarathustra reflects the substance 
of the Ugliest Man's being, but also finds that his own is reflected through his 
benevolence. Zarathustra's pity for the Ugliest Man ultimately turns back to shame, 
which is symptomatic of this benevolence: 
How poor is man! (he thought in his heart) how ugly, how croaking, how full of secret 
shame! 
They tell me that man loves himself: ah, how great must this self-love be! How much 
contempt is opposed to it! (Z4, 'The Ugliest Man')"*" 
The shame that Zarathustra feels at the sight of the Ugliest Man and which is preferable 
to the pity of the little people, is more fundamental than the pity by which he is initially 
overcome.'*' Zarathustra is therefore able to resist the test of pity by cultivating the sense 
of shame that he experiences in the face of such ugliness. 
On this reading, we can observe the ful l significance of the mirroring power-
relation between Zarathustra and the Ugliest Man. This is made clear by Zarathustra's 
Stanley Rosen, The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp. 219-220. 
Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986), p. 297. 
Rosen, op. cit., note 39, pp. 219-220. 
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remark that while he loves the great despisers, "man, however, is something that must 
be overcome". Critically, this is as true of Zarathustra himself as it is of the Ugliest 
Man. Zarathustra is a creature of the heights, just as the Ugliest Man, in despising 
himself so deeply, achieves comparable and deeply ironic 'height'.''^ But it is their 
interaction through the power-relation which reveals Zarathustra's ability to develop -
or rather, interpret - his shame into benevolence as a remedy for being-appropriation, 
and which thereby points the way to the future. This is symbolised in the text by the 
positive/negative inversion of their exchange of directions. The Ugliest Man warns 
Zarathustra against his road which leads quite literally to nowhere in the shape of 
nihilism, and conversely, Zarathustra recommends that the Ugliest Man follow his, 
which although it passes through nihilism, leads to the possibility of a solution to the 
nihilistic crisis in value. Neither of them is, at that moment, capable of the authentic 
creation of values. As Zarathustra reminds us: 
The present and the past upon the earth - alas! My friends - that is my most intolerable 
burden; and I should not know how to live if I were not a seer of that which must come (Z 
2, 'Of Redemption'). 
The future to which Zarathustra and the Ugliest Man point is concerned with the 
problem of value, by virtue of the fact that the ability to generate value is what their 
interaction tells them they both lack. Zarathustra acknowledges that he is a creator and a 
bridge to the future, but he is also "like a cripple upon this bridge" (Z 2, 'Of 
Redemption'). The similarity of Zarathustra to Hamlet on this point is evident. Hamlet 
teaches us that "understanding kills action, action depends on a veil of illusion", and this 
describes one aspect of Zarathustra's position: he is crippled on the bridge to the future 
both by philosophical reflection and by the reflection of the being of the Ugliest Man 
(BT, §7). We cannot identify Zarathustra as the Ubermensch, or indeed as authentically 
Dionysian, for this reason. But Zarathustra is also a creator, and in as far as his 
dynamism outweighs his inaction in this section, he is able to pass the test of pity by 
developing his benevolence in the face of the Ugliest Man. Continuing in the 
Shakespearean idiom, we can see a counter to his kinship with the passive Hamlet in the 
form of a link to Brutus, "the exemplary man of action".'*'' 
Rosen therefore holds that the UgHest Man is an expression of the ironic 'height' of a decaying 
European culture (p. 222). 
Duncan Large, "Nietzsche's Shakespearean Figures", Alan D. Schrift, Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections 
on Drama, Culture, and Politics, (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), p. 46. 
Large explains how Nietzsche's interest is captured by the "psychological penetration and power of 
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As a result, we can see that it would fly in the face of the mirroring relation 
between Zarathustra and the Ugliest Man to interpret the murder of God purely in terms 
of the Ugliest Man's revenge against the shamelessness - and the supreme pity - of God 
as the witness of humanity. This would overlook the need for a reconciliation with life 
that constitutes one of the central themes of Z, and which is required for the possibility 
of authentic value-creation.'*^ As we saw in Chapter 2, and as is reflected in the Z 
passage, the conception of the divine is coeval with a conception of enduring truth; and 
the fact of this enduring witness precludes the possibility of value-creation, impeding 
the aestheticist's interpretative existence within an ontology of will to power. We can 
therefore begin to appreciate why Zarathustra's conception of value-creation is tied to a 
supreme valuing of life: 
Man first implanted values into things to maintain himself - he created the meaning of 
things, a human meaning! Therefore he calls himself: 'Man', that is: the evaluator. 
Valuation is creation: hear it, you creative men! Valuating is itself the value and jewel of 
all valued things (Z 1, 'Of The Thousand And One Goals'). 
The reconciliation with life is a part of the future to which Nietzsche and Zarathustra 
both look, and should be read in the light of the inestimability of the value of life. 
Recalling my discussion in Chapter 1, we can see that pity is one of the virtues 
generated by the ascetic ideal of slave morality. I shall now turn to consider the critique 
of pity in relation to the ascetic ideal and to the related question of the value of life, 
which are brought to the fore by the question of temporality invoked in Zarathustra's 
appeal to the future. This will clarify the genealogical reason for Nietzsche's critique of 
pity, which speaks to the real value of suffering within his wider conception. 
Two points on heroism and on fatalism are of relevance here. In GS, Nietzsche 
asks "what makes one heroic?", answering that the heroic is constituted in "going out to 
meet at the same time one's highest suffering and one's highest hope" {GS, §268). We 
find Nietzsche expressing a similar sentiment in the claim that "how deeply human 
beings can suffer almost determines their order of rank" (BGE, §270). Perhaps most 
infamous, however, is his observation from the military school of life, that "whatever 
does not kill me makes me stronger" (77 I , §8). What these quotations show Nietzsche 
to advocate is that the experience of suffering in itself is heroic, in that it is tragic.'*^ The 
Shakespeare's character portraits", including those of Hamlet and Brutus (ibid.). An additional example 
in light of the critique of pity would be Othello. 
Rosen, op. cit., note 39, p. 221. 
The connection of the critique of pity to tragedy will be developed in Chapter 4. 
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more deeply an individual proves him/herself capable of suffering, the greater they 
show themselves to be as individual human beings. As Babette Babich puts it, "the 
heroic individual is able to draw suffering into him or herself, consecrating his or her 
right to be.""*^  It is particularly important to note the celebratory nature of the hero's 
response to suffering: it is not merely a case of simply enduring a fate that is inevitable, 
as the following passage from EH reminds us: 
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be 
other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in all eternity. Not merely to endure 
that which happens of necessity, still less to dissemble it - all idealism is untruthfulness 
in the face of necessity - but to love it . . . (EH, 'Why I Am So Clever', § 10) 
Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati does not ask merely that we should, rather stoically, 
perhaps, endure an unpleasant experience such as suffering. It demands of us that we 
love that experience. As such, Nietzsche's view of suffering is not fatalistic in the sense 
of resignation, but is profoundly positive, allowing for the possibility of affirming one's 
experience of suffering in its entirety. 
However, the hero's status with respect to suffering is contingent upon the 
problem of fatalism. We have seen that this is not a question of resignation; rather, a 
temporal aspect of fatalism remains problematic for the heroic view of suffering. This is 
so in as far as the doctrine of amor fati yields a connection to the notion of eternal 
recurrence by demanding that we not only love any one particular experience or event, 
but all experiences and events in our lives, and wish each one to recur eternally.'*^ The 
claim that the hero might make in the light of eternal recurrence is a Kiplingesque one: 
that i f all experiences were to recur eternally, one would have the same attitude (amor 
fati) towards all of them, from the highest point of ecstasy to the deepest point of 
despair, terror and agony."** Note that this is cast in the terms of psychological attitude, 
reflecting Nietzsche's conviction that i f the thought of eternal recurrence were to gain 
possession of us, it would either change us or crush us (G^, §341). The psychological 
*^  Babette E . Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and 
Life, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 249 (henceforth NFS). 
*^  The doctrines of eternal recurrence and amor fati are of course not necessarily connected throughout 
Nietzsche's writing; my remark here is restricted to their relationship within the context of suffering. For 
Nietzsche's key remarks on the eternal recurrence, see especially Z 3, 'Of The Vision And The Riddle', Z 
4, 'The Convalescent', GS, §341 and BGE, §56. I do not propose to give a complete reading of the issues 
surrounding Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence here. Rather, my aim in invoking the eternal 
recurrence is to consider the relevance of the continuing debate concerning its cosmological status to my 
ongoing defence of aestheticism. 
Magnus, Stewart and Mileur reprise the ethical problem for aestheticism by arguing that the prospect of 
this ought to "give pause" to those who think the eternal recurrence is a celebratory doctrine (op. cit., note 
27, p. 23). 
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weight of the question "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" is 
a consequence of the view that one's actions seal the future (GS, §341). However, the 
temporal problem that this poses is apparent: i f one's present self has the same logical 
relation to one's future self as to one's past self, then the notion of choice is redundant: 
while the present self believes it is directing the course of the future, its choice has 
already been determined by the actions of the past self."*^  So in the light of this temporal 
aspect of the eternal recurrence there should be no sense in Nietzsche in which the past 
is changeable, as the past is already determined.^" Stanley Rosen supports this view to a 
certain extent, by claiming that the doctrine of the creation of values in Z is illusory on 
the ground that the openness of the future on which it depends would amount to a 
source of vengeance against the past. '^ 
However, there is an undeniable sense of the past as changeable in Nietzsche; as 
Alexander Nehamas argues, the Nietzschean significance of the past is in its 
relationship to the future, and in as far as the future is yet to come, the significance of 
the past remains an open question.^^ The reason for this is the necessity of all of our 
experiences in the construal of the self; for Nietzsche there is no subject left over 
beyond the sum of its experiences, characteristics and actions. A broader distinction 
between the quantitative and the qualitative modes of analysis discussed in section 3.1 is 
significant here. Arguing for greater recognition of the value of the qualitative as a 
whole, Edwards claims that in the absence of sentient beings with the capacity for 
qualitative awareness, the value of the entire solar system would be neutral.^^ Value is 
conferred in the same way that identity is generated: through the ongoing experience of 
being. Thus, Rosen is right to say that Zarathustra's doctrine of eternal recurrence 
makes the future identical with the past; but as he moves on to show, this is only so for 
historical time and not for cosmological time. As eternal recurrence is only one of 
manifold possibilities in cosmological time, Rosen concludes in true aestheticist 
perspectival vein that "we are as free to reject Zarathustra's vision as he is to propose 
Magnus, Stewart and Mileur, op. cit., note 27, p. 27. 
^ There is some disagreement within Nietzsche scholarship as to whether or not Nietzsche intended 
eternal recurrence as a cosmological theory. For an account which strongly rejects eternal recurrence as 
cosmological, see Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975). For an account of the eternal recurrence as a cosmological doctrine, 
see Danto, op. cit., note 20, pp. 195-213. 
'^ Rosen, op. cit., note 39, pp. 185-186. 
Alexander Nehamas, "The Eternal Recurrence", John Richardson & Brian Leiter (eds.), Nietzsche, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 133 (henceforth ER). Nehamas' reading is an equivocal 
account of eternal recurrence as cosmology; he acknowledges textual evidence of both psychological and 
cosmological readings of the doctrine, showing that while eternal recurrence is independent of 
cosmology, it is likely that Nietzsche was not aware of this (ibid., p. 125). 
Edwards, op. cit., note 9, p. 26. 
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it", but only in so far as the prospect of the eternal return is equally as frightening as any 
rejection of it.^'* 
Recalling my discussion of Nietzsche's view that fear is the mother of morality in 
Chapter 1, the genealogical significance of value creation to the wider aestheticist 
project becomes apparent. What the notion of eternal recurrence forces us to consider in 
this context is a question that Nietzsche, in the light of his critique of pity, does not 
believe ought to be necessary at all but which he finds is ubiquitous: the question of the 
value of life. Nietzsche's unequivocal acceptance of life is the only criterion of 
evaluation that he deems valid in the case of suffering, and indeed in the case of his 
wider aestheticism: 
For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life is thus even an objection against 
him, a question mark against his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom (TIII, §2). 
This is to move beyond the compass of the ethical problem for aestheticism and to begin 
to appreciate the possibility of common ontological ground between art and being. The 
first step on this path is to give further consideration to the question of the relation of 
value and life. I shall consider this as an echo of Nietzsche's analysis of the problem of 
Socrates, which reveals the fallacy of value judgements concerning life. 
Nietzsche cites Socrates' dying words, in reflection not only of the weary attitude 
of Socrates to life, but also of his understanding of death as a remedy for sick and 
worthless life {TI I I , §1).^^ He latches on to the extent of Socrates' duplicity, as he 
underlines the distinction between the cheery demeanour of Socrates during life, and the 
vengeful pessimism of his "ridiculous and terrible" last word (GS, §340). "For those 
who have ears", Nietzsche says, death for Socrates is the cure for the sickness that is 
'"Ibid., p. 186. 
Ibid. According to Plato in the Phaedo, Socrates' dying words to Crito were that he owed a cockerel to 
Asclepius, the usual payment to one's physician on recovery from an illness. Alexander Nehamas uses 
Foucault's reading of Socrates' death to challenge Nietzsche's later view, expressed in TI, that Socrates 
was a pessimist. Nehamas thinks that Foucault is able to read the disease for which the rooster is payment 
as the notion of a false belief as a disease of the soul, following Foucault's interpretation of the Apology, 
the Crito and the Phaedo as a single cycle linked by Socrates' death. On this account, the false belief in 
question is Crito's: that Socrates should have escaped from prison. But Nehamas also points to the 
collective nature of the debt to Asclepius, and notes that in fact, Socrates actually says "not that T but 
that 'we owe a rooster to Asclepius'". By virtue of the collective nature of the debt, Nehamas ultimately 
determines that false belief is but a symptom of the actual disease in question, which can only be life 
itself. As proof of this, he cites animosity towards the body in the Phaedo, and the inextricability of 
embodied life and disease for Plato. See Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from 
Plato to Foucault, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 160-162, 240 (henceforth AL). 
More interestingly however, in the context of my discussion of mirroring, Nehamas points out that 
Nietzsche's wider attitude to Socrates is ambivalent in terms of "his reaction to the gnawing question 
whether the protruding eyes that stare back at him when he squints at Socrates' portrait may not be his 
own, whether in looking at Socrates he may not after all be looking into a mirror" {LL, p. 30). 
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life: "O Crito, life is a disease" {GS, §340).^ ^^ This Socratic value of life unmasks the 
fundamental absurdity of the philosopher who thinks such a judgement can ever be true 
or false. As Nietzsche has it, "the value of life cannot be assessed' {TIII, §2). And this 
is so, not because Nietzsche is able to quantitatively invert Socrates' judgement in order 
to ground an argument for the overweening positive value of experience, but because he 
is able to step beyond simple quantification. He is able to understand the transfiguring 
value of stepping beyond the temptation of desire (acknowledged or otherwise) for 
access to others' qualitative experiences, and simply hold precious the qualitative feel of 
his own individual experience in life, no matter what kind of experience this may turn 
out to be. 
But what precisely are we to understand the transfiguring nature of such 
qualitative value to be? My suggestion is that we should understand transfiguration to 
refer to the effect of the aestheticist outlook on existence/world. Nietzsche's 
understanding of the limits of experience, coupled with his ability to esteem this 
boundary of experience purely because it is his own, is a practical response drawn from 
the aestheticist claim. Accepting the unquestionable value of life frees him to unite the 
unencumbered state of primordial man with the mediating influence of culture, which in 
a more aestheticist sense can be described as a unity between the natural world and the 
world of art and aesthetic appreciation. This unity between nature and artifice allows 
Nietzsche sufficient conceptual space to impel us to "really stretch out our fingers and 
make the effort to grasp this astonishing^ne^^e", that the value of life is inestimable {TI 
I I , §2). But while the notion of finesse here embodies the aestheticist's understanding of 
an ontological identity between art and existence/world, it also plays on the duplicity of 
Socrates in bowing to pessimism after his cheerfulness during life.^^ Nietzsche himself 
understands that any attempt of estimating the value of life is impossible because the 
perspective required for a human to make such a judgement is simply non-existent.^^ 
The act of judgement cannot be performed "by a living man, because he is a party to the 
Nietzsche writes that "what distinguishes the higher human beings from the lower is that the former see 
and hear immeasurably more, and see and hear thoughtfully" (GS, §301). 
" The notion of finesse understood in this way also points to my view that the aestheticist claim is 
successful by virtue of the transfiguration of value by the will. 
Note that I do not claim that such a perspective is inaccessible, which would leave room for its 
conceivability. Babich emphasises the alogical nature of this idea that we can know "the objective look of 
things". While she finds the question of the objective reality of the world absurd, this is so precisely not 
on the logical ground that the claim of what it means for "the world to be given without one to whom it 
would be given denies the possibility of the assertion", no matter how tangled the logic is seen to be. As 
Babich shows, Nietzsche is simply practical in recognising that it makes no sense for us to wonder how 
the world would look if we were able to "cut our heads off and still take a look". See Babette E. Babich, 
"The Hermeneutics of a Hoax: On the Mismatch of Physics and Cultural Criticism", Common 
Knowledge, 6/2, September 1997, pp. 23-33. 
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dispute, indeed its object, and not the judge of it; not by a dead one, for another reason" 
(Till, §2). 
The true finesse, the sheer artfulness of Nietzsche's argument for the inestimable 
value of life is thus fully appreciable: his assertion not only embodies the aestheticist 
claim, and provides an objection to the philosopher who sees a problem of value 
regarding life - "a question-mark against his wisdom" - but it also shows us the beauty 
of the question itself as a phenomenon. This is so insofar as the inestimability of the 
value of life hints at the possibility not only of nonteleological interpretation of 
existence, but also of nonteleological reflection by rendering the question of the value of 
life unanswerable rather than simply rephraseable (TIII, §2).^° The unity here between 
existence/world, creativity and beauty in Nietzsche begins to become clear. 
How is it, though, that we come to reflect upon the question of the value of life at 
all? It is in GM that we are really encouraged by Nietzsche to question how it is that 
adoption of an ethical standpoint from which to evaluate our experiences leads us to 
question the value of life itself. Nietzsche invites us to consider the individual whose 
experience of suffering prompts him or her to demand an explanation for the cause of 
that suffering. The ascetic priest directs the individual to search for that cause not in the 
external world, but within him or herself. Such an individual is encouraged to realise 
that "he should understand his suffering itself as a state of punishment" {GM 3, §20). 
Let us consider the example of an experience of severe pain or trauma. In Nietzsche's 
view of asceticism, we are encouraged to interpret such severe pain as a punitive 
measure for some transgression, in order to provide ourselves with justification for that 
experience. Resentment of a pain experience can prompt a number of self-recriminatory 
questions: "Why me?", "Have I done something to deserve this?" What Nietzsche 
emphasises is not the practice of resentment, but the more fundamental, and for him 
creative, act of interpretation - and in this case, Nietzsche thinks that our interpretative 
faculty is shackled to moral asceticism, thus refracting our interpretative perception of 
pain or suffering through a lens of vengefulness, itself motivated by desire.^' 
'^ These remarks on the inestimability of the value of life from TI recall Nietzsche's earlier claim from 
HA that all judgements about life have developed illogically and therefore unfairly {HA, §32). 
^ By "nonteleological reflection" I have something in mind akin to Heidegger's final remark in 'The 
Question Concerning Technology" that "questioning is the piety of thought". Martin Heidegger, "The 
Question Concerning Technology", The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, William 
Lovitt (trans.), (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 35. In the essay, Heidegger claims questioning as 
the piety of thought as an aspect of the inversion trope of greatest danger/saving power. See also 
Alphonso Lingis, 'The Will to Power", David B. Allison (ed.). The New Nietzsche, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1985), pp. 42-43. 
See Abraham Olivier, "Nietzsche and Pain", (conference paper read at the 11"" Annual Conference of 
the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, Emmanuel College, Cambridge, September 2001), for a discussion of 
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But this is only the case from the point of view of the moral ascetic, and not from 
the aestheticist's perspective. What the notion of desire points to in this instance for the 
aestheticist is meaning, or rather, to a lack of it. The ascetic interpretation of suffering is 
an invention of genius, Nietzsche knows, not least because in making no promises to 
eliminate suffering, it protects itself from the "recalcitrant fact" that suffering is 
inevitable.**^ As asceticism does not eliminate suffering, the ascetic priest can therefore 
safely preach the message that suffering is inevitable - though for an entirely different 
reason than does Nietzsche.^^ What also happens, however, is that asceticism provides a 
purpose for our suffering. Nietzsche does accept that suffering can be a horrifying 
experience - even while he does not think that we should yearn to alleviate it - not 
because the suffering that we experience is necessarily so terrible in itself, but because 
there just is no underlying reason for it: 
For the meaning of the ascetic ideal is none other than this: that something was missing, 
that man was surrounded by a gaping void - he did not know how to justify, explain, 
affirm himself, he suffered from the problem of his meaning (GM 3, §28). 
The void acknowledged here by Nietzsche is precisely the absence of a meaningful 
answer to the question "Why do I suffer?" (GM 3, §28).^'* In undergoing an experience 
of profound suffering, the most difficult thing to accept is the silence in response to the 
question of why one is suffering. This silence is a token not only of the lack of meaning 
for suffering, but also of our modem alienation from those around us in and through that 
experience.^^ To clarify, it is bad enough to ask why one is suffering and to find no 
answer, but surely the realisation that one is alone in asking that question is far worse. 
As Nietzsche writes: 
The meaninglessness of suffering, and not suffering as such, has been the curse which has 
hung over mankind up to now - and the ascetic ideal offered mankind a meaning! {GM 3, 
§28) 
For Nietzsche, the success of the ascetic ideal is attributable to the notion that any 
meaning is better than no meaning at all; any answer is better than no answer at all; and 
how Nietzsche's account of pain can be successfully mapped onto modern neurophysiological modelling 
of pain sense-data. 
Nehamas, LL, p. 123. 
" Ibid., p. 122. 
^ We should note that the void mentioned here also recalls the threat of nihilism discussed in Chapter 1. 
The symmetry between alienation through lack of meaning and the aesthetic alienation of the work of 
art, as discussed in Chapter 1, is significant here. A lack of meaning of the work of art outside the sphere 
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so it is that, through the provision of meaning, asceticism is able to safeguard the will . 
This is the product of the creative will in its madness caused by its perception of 
imprisonment within time.^^ At first, with the door against nihilism not properly shut, it 
did not matter what was actually willed, even if this proved to be (as in the case of 
asceticism) "a will to nothingness, an aversion to life."^^ In a nutshell, "the will not to 
will is still to will".^^ Nietzsche's conclusion, that "man would rather will nothingness 
than not will at all", finally unveils for this interpretation, the bipolarity of meaning and 
lack of meaning by and through which suffering relates interpretatively to the 
Nietzschean ontology of will to power {GM 3, §28). Meaning is a function of power; 
but we must understand the word that states meaning as being ascribed to the wil l , in 
contrast to the more usual ascription of meaning to the understanding or to reason.^ ^ 
The emphasis upon reason rather than upon will is one of the key differences 
between Socrates and Dionysus. Socrates, for Nietzsche, represents the degeneration of 
the creative will through time-madness, where Dionysus represents the superabundance 
of the creative will in full health and sanity, redeemed from the desire for revenge 
against time.^° We have established that suffering and the will to power are deeply 
connected in Nietzsche, having shown how Nietzsche's rejection of the ascetic ideal 
brings the phenomenon of suffering out from under the perspective of guilt. In rejecting 
the moral ascetic view of pity as beneficial, and in rejecting Socrates' pessimism about 
life, Nietzsche also relieves us of the ascetic notion that value judgements are in fact 
moral ones. '^ Without the perspective of guilt and morality, suffering is 'meaningless' 
once again, in the sense that there is no universally applicable view available to us that 
of the aesthetic characterises the process of aesthetic alienation, where a lack of meaning of the 
experience of suffering outside the sphere of ascetism characterises existential human alienation. 
Lampert, op. cit., note 40, p. 144. 
" Ibid. 
Nehamas, LL, p. 123. Cf. Henri Birault, "Beatitude in Nietzsche", David B. Allison (ed.). The New 
Nietzsche, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 225-226. C f Lampert, op. cit., note 40, p. 144. 
Birault, ibid., pp. 224-225. According to Birault, where meaning can be the last residue of essence in a 
nihilistic philosophy, it is also the goal that things are on their way to: "this becoming that is their being, 
this being that is their becoming." This is so for Birault in the sense of the saying that Zarathustra gives to 
his disciples and in the sense of the genuine philosopher; this saying being that of a will that orders, or 
commands. The will must state that the Ubermensch is the meaning of the earth in order that "the being of 
meaning become the meaning of being." As Birault comments, this is indeed "a strange situation, in 
which meaning is and nonetheless is only if it is uttered" (ibid., p. 224). 
™ To put it another way, Dionysus follows Heraclitus in his style of philosophy, where Socrates follows 
Aristotle (of course this sounds anachronous, but I am speaking of Socrates as a semi-fictional character 
for Nietzsche as indeed he was for Plato, a figure that represents the actual philosopher). See Sarah 
Kofman, "Metaphor, Symbol, Metamorphosis", David B. Allison (ed.). The New Nietzsche, (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1985), p. 210. 
'^ According to Nehamas, Nietzsche claims that it was Socrates who first made judgements of value 
moral, and that value judgements should be unconditional. Nehamas, AL, p. 144. 
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can provide meaning. However, there still remains the possibility of creating meaning 
through interpretation, in the sense represented by Dionysus. 
The modem man of ressentiment still nurses the possibility of revenge on time 
which is expressed through the nihilism of the ascetic ideal, and which is something that 
can only be ameliorated by the re-emergence of a self-aware creative will.^^ Zarathustra 
himself notes that the will's most lonely affliction is that it cannot "break time and 
time's desire" (Z 2, 'Of Redemption'). The key point to bear in mind is that the creative 
will already exists, even within the man of ressentiment, but in the case of such a man it 
has degenerated into asceticism. The change of values which requires a change of 
creators, and in which the transfiguration of values is simultaneously a destruction of 
the civilisation dependent on those values, is therefore not yet at hand: modem culture 
remains a part of the nihilist progression.^^ As Nietzsche points out, "the individual 
himself is still the latest creation"; similarly to Zarathustra and the Ugliest Man, the 
modem individual is unequipped to become the creator of values, and Nietzsche invites 
us instead to look to the advent of the Ubermensch (Z 1, 'Of The Thousand And One 
Goals'). Thus the revenge of the unfortunate man against his own lack of identity or 
personality is revealed as a revenge against the self.^ "* This is symptomatic of the 
nihilism that directs the ascetic ideal: with the possibility of both self-creation and 
value-creation held at bay, both individual life and being in a more general sense are 
seen as problematic. 
The idea of revenge against oneself is the most accurate characterisation of what 
Nietzsche means when he talks about nihilism, because this state precludes all 
possibility of understanding the inestimability of the value of life. The individual who 
exists in this state cannot appreciate even for a moment the pure interpretative power of 
the qualitative feel of experience. For example within a Christian mythology, all such 
experience is subsumed by the notion of the hereafter, and both pleasures and pains are 
evaluated in these terms rather than in terms of their phenomenology. As such, both 
pleasure and pain, cast into the shadow of sin, only serve to alienate the individual 
further. This is why Nietzsche thinks Christianity is ultimately self-defeating (GM 3, 
Lampert, op. cit., note 40, pp. 140-142. We should also note as Lampert does that the 'Of Redemption' 
passage in Z shows that the teaching of eternal recurrence is dependent on the discovery of will to power, 
and is subsequent to it (ibid., p. 140). The re-emergence of the self-aware, creative will should therefore 
be read as Nietzsche's attempt to revive the tragic disposition. See also Chapters 1 and 4. 
" Lampert, ibid. 
Hence we could speculate that one meaning behind Nietzsche's claim that the need to give style to 
one's character is "a great and rare art", lies in the rarity of those individuals who do not succumb to the 
having of pity or who, having succumbed, can emulate Zarathustra and overcome the test of pity {GS, 
§290). 
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§27). As well as a reaction to a lack of personality, however, revenge is also to be 
understood as the revenge against time, in terms of the lack of the goal of eternal 
recurrence (Z 1, 'Of The Thousand And One Goals'). The recognition of the lack of 
distinction between facts and values brings us to the understanding that the cycle of the 
eternal recurrence is not completed by the thousand and first goal, and as such, mankind 
has no goal.^^ In the absence of a goal, we must create our own: the formula of our 
happiness being "a yes, a no, a straight line, a goal" {TI I , §44). This is the authentic 
task of the Nietzschean hero, whose creative power encompasses all of being, including 
self and world. As we shall see in the next chapter, the genealogy of this power may be 
traced to the work of art, and in particular to Greek tragedy. 
" Rosen, op. cit., note 39, pp. 114-115. 
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3.4: Conclusion 
In these concluding remarks, I shall review my argument in the present chapter with a 
view to sketching the framework of a sustained account of how the remaining obstacle 
to Nietzsche's aestheticism may be overcome. I shall begin by discussing my argument 
against the ethical problem for aestheticism, and will move on to show how the solution 
to the ethical problem yields the possibility of a solution to the third problem for 
aestheticism: the lack of common ontological ground between art and being. 
As we have seen, the ethical problem for Nietzsche's aestheticism arises from 
the inclusive scope of the aestheticist claim. The charge faced by aestheticism is one of 
trivialisation: in attempting to justify the horrific and the painful aspects of being as 
aesthetic phenomena, aestheticism runs the risk of trivialising the realia. However as I 
have shown in this chapter, Nietzsche's view of suffering is not trivial, and neither is it a 
practical form of cruelty. The critique of pity is developed in the light of what Nietzsche 
takes to be a serious danger. This is the possibility of being-appropriation through the 
power-relation of mirroring. Nietzsche's critique identifies pity as a particular danger 
for the individual, owing to the ease with which an individual who has pity for another 
may have their being appropriated. The dangerous consequence of being-appropriation 
is what Nietzsche takes so seriously. 
What is lost when one's being is appropriated is the aestheticist freedom of 
interpretation. Power is intrinsic to aestheticist interpretation, hence the reason why 
mirroring is a relation of power. Although there is no true passive role within the power-
relation and thus no inherent cruelty to it, the possibility of being-appropriation remains 
dangerous because of this loss of interpretative freedom. When one's being is 
appropriated as in a case where one succumbs to having pity for an unfortunate, one 
does not become passive in a true sense; rather, the intrinsic power of ongoing 
aestheticist interpretation is frustrated. With a nod to my discussion of perspectivalism 
in Chapter 2, we can see that the qualitative experience of being is of paramount 
importance within Nietzsche's philosophy because it is in terms of our experiences that 
we are able to generate a meaning for our suffering. The boundaries of the human 
perspective are organic. Reflected in its own perspective, the intellect is indivisible from 
its ecophysiological location; as Nietzsche writes, we are dependent upon the organic in 
as far as "we behold all things through the human head and cannot cut off this head" 
(HA, §27).^^ This organic dependency precludes the possibility of "nonerring truth", 
which translates to the notion of ongoing, active aestheticist interpretation within the 
See Chapter 2. See also Babich, NFS, p. 84. 
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ontology of will to power.^'' Nietzsche is so critical of the ascetic ideal and the virtues 
that it gives rise to because it encourages the abdication not only of the genesis of 
meaning for any given experience such as suffering, but also because it imposes a 
meaning above and beyond the boundaries of that experience: the intrinsic power of 
aestheticist interpretation is frustrated from within. 
However, I also suspect that this power-relation of mirroring is not only a way 
of understanding social interaction, but that it is also a model which has an application 
within Nietzsche's wider project. While the preceding sections give us reason to think 
that Nietzsche's critique of pity is internally coherent and that it evades the charge of 
trivialisation, they do not adequately explain the mechanism by which pain and terror 
can be justified in aesthetic terms. What is required is an account of how the mirroring 
power-relation between individuals operates within Nietzsche's wider aestheticist 
project of restoring the tragic disposition. In section 3.3, we saw that Nietzsche claims 
that suffering is heroic in that it is tragic. This link between the hero, suffering and the 
tragic provides us with an important clue with respect to the link between being and art 
which would constitute the common ontological ground required for a successful 
defence of aestheticism. If we could establish that the same model of power-relation 
exists for Nietzsche not only within the critique of pity but also within the critique of 
tragedy, then it would go some way towards establishing common ontological ground 
between being and art. Recall that according to my claims for the standard account of 
aestheticism, all that is necessary to complete a ful l defence of aestheticism is to 
identify one instance of such common ontological ground. The identification of a 
power-relation of mirroring within Nietzsche's critique of tragedy would confirm a link 
between the genre of art and being. This would also seem to require that we demonstrate 
the ontological nature of this link. 
But on further consideration, the ontological nature of the link (should it be 
confirmed through a reading of the critique of tragedy) is already evident. As we have 
seen, the nature of the power-relation is a constituent part of Nietzsche's wider doctrine 
of will to power. The concept of the individual's characteristics as determined by a 
complex web of experience locates the individual firmly within a wider ontology of will 
to power. As I showed in Chapter 2, an individual cannot exist in contravention of his 
ecophysiological location which, following Babich's argument, is the sovereign artistic 
power of our constant experiential engagement.^ * The mode of our engagement is 
" Babich, NFS, p. 95. 
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Ibid., p. 119. 
therefore irreducibly perspectival. And as we saw in Chapter 2, this constant 
engagement is unilaterally interpretative, linking ordinary aesthetic interpretation with 
'truthful' metaphysical or scientific accounts of the world. The genesis of such 'truthful' 
accounts is commensurate with Nietzsche's explanation of the genesis of meaning for 
the experience of suffering discussed in this chapter: both are constituent parts of the 
ascetic ideal or what was referred to in Chapter 1 as the optimism of weakness, which is 
the source of the nihilistic crisis in values. A fresh appreciation of the artistic power that 
lies forgotten at the root of culture explains the sovereignty of Nietzsche's aestheticist 
characteristic of creative interpretation within his wider project of developing a therapy 
for nihilism.^^ Hence the task of Chapter 4 is twofold: to provide an answer to the 
question of whether a mirroring power-relation exists within Nietzsche's critique of 
tragedy, and in thus completing my defence of aestheticism to finally clarify the relation 
of art and truth within his thought. 
™ Babich, NPS, p. 119. 
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Chapter 4: Suffering and beauty within the tragic disposition^ 
The preceding chapter discussed the connection between suffering and the will to 
power. By showing that pity is a power-relation between forces, within an indeterminate 
contingency of force, Nietzsche's critique of pity ultimately restores the possibility of 
value creation ex nihilo. As we saw, the interrelation of individuals within the context of 
pity may be described by the power-relation of mirroring, in which each individual 
appropriates the being of the other in order to force recognition and thus gain or 
consolidate power. The mirroring power-relation was contextualised against the 
inversion of the pessimism of strength and the optimism of weakness within culture. An 
optimism of weakness develops out of the loss of the aestheticist interpretative freedom, 
generating the ascetic ideal and removing the need to create meaning or value by 
providing a meaning and a (decalogic) set of values. However, the pessimism of 
strength faces what is problematic, terrifying and painful in existence head-on. 
This recalls my discussion of the problem of science and of the nihilistic crisis in 
values in modem culture in Chapter 1, in the light of which Nietzsche develops the 
therapy of restoring the tragic disposition as a means to restore the balance between 
optimistic and pessimistic aspects of culture. The aim of restoring the tragic disposition, 
coupled with the identification of the mirroring power-relation, returns us to the 
paradigm of art and its significance for Nietzsche's aestheticism. As I showed in the 
previous chapter, identification of common ontological ground between being and the 
work of art would overcome the remaining problem for aestheticism, and would also 
clarify the nature of the art/truth relation in Nietzsche.^ For aestheticism to be shown to 
be defensible, neither a complete exposition of Nietzsche's aesthetics, nor even a 
comprehensive account of the connections between art and being in his wider thought 
are necessary.^  Al l that is necessary is to show one instance of common ontological 
' An earlier version of some of the ideas expressed in this chapter has been published in S. R. Bamford, 
"Nietzsche's Aestheticism and the Value of Suffering", Paul Bishop & R. H. Stephenson (eds.), Cultural 
Studies and the Symbolic, (Leeds: Northern Universities Press, 2003 - in press). 
^ In case of any confusion concerning the art/truth relation being clarified in terms of being, recall from 
Chapter 2 that Nehamas' conclusion to his account of aestheticism presupposes an equivocal question of 
whether or not truth is created or discovered. This presupposition of equivocation matches Megill's 
scepticism towards Nietzsche's aestheticism in the absence of common ontological ground between art 
and being. 'Truths' are interpretations of the nature of being, which encompasses the possibility of both 
internal and external worlds: hence finding the common ground between art and being is a matter of 
acknowledging the interpretation of being, frustrating Nehamas' analysis of equivocation. 
^ Such readings are beyond the scope of the present study in any case. See Julian Young's Nietzsche's 
Philosophy of Art, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and Philip Pothen's more recent 
Nietzsche and the Fate of Art, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2002), both of which deal with these 
themes in significant detail. 
142 
ground between art and being: just one such instance would stand as evidence of 
aestheticism's defensibility. The ontological nature of the link between mirroring in the 
critiques of pity and tragedy has already been shown, in as far as the power-relation of 
mirroring is a part of Nietzsche's will to power. Hence all that is required in this chapter 
is simply to show evidence of the mirroring power-relation at work in the critique of 
tragedy. In Chapter 3 we were concerned with the question of whether it is morally 
acceptable to see suffering as beautiful. This chapter sets out to show that it is indeed 
possible to see suffering as beautiful. 
The genealogy of Nietzsche's positive aestheticist concern of restoring the tragic 
disposition is grounded in his ontology of will to power, through identification of the 
mirroring relation as the interpretative common ground between art and being. This is 
exemplified by a relation of identity between beauty and suffering in the genre of 
tragedy and in Nietzsche's tragic conception of knowledge. As we have already seen in 
Chapter 2, this ontology is distinct from Plato's ontology of Forms and the subsequent 
misreadings of that ontology which are reflected so strongly in contemporary 'two 
world' metaphysics. On this basis, I claim the success of my defence of Nietzsche's 
aestheticism as evident. There are additional consequences of this objective, however. 
First, in as far as the chapter is conceived broadly as a comparative reading of BT and 
Nietzsche's wider corpus, evidence of a deep connection between BT and the 
subsequent works is yielded. Second, a fresh insight is provided into certain key figures 
in Nietzsche's writing, by virtue of their contextualisation within Nietzsche's wider 
aestheticist project. The genealogy of aestheticism is concerned with, but has not thus 
far considered, the connection between two key figures: Dionysus and the Ubermensch. 
I begin in section 4.1 by adopting an historical approach in order to establish 
Nietzsche's critique of tragedy in its relationship to Socratic rationality. I consider the 
Aristotelian conception of tragedy as developed in the Poetics, and move on to explore 
Nietzsche's genealogical chronology of Greek tragedy, which is cast in the light of the 
rise of Socratic rationality. Some of the inconsistencies within Nietzsche's chronology 
of tragedy are considered as a challenge to his critique. However, these are shown to be 
a product of misreading Nietzsche's intentions in BT. Rather than as an unsatisfactory 
critique of Greek tragedy, I suggest that a more satisfactory way to read Nietzsche's 
project in BT is as a discourse on the nature of being in relation to modem culture, 
where tragedy acts as a cipher for being. This grounds the aestheticist project of 
restoring the tragic disposition as a therapy for the nihilistic crisis in value in modem 
culture. 
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Section 4.2 debates a potential problem with this view. Nietzsche's view of 
tragic pity as pleasurable is considered, which seems to contradict my argument in the 
previous section by showing that Nietzsche is in fact discussing tragedy in an aesthetic 
sense."* In aestheticist vein, we ought to consider that Nietzsche is using tragedy in more 
than one way. I suggest that Nietzsche does in fact discuss tragedy in an artistic sense in 
BT, and that this complements his use of tragedy as a cipher for being. This is to claim 
that the theme of tragedy, in Nietzsche's BT, can be read as a cipher for the aesthetic.^ 
Section 4.3 shows that these two tragic 'codes' work in tandem with one another 
in order to make the aestheticist claim possible. Evidence of the interaction of these two 
tragic ciphers is provided by considering the suffering of the tragic hero in comparison 
with suffering seen through the lens of Nietzsche's critique of pity. The heroic attitude 
to suffering mentioned in Chapter 3 is reprised in as far as I consider how the figure of 
the tragic hero is embedded in the power-relation inherent to Greek tragedy. As I argue, 
this power-relation is reflected in the wider history of the relation between tragedy (and 
thereby art and the aesthetic) and philosophy, as well as in the performance of tragic 
drama. The aestheticist project of restoring the tragic disposition is contextualsed in 
terms of Nietzsche's conception of the original cultural function of tragedy. As such, 
my claim for the defensibility of aestheticism is complete. 
I conclude the chapter in section 4.4 by offering some further remarks on 
aestheticism in the light of the common ontological ground between being and art. I 
take up Nietzsche's aestheticist outlook in order to offer some contextualising remarks 
on mirroring as a power-relation in both critiques of pity and of tragedy. I therefore 
consider some of Nietzsche's remarks on innocence, conceptualised in the terms of 
child's play, in order to evaluate the significance of innocence to Nietzsche's notion of 
being as an interpretative process of becoming. 
•* It also seems to belie my divorce of practicality from cruelty in my discussion of the critique of pity in 
Chapter 3. However, this objection is quashed on consideration of the wider context of these remarks in 
HA, §103: on pity as tragic pleasure, when discussing Schadenfreude, Nietzsche specifically 
acknowledges that "[a]ll joy in oneself is neither good nor bad." In this context, his remarks are in accord 
with my earlier analysis that the pleasure of pity is analogous to the benevolent expression of pity, and 
that it accords with the mirroring power-relation. 
' Paul Bishop & R. H. Stephenson, "Nietzsche and Weimar Aesthetics", German Life and Letters, 52:4, 
October 1999, pp. 426-427. 
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4.1: Chronology, tragedy and Nietzsche's conception of being 
In this section, an historical approach will be taken towards BT as a means of 
contextualising the forthcoming discussion of Nietzsche's critique of tragedy in terms of 
its relationship to Socratic rationality. I begin by considering the Aristotelian conception 
of tragedy which, as we shall see, Nietzsche rejected. Subsequently, I explore 
Nietzsche's genealogical chronology of Greek tragedy. This chronology is cast in the 
light of the rise of Socratic rationality. Some of the inconsistencies within Nietzsche's 
chronology of tragedy are considered, and these are shown to be a product of 
misreading Nietzsche's chief intentions in BT. Rather than a simple critique of tragedy, 
I suggest that Nietzsche's project in BT is a discourse on the nature of being. 
I shall begin with a brief consideration of the Aristotelian model of tragedy, 
conceived of against the background of Plato's expulsion of the poets in Republic^ As 
we saw in Chapter 1, Plato decided that the best course of action was to remove poetry 
entirely, albeit leaving a door ajar for poetry to return to the Republic i f it "can come up 
with a rational argument for [its] inclusion in a well-governed community".^ 
Immediately before his offer, Plato defends himself from the charge of "insensitivity 
Q 
and lack of culture" that might be made against him by poetry, on learning of its exile. 
His reply to poetry would be to remind "her that there's an ancient quarrel between 
poetry and philosophy".^ In Plato's dialogue, the invocation of this ancient quarrel is not 
explained: more specific instances of it are given as examples, but no justification of its 
mention is offered. Aristotle's Poetics responds to the exile of the poets, not reversing 
Plato but not acting entirely in accordance with him either: this response is itself a 
philosophical stratagem, as we shall see in what follows.'" 
Aristotle interpreted tragedy in the Poetics in terms of its effects upon the 
spectators, and not in terms of what was represented in the drama itself." The 
significant effect here is that of katharsis. Aristotle's view of tragedy is composed in 
terms of the kathartic effect; as he claims, the arrangement of tragedy at its best should 
present a mimesis of things which arouse fear and pity in the observer, but only where 
such suffering is underserved.'^ While the aesthetic pleasure arising from pity and fear 
* A sustained exegesis of Aristotle is not practical here; my attention will be devoted to the conception of 
tragedy's function. Aristotle, Poetics, Ackrill, J. L . (ed.), A New Aristotle Reader, Hubbard, M. E . (trans.), 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
^ Plato, Republic, Robin Waterfield (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 607c. 
* Ibid. 
' Ibid. 
'° See Gerald L . Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modem, (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press. 1992), p. 230. 
" Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics, (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1986), pp. 65, 162-164. 
Aristotle, op. cit., note 6, 1453a. Halliwell, ibid., p. 174. 
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through mimesis is of the fullest kind, it is the experience of these emotions by the 
spectator identifying with the undeserving and innocent sufferer that receives Aristotle's 
emphasis, rather than simply the direct effect of the tragic spectacle itself.'^ Aristotle 
expects action and character to be interlocked in order to reflect the ethical nature of 
human life, thus prompting the spectator's identification with the undeserving 
innocent/tragic hero.'"* 
This raises what has been referred to as one of the "hoariest" problems in 
aesthetics: "the problem of the value and desirability of the negative or unpleasant in 
art."'^ The pity and terror evoked by tragedy demand that tragedy be justified, and this 
is why Aristotle introduces the notion of the kathartic effect of tragedy.'^ Jerrold 
Levinson explains the reasoning behind this using the example of music.Levinson's 
question is why a negative emotional response to music is desirable; his answer turns on 
the issue of one's mental health. As he argues, a negative emotional response to a piece 
of music is desirable "because it conduces to mental health, improving the listener's 
future self by administering momentarily painful doses of emotional medicine in the 
present."'^ Levinson notes that the therapeutic value of such "dark music" is contingent 
upon the listener being in the grip of unhealthy emotions, whether conscious of this or 
not.'^ However, Levinson is also aware that listeners who are not in the grip of such 
emotions evince a similar response. This illustrates the distinction between the modem 
and the classical appreciation of emotion; Levinson conceives of a particular state of 
negative emotion such as sadness, where for Aristotle, the issue is much broader: all 
unmediated emotion is negative. 
Through this we can begin to appreciate how the Aristotelian model constitutes a 
philosophical stratagem for the mediation of emotion. Aristotle views tragedy in the 
way that a modem psychiatrist would view a psychiatric medication or a psychologist 
would understand cognitive therapy. The imitation of an action on the stage which 
arouses fear or pity in the spectator yields the emotionally purgatory effect of katharsis, 
cleansing the mind by relieving it of emotion: channelling the expression of emotion 
within a circumscribed, 'safe' area (and in the sense of the amphitheatre, this quite 
Halliwell, op. cit., note 11. 
'^Ibid. 
Jerrold Levinson, Music, Art & Metaphysics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 307. 
Halliwell notes that the philology of the term is complex; however, in the terms of tragedy, katharsis 
may be understood as tied to the notion of a conscious, cognitive experience of a work of mimetic art, and 
the resulting emotional response (op. cit., p. 200). 
''Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 323. 
'"Ibid. 
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literally refers to the boundaries of the arena).^° The Poetics may be understood not so 
much as a reversal of Plato but rather as an extension of its appropriative logic, whereby 
Aristotle understood that a less draconian method of getting rid of poetry would be to 
redescribe it, thereby incorporating it as a part of a systematic philosophy.^' 
As Stephen Halliwell shows, reflection upon the Aristotelian necessity of moral 
characterisation of the tragic hero in order to establish innocence in the eyes of the 
spectator, and thus grounds for pity, reveals the limitations of Aristotle's vision of 
tragedy in terms of the negation of e m o t i o n . A character's moral innocence, or 
worthiness, is the technical prerequisite for pity, necessitating ignorance of his/her 
motivations, where a character's likeness to the spectator is the technical prerequisite 
for the spectator's fear, which demands that the dramatist avoid the use of extreme 
virtue in characterisation. But where Halliwell's analysis is confined to the negative 
consequences of Aristotle's vision for tragedy, we can appreciate that for Nietzsche, 
these consequences extend to the status of the spectator. In the terms of Nietzsche's 
critique of pity, Aristotle's vision of tragedy in the Poetics casts him as an ascetic priest, 
afraid of the power of unchained and intoxicating emotion and committed to a moral 
interpretation of suffering as a state of punishment. 
Nietzsche's reading of the Aristotelian model of tragedy is closely connected to 
his views on truth and science. In rejecting katharsis, Nietzsche also rejects the primacy 
of Socratic rationality. In so doing, he rejects the monological perspective of Socratic 
rationality in favour of a move towards perspectivism. This corresponds to the shift in 
perspective from the Aristotelian to the Nietzschean models of Greek tragedy, and thus 
away from art "as it is conventionally conceived" {BT, §16). The Aristotelian 
interpretation of tragedy is conducted for the benefit of the spectator or audience 
Fran9oise Dastur, "Tragedy and speculation". Philosophy and Tragedy, Miguel de Beistegui & Simon 
Sparks (eds.), (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 78. The Aristotelian idea of tragedy as a quasi-psychiatric 
solution to emotion - where emotion is viewed pathologically, as a disorder - contrasts with Nietzsche's 
claim against Aristotle that "[o]ne can refute this theory in the most cold-blooded way: namely, by 
measuring the effects of a tragic emotion with a dynamometer. And one would discover as a result that 
only the absolute mendaciousness of a systematizer could misunderstand - that tragedy is a tonic" {WP 3, 
§851). The difference between these two accounts should be understood in terms of intoxication. For 
Aristotle, tragedy acts as a prophylaxis against the intoxicating effects of emotion which, left uncontrolled 
and unmediated, pose a threat to the order of the poUs. In this vein, Walter Kaufmann describes the 
Aristotelian emotional relief provided by tragedy specifically as 'sobering' in "Nietzsche and the Death of 
Tragedy: A Critique", Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition, James C. O'Flaherty, Timothy F. 
Sellner & Robert M. Helm (eds.), (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976), p. 242. 
For Nietzsche, pleasure in the benevolent expression of pity is a part of the wider Dionysiac intoxication 
that he construes in deliberately positive terms - intoxication here is not pathologised, there is no need to 
'have' pity in the sense intended by Aristotle. 
'^ Bruns, op. cit., note 10. 
^^Ibid. 
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member, which Nietzsche views as an interpretation of tragedy in a state of decline. 
He argues that the culmination of tragic decline is reached in Euripides, and 
subsequently is survived by a shadow of itself in the form of Attic comedy (BT, §11).^'* 
This is so for Nietzsche by virtue of the fact that Euripides, unlike Aeschylus or even 
Sophocles, does not recognise the metaphysical element in tragedy and allows the 
spectator to climb onto the stage for the first time:^^ 
Through him, everyday man pushed his way through the auditorium onto the stage, and 
the mirror in which only great and bold features had hitherto found expression now 
showed the painful fidelity that also reflected the blemished lines of nature (BT, § 11). 
The pre-Euripidean (as Nietzsche styles them. Promethean) dramatists showed little 
concern for the "accurate mask of reality" found in Euripides' own drama (BT, §11).^^ 
Nietzsche thinks that the rise of the herd, in terms of the rise of rationality, is 
documented by the dwindling power of the figure of the tragic hero, from the "pompous 
obesity" that Euripides decried in earlier tragedy to the direct reflection of the 
spectator's double on the stage (BT, §11). The rejection of the Aristotelian model 
liberates Nietzsche's understanding of the tragic hero from the notion of specifically 
moral action or motivation, and thereby liberates the Nietzschean spectator from having 
pity for the hero's tribulations or from discharging their emotions without awareness of 
the tragic effect. This is in direct accord with the active power-relation of mirroring 
observed in Chapter 3. 
However, there are two objections to this view of Nietzsche's claims concerning 
Euripides which must not be overlooked, both of which turn on the issue of chronology. 
Commenting on E. R. Dodds' contention that Euripides was in two senses an 
irrationalist, Walter Kaufmann notes that "Dodds might be almost as wrong as 
Nietzsche" in thinking that Euripides was influenced by Socrates.^ ^ Not only does he 
" Dastur, op. cit., note 20, p. 78. 
This is in contrast to Aeschylus, whose drama Nietzsche praises as exemplifying the principles of 
primordial tragedy. 
Dastur, op. cit., p. 78. 
The idea of the mask is deeply significant throughout Nietzsche's works, hinting at the notion of the 
self as fiction and standing as a symbol of Nietzsche's view of the ultimate nature of reality as ineluctably 
interpretative. See for example Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche without masks, (Chicago & 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), W. D. Williams, "Nietzsche's Masks", Malcolm Pasley 
(ed.), Nietzsche: Imagery and Tliought, (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 
and Walter Brogan, "Zarathustra: the tragic figure of the last philosopher", Miguel de Beistegui & Simon 
Sparks (eds.), Philosophy and Tragedy, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 152-166. 
" Kaufmann cites an early article by Dodds, "Euripides the Irrationalist", Classical Review, 43, 1929, pp. 
97-104, in which Dodds claims that Euripides was an irrationalist in two senses: first in that he opposed 
the three claims that reason is the sole instrument of truth, that the structure of reality must be rational and 
that moral/intellectual error arises from a failure to apply reason and is curable via intellectual process, 
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show Dodds as acknowledging that characteristic features of Euripidean drama appear 
in 438 B.C., arguably before Socrates had attained independent prominence as a thinker, 
Kaufmann also inverts the relationship between Socrates and Euripides by virtue of the 
claim that Socrates attended only Euripidean tragedy, speculating that the truth of the 
matter may well be that Socrates was in fact inspired by Euripides to write counter-
theses.^ ^ Hence Kaufmann claims that Nietzsche "was wrong about the birth of tragedy, 
about Aeschylus and Euripides, and about the death of tragedy", and that BT is "widely 
overrated".^ *^ 
It is also worth noting in a wider sense, as does James I . Porter, that Nietzsche's 
reading of antiquity "obeys no ordinary chronologies" and thus despite its utility for a 
defence of the aestheticist claim, it should be accepted with a degree of caution by any 
purely historicist reading.^ *^ In these chronological terms, the ultimate consequence of 
Nietzsche's reading for an historical view of Greek art is that time begins to flow in 
reverse. When taken to its fullest extent, Nietzsche's critique ultimately reveals the 
implicit argument that "the signs of decline are detectable in Sophocles, then in 
Aeschylus, and finally in the very first glimmerings of Greek cultural life" instead of 
supporting the apparent chronology of halcyon days of 'healthy' tragic art in Aeschylus 
and Sophocles followed by the sickness of Socratic rationalism as expressed by 
Euripides.^' A particularly clear example of this is that of Homer, who in Nietzsche's 
reading both "is and is not an instance of Dionysian insight, is and is not 'pre-
Homeric'", by virtue of the effect of this transhistorical treatment of Dionysianism.^^ 
However, Porter's analysis is not really opposed to the aestheticist position. 
Having drawn attention to this apparent flaw in Nietzsche's analysis of Greek antiquity 
and thereby echoing Kaufmann's concerns. Porter claims (apparently idiosyncratically) 
that in fact Nietzsche has no views about antiquity, and therefore cannot be held 
accountable for the incoherence of his views as they relate to historical fact.^^ This 
seemingly odd pronouncement, which runs counter to the apparent concern with 
antiquity evinced by Nietzsche in BT and indeed elsewhere, actually makes a great deal 
of sense in the light of Nietzsche's aestheticism. It shows us that the mistake is to 
and second that as these traits summarise the major contribution of Greek philosophy, evidence that 
Euripides was a reactionist against the supremacy of reason, where Socrates affirmed its supremacy, thus 
looks like an irrational reactionism against Socrates. See Kaufmann, op. cit., note 20, pp. 251-252. 
Ibid., p. 252. 
Ibid., p. 254. 
James I. Porter, "After Philology: Nietzsche and the Reinvention of Antiquity", New Nietzsche Studies, 
Vol. 4, Nos. 1&2, p. 36. (Henceforth AP in citations). 
Ibid., p. 37. 
Porter, AP, p. 36. 
" Ibid., p. 37. 
149 
understand BT, and indeed the entirety of Nietzsche's published and unpublished 
comments on antiquity, as simply comments on antiquity. Rather, as Porter has it, the 
telling contradictions in Nietzsche's writing on the Greeks point to the use of antiquity 
not as the object of Nietzsche's analysis but as a favoured tool of his analytic method, 
where these views: 
[T]end to be derived from contemporary attitudes to antiquity and then are reflected 
back, provocatively, upon these sources in a distortive mirroring.^'' 
Porter is consequently able to conclude that Nietzsche's stances on antiquity, though 
marked by contradiction and paradox, are not reducible to such.^ ^ While Nietzsche was 
not entirely lacking in views on antiquity, his priority is to put antiquity to work on 
behalf of his more immediate concem: the critique of modemity.^^ Thus Nietzsche's 
views on antiquity reveal themselves to be contradictory precisely because they are not 
views on antiquity, but views on modernity discussed through the lens of antiquity. 
This supports my view that it is possible to couple this view of Nietzsche's 
thinking on antiquity with a part of his critique of modernity. What I think we can begin 
to draw from reflection upon Nietzsche's critique of tragedy is not principally an 
analysis of a genre, or a historical picture of art in Greek antiquity, but an exploration of 
the ontological relation between beauty and suffering, couched in terms of identity and 
will in both cultural and individual senses.It should be noted from the first that even 
in this, Nietzsche's first published work, the themes of suffering and beauty are already 
connected: 
The tragic cannot be honestly inferred from the nature of art as it is conventionally 
conceived, according to the single category of illusion and beauty. Only from the spirit 
of music can we understand delight in the destruction of the individual {BT, §16). 
The connection between them notwithstanding, however, Nietzsche is also pointing to 
the difficulty of understanding the relationship of suffering to beauty: a relationship that 
is most clear to us in tragedy, and especially in Greek tragedy. The difficulty is 
produced by our conventional conception of art, which is commonly made in terms of 
Porter, AP, p. 37. 
" Ibid. 
'^Ibid. 
" Of course, this does not mean to say that Nietzsche had no such views, or that his remarks have no 
direct consequences for aesthetics proper. 
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the beautiful. However useful for the appreciation and evaluation of individual works of 
art, this is insufficient for the interpretation of tragedy, in which beauty is directly 
linked to pain, fear, and death. As such, finding the aestheticist claim expressed in BT 
should not perhaps come as any real surprise to us {BT, §§5, 24). 
Nietzsche assures us at the beginning of BT that "we shall have gained much for 
the science of aesthetics" through his presentation of the relation between Apollo and 
Dionysus, which strongly suggests that Nietzsche's project in BT is to reinvent 
aesthetics, or at least to offer a critique of art {BT, §1). It is equally certain that in one 
sense, this is precisely what he does - there is no real barrier to reading BT in these 
terms, as we shall see. But to interpret this in terms of a simple analogy between 
suffering in life and suffering in art is, I think, inadequate. The view that BT is 
fundamentally an aesthetic project perpetuates a notion of difference between tragic 
suffering and suffering in the real world. In a wider sense, this is to perpetuate the 
Platonist (but not Platonic) view that there is no common ontological ground between 
art and being, without even pausing to question the inherent assumption involved. 
However, recognising and challenging assumptions is perhaps Nietzsche's greatest 
talent. It seems to me to be no accident that the much-cited opening phrase of BT is 
couched in the terms of direct perception, and that a contrast is drawn between this and 
the notion of logical reasoning from the first. The contrast present in this opening phrase 
therefore gives leave to consider what the nature of perceiving the Apollo/Dionysus 
interaction directly, and "not only through logical reasoning", might be like {BT, §1). 
Recalling Nietzsche's distinction between historical and metaphysical modes of 
philosophy, it is not difficult to see BT as an active part of the fundamentally 
interpretative nature of Nietzsche's aestheticist philosophy. 
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4.2: 'Tragedy' as a cipher: suffering and art 
Some possible contradiction in Nietzsche's position on Aristotle requires clarification 
before we can proceed any further. For Nietzsche, pity contains two elements of 
personal pleasure: one of these elements is the pleasure of our satisfaction in the 
exercise of power, and the other is the pleasure of the emotion itself, which he sees as 
"the kind of pity we find in tragedy" (HA, §103). At first glance, this might give rise to 
the impression of Nietzsche as arguing in Aristotelian terms for the function of tragedy 
as katharsis. But in BT, Nietzsche is concerned to reject the Aristotelian view of 
38 
tragedy. Nicholas Martin has argued that the rejection of Aristotle's theory in BT 
remains implicit within the text to some extent, and is only brought out more explicitly 
in the light of Nietzsche's later comments on his own writing.^^ This is correct in as far 
as Nietzsche's primary objective in BT is not to write a critique of the Poetics. Martin 
shows that the implicit rejection of Aristotle in BT is made explicit in EH, citing as 
evidence of this EH, 'The Birth of Tragedy', §3. In fact, Nietzsche makes the same 
point in 77 X, §5. The implicit rejection in Br of such an important theory of tragedy as 
that of Aristotle must surely signify an explicit engagement with something of greater 
importance within the text of BT. I argued in the previous section that this was a 
discussion of the nature of being through the language of tragedy. 
However, i f this is the case, then a problem with my account is brought to the 
fore. Nietzsche's remark on tragic pity as pleasurable seems to contradict my argument 
in the previous section, by showing that Nietzsche is in fact discussing tragedy in an 
aesthetic sense. In aestheticist vein, we ought to consider that Nietzsche is using tragedy 
in more than one way. I suggest that Nietzsche does in fact discuss tragedy in an artistic 
sense in BT, and that this complements his use of tragedy as a cipher for being. This is 
the claim that the theme of tragedy, in Nietzsche's BT, can be read as a cipher for the 
aesthetic.'^ " 
It is obvious that works of art from genres other than tragedy depict instances of 
pain, fear and death in a manner that is beautiful, or that represent a link between 
suffering and beauty - examples might include the poems of Wilfred Owen, Lord 
Byron, or the pictorial art of Goya. In BT, Nietzsche's own examples of this include 
See also WP 3, §851: "On repeated occasions I have laid my finger on Aristotle's great 
misunderstanding in believing the tragic affects to be two depressive affects, terror and pity. If he were 
right, tragedy would be an art dangerous to life", 
Nicholas Martin, Nietzsche and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 43. 
Bishop & Stephenson, op. cit., note 5, pp. 426-427. 
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Raphael's Transfiguration. But his more fundamental point is that tragedy, and 
specifically Greek tragedy, is the ultimate source of all such art. Greek tragedy, 
Nietzsche thinks, is the foundation of modem Western art; or rather, modem Westem 
art is, like the culture that produces it, a degenerate form of Greek tragedy and Greek 
culture. Thus, in couching his critique of modemity in the language of Greek tragedy, 
Nietzsche can speak to the source of our difficulty of understanding the relationship of 
suffering to beauty and thereby of art to being, and not merely to individual artworks or 
genres as aspects of this relationship.'*' A double sense of tragedy understood as the 
aesthetic is at work in the text. First, tragedy is shown to operate in the sense of the 
mind's despair at its incapacity to overcome the gulf between being (Sein) and 
appearance (Schein).'*^ This first sense of tragedy corresponds to the idea of 
appropriation of being in the critique of pity, only in this context the form of the 
argument is channelled through the interaction between Apollo and Dionysus. The 
"supreme goal of tragedy and of art in general" is symbolised through what amounts to 
the mutual appropriation of being through language; as Nietzsche puts it, "Dionysus 
speaks the language of Apollo, but Apollo finally speaks the language of Dionysus": 
In the overall effect of tragedy the Dionysiac predominates once again; its final note 
could never echo from the Apolline realm. And in this process Apolline deception is 
unveiled for what it is, a veiling of the true Dionysiac effect, which lasts for the duration 
of the tragedy (BT, §21). 
Instead of purging the emotion of pity for the suffering of the hero through katharsis as 
in the Aristotelian model of tragedy, the Nietzschean model returns tragedy to the 
Dionysiac effect that Nietzsche himself believes is the tme effect of tragedy. This effect 
is the reflection of life and nature in their full strength, which is as terrible as it is 
beautiful; it stands in contrast to the mere reflection of the social reality that 
characterises the Euripidean tragedy.'*'' 
The parallel here with the critique of pity in Nietzsche's later writings is 
obvious, and speaks to an identical ontological relation between beauty and suffering in 
terms of the will to power. The Aristotelian model of tragedy itself reflects the nihilistic 
disempowerment of Greek humanity effected by the decline in power of the tragic hero 
This is by no means to say that Nietzsche does not value works of art in themselves, or that he does not 
appreciate and/or evaluate them in terms of the beautiful alone. 
Bishop & Stephenson, op. cit., note 5, pp. 426-427. 
Dastur, op. cit., note 20, p. 78. 
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and the corresponding rise of the ascetic interpretation of being. Nietzsche's model 
hopes to restore a similar conceptual space in order for the desire for self-contemplation 
to fulf i l itself once again, a "sphere of beauty" in which to see the full terror and horror 
of life reflected once more {BT, §3). This is the second sense of tragedy understood as a 
cipher for the aesthetic, this time in a more specific sense: as a form of art that is 
capable of reconciling being and appearance."*^  This recognition touches on the notion 
of art as necessary to life in the justificatory spirit of the aestheticist claim: 
How else could life have been home by a race so sensitive, so impetuous in its desires, 
so uniquely capable of suffering, if it had not been revealed to them, haloed in a higher 
glory, in their gods? The same impulse that calls art into existence, the complement and 
apotheosis of existence, also created the Olympian world with which the Hellenic 'will ' 
held up a transfiguring mirror to itself {BT, §3). 
The Hellenic will transfigures itself through the reflection of what I shall call the 
synthesised Dionysus. In binary synthesis, the name of one of a pair of antitheses is 
applied to the resulting synthesis; thus a richer concept is represented, but this is also a 
concept that leans towards the characteristics in an ascending hierarchy.'*^ Thus to 
reprise Nietzsche's claim cited above that "the entire book knows only one overt and 
implied artistic meaning behind all events" and that this meaning is the "entirely 
thoughtless and amoral artist-god ... who, creating worlds, rids himself of the affliction 
of abundance and super-abundance, of the suffering of his intemal contradictions", we 
can confirm without contradiction that Nietzsche's authentic tragic hero is called 
Dionysus - but that this 'synthesised Dionysus' is constituted from the interacting 
antitheses of Dionysus and Apollo {BT, 'Attempt', §5). 
Additionally, however, there is a sense in which tragedy in BT, decoded and 
revealed as the aesthetic, touches on the aestheticist claim through the inseparable unity 
of music and tragic myth.'*^ What is required here is a physiological reading of the 
transfiguring effect of the unity of music and tragic myth in relation to the binary 
Bishop & Stephenson, op. cit., note 5, p. 429. 
Ibid., p. 420-421. The example of binary synthesis in 67 constitutes evidence for the main claim of the 
authors, that Nietzsche can be regarded as participating in a "perennial aesthetic" that owes much to 
Weimar aesthetics (p. 412). The aestheticist claim, on this reading, is a direct descendant of Schiller's 
concept of the aesthetic as a fusion of physical and intellectual experience (p. 413). Gunter Figal argues 
that in simultaneously assimilating and radicalising Schiller's thought, the aesthetic becomes that realm in 
which self-limited reason becomes transparent for Nietzsche, despite what Figal interprets as the lack of 
an overarching unity in Nietzsche's conception of the aesthetic in BT that for him signifies an implicit 
opposition within Nietzsche to Schiller's aesthetic of reconciliation and the German idealist aesthetic that 
descended from it. See Gilnter Figal, "Aesthetically limited reason: on Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy", 
Miguel de Beistegui & Simon Sparks (eds.). Philosophy and Tragedy, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 
141-142. 
Bishop & Stephenson, op. cit., note 5, p. 429. 
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synthesis of Apollo and Dionysus.'*'' More specifically, the question to be answered here 
is whether the creative power of the will that transfigures the experience of being is 
fundamentally visual or auditory. In analysing the origin of Greek tragedy, and its 
subsequent decline, Nietzsche has diagnosed that modem humanity needs the spirit of 
music out of which tragedy is bom, and from which Greek tragedy emerged in company 
with the Dionysian mystery rites."*^ There are two items to consider: first, how auditory 
and visual representation relate the individual to the synthesised Dionysus, and how it is 
that Nietzsche thinks our characteristically modem perception can be transfigured in 
order to effect the renewal of the tragic disposition. 
Wolfgang Welsch has remarked that our culture, which has until recently been 
determined chiefly by vision, is beginning to feel the effects of what he terms the 
"auditive cultural revolution"."*^ Welsch places the shift from the auditory to the visual 
as proceeding from Heraclitus' assertion that "the eyes are more accurate witnesses than 
the ears" - though he nonetheless continued to employ the metaphors of music, 
especially with regard to the cosmos - through to Plato, with whom the visual achieved 
dominance.^" The resulting attribution of the visual to concepts - Platonic Ideas -
culminated in the linear form of the will to tmth (understood via the literal meaning of 
Enlightenment [Aujklarung], progression towards the light of reason). In Platonic terms, 
Welsch describes this as the path from the darkness of the cave, up and out into 
daylight.^' The corresponding Platonic hierarchical division of the world into 
appearance and the higher reality, the realm of Ideas or of the Forms, resulted in the call 
for the expulsion of the artists from the Republic, ostensibly on the grounds of the 
potential art had for cormpting public morality, but, more cynically, because it 
threatened the hierarchy of the Idea as the highest point of reality over appearances. 
Nietzsche distinguishes between Apollonian plastic arts, which he takes as 
representing phenomena, and Dionysiac music, which for him represents the 
metaphysical - "the direct replica of the will i tself {BT, §16). Following Wagner, he 
finds that although music cannot be measured according to the category of beauty, a 
false aesthetic prevails in which it is judged that music ought to provide "an effect 
^^Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 427. 
Wolfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics, Andrew Inkpin (trans.), (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 
1997), p. 150. 
°^ Ibid., p. 151, 164. 
" Ibid. See also Robert Gooding-Williams, Zarathustra's Dionysian Modernism, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 51-53. Gooding-Williams identifies Macrobius as a source of the mirror-
imagery at work in Nietzsche, which links the tragic hero (Dionysus/Zarathustra) with the Platonic 
nuances of Z. 
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similar to that of works in the visual arts - the arousal of pleasure in beautiful forms" 
{BT, §16). The contrast between Nietzsche's own conception of the abyss between 
visual arts and music, and the false aesthetic that proposes to evaluate them according to 
the same criterion, forms his essential problem of tragedy. 
In aesthetic terms, Nietzsche reflects upon the decline of Greek tragedy in terms 
of the importance given to the choms.^ ^ For him, the primordial choms is "the symbol 
of the crowd in a Dionysiac state", where the stage and the action are conceived purely 
in terms of a vision, and the chorus itself generates the sole reality through articulation 
in "dance, sound and words" {BT, §8). The key point is that in the earliest forms of 
tragedy, the chorus itself does not act: 
In its vision this chorus beholds its lord and master, Dionysus, and hence it is always a 
chorus of votaries: it sees how he, the god, suffers and is exalted, and it therefore does 
not act itself (57, §8). 
The choms in this sense is wise, in that it shares the suffering of Dionysus {BT, §8). 
This interpretation from the perspective of the tragic actor or choms is Nietzsche's 
reconstmcted view of tragedy in its full health, as exemplified by Aeschylean drama. In 
acknowledging that tragedy is bom from the choms, Nietzsche considers two 
'idealising' interpretations of the function of the choms in tragedy: Schiller's view of 
the choms as a living wall that divides tragedy from the real world, and Schlegel's view 
of the choms as the ideal spectator {BT, §7).^^ Schiller's interpretation is, Nietzsche 
thinks, the chief weapon in the fight against naturalism understood as the illusionism 
typically demanded from dramatic poetry {BT, §7). Understanding the choms as a living 
wall allows Schiller to locate the beings of the satyr choms within an invented natural 
state, "a world of equal reality and credibility, as Olympus with its inhabitants was for 
the Hellenes", and thereby allows him to idealise this state {BT, §7). '^* Contrastingly, 
Schlegel's view that the choms as "the epitome and concentration of the mass of 
spectators" is in fact the "ideal spectator", is rejected by Nietzsche {BT, §7). Nietzsche's 
claim that ''tragedy arose from the tragic chorus" explicitly acknowledges that tragedy 
was, in its primordial incarnation as a religious rite, "originally only choms and nothing 
" Porter, AP, pp. 36-37. 
" Nietzsche also considers a political explanation of the chorus as representing the immutable moral law 
of the Athenian democrats, "always correct in its appraisal of the passionate misdeeds and extravagances 
of the kings", but dismisses this on the ground that the religious origin of tragedy precludes an 
interpretation of the function of the chorus in terms of the contrast between nobility and populace {BT, 
§7). 
Nietzsche's reading makes it clear that in Greek myth the votaries of Dionysus were satyrs; hence this 
characterisation of the chorus in tragedy. 
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else", and as such refutes the SchlegeHan view insofar as "the idea of a spectator 
without a play is an absurd one" (fir, §7). 
What Nietzsche leaves unsaid is that he rejects Schlegel precisely on the ground 
of the "ideal spectator" being incompatible with the natural state of the individual - a 
state in which the synthesis of perspectives proposed by this view of the chorus would 
be impossible. There is no such 'ideal' perspective.^^ The perspective of Schlegel's 
observer is thus far too close to that of "the great Cyclops eye of Socrates", which 
Nietzsche says would have seen tragedy as something "irrational" and repellent to the 
"sober temperament" (fir, §14). Schiller's natural view is in much greater accord with 
Nietzsche's belief that the Greek man of culture felt annulled by the satyr chorus: 
annulment being the direct effect of tragedy in which "the gulfs separating man from 
man, make way for an overwhelming sense of unity that goes back to the very heart of 
nature" (fir, §7). This sense of the unity of nature is the metaphysical consolation of 
tragedy. 
Schiller's view of the chorus is in greater accord with the aestheticist outlook. 
The "musical mood" that Schiller observed in himself to precede the act of writing 
poetry accords with what Nietzsche describes as the most important phenomenon in 
ancient poetry, "the unification, or indeed the identity - which they assumed to be quite 
natural - of the lyric poet with the musician" (BT, § 5). The sense of the unity of nature, 
the "primal Oneness" as Nietzsche styles it, not only provides the consolation of 
tragedy, but does so precisely through the spirit of music to which BT appeals. This 
musical unity between individuation and the primal oneness, between the lyric poet and 
the musician, is described by Nietzsche in terms of both reflection and being, in order to 
answer the question of how it is possible to consider the lyric poet, the first subjective 
artist and "this Archilochus who frightens us", to be an artist at all (fir, § 5). It is quite 
clear that this is Nietzsche's reading of the lyric poet through the lens of the artist's 
metaphysics that he develops during the course of fir: 
First of all, as a Dionysiac artist, he has been thoroughly united with the primal 
Oneness, its pain and contradiction, and produces the copy of that primal Oneness as 
music, if we can rightly call music a repetition and recast of the world; but now, under 
the Apolline dream influence, this music is revealed to him as an allegorical dream 
" This mirrors Nietzsche's view that estimating the value of life is impossible because the perspective 
required for a human to make such a judgement is simply non-existent. See Chapter 2 for a discussion of 
perspectivism, and also Gary Shapiro, "Nietzsche's Story of the Eye: Hyphenating the Augen-blick", 
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 22, Autumn 2001. Shapiro shows that Nietzsche's conception of vision 
holds the eye not as beholding an unchanging reality, but as seeing what is at best "a flickering world in 
which it will find no absolute ground" (p. 34). 
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image. That reflection of primal pain in music, free of images and concepts, redeemed 
by illusion, now creates a second mirror image as a single allegory or example (Br, §5). 
Recalling Nietzsche's project of translating the text of homo natura, however, we must 
be aware that the metaphysical consolation of tragedy is illusory in the sense that it is 
another one of the "vain and fanciful interpretations and secondary meanings" which 
have obscured that basic text {BGE, §230). 
While on the one hand BT attempts to legitimise the worship of Dionysus, by 
which means it legitimises the presence in art of a destructive quality that may challenge 
the goal of art as culture, on the other hand it also respects the sublimation of fiction as 
it is presented in the form of Apollo.^^ But why is it that "our aestheticians, of course, 
can tell us nothing of this return to the primal home, of the fraternal bond between the 
two artistic deities that exists in tragedy, or of the ApoUine and Dionysiac excitement of 
the listener, in their tireless characterisation of the hero's conflict with destiny"? {BT, 
§22). This is due to Nietzsche's requirement for the "truly aesthetic listener", of which 
company the aesthetician as styled by Nietzsche is not a member {BT, §22). The truly 
aesthetic listener is one who interprets "the effect of a true musical tragedy in a pure and 
unadulterated way, in terms of his own experiences" {BT, §22). The attentive friend to 
whom Nietzsche is speaking, we should remember in the light of the critique of pity, is 
a figure from the possible future in which the perception of all things will have been 
transfigured within the creatively aestheticist terms of an ontology of will to power.^ ^ 
Nietzsche's optimism with regard to this future is expressed in his hope that, 
through the explanation given in the text of the effect of a musical tragedy, the friend 
will "now be able to interpret his own experiences" {BT, §22). More specifically, the 
individual's perception of values will have been transfigured and the Socratic 
distinction between understanding and evaluating fully overcome. We should 
understand this hope as a key constituent of Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power. 
Through the transfiguring analysis of the tragic effect it is possible "to see the motions 
Tillotama Rajan, Dark Interpreter, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 43. 
Of course, in a more historical sense, the "attentive friend" denotes Richard Wagner; but there is an 
interesting case to be made here for a mixing of history and theory. There is insufficient space to develop 
this suggestion here; to sum up, however, I think that a more detailed analysis would show that 
Nietzsche's "fictionalisation" ofWagner's character remained vital within his wider philosophy long after 
the break from Wagner. The move away from Wagner prompted a desire to replace Wagner's musically-
sophisticated but ultimately deaf ears with those of a figure who could, or who had the future capacity to, 
properly hear and understand what Nietzsche has to say. This is deeply significant in the context of the 
transfiguration of perception in an ontology of will to power. Put simply, I suggest that the loss of 
Wagner as the "attentive friend" necessitated Nietzsche's creation of the Ubermensch. 
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of the wi l l " {BT, §22). " This returns our discussion to the cultural inversion between 
the pessimism of strength and the optimism of weakness. The sense of the optimism of 
weakness is made evident in the following passage: 
Might we not assume - in the face of all 'modem ideas' and prejudices of democratic 
taste - that the victory of optimism, the now predominant reason, practical and 
theoretical utilitarianism, like democracy itself, with which it is coeval, is a symptom of 
waning power, of approaching senescence, of physiological fatigue? And precisely not 
pessimism? Was Epicurus an optimist - precisely because he suffered? We can see what 
a heavy load of difficult questions this book has taken on - let us add its most difficult 
quesdon! What, under the lens of life, is the meaning of morality?... (BT, 'Attempt', 
§4). 
Note first the strong connection between reason, utilitarianism and the waning of power, 
and second, the contrast between these three elements and pessimism.^^ This passage 
from Nietzsche's 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' connects the problem of the question of 
value, explicitly identified at the end of GM 1, with the original aestheticist claim of BT. 
Nietzsche's security in the inestimability of the value of life, in contrast to his more 
general view that values are created, focuses attention not only upon morality (and 
indeed science) as questionable for the first time, but also upon art as questionable. To 
follow Nietzsche's identification of the task of BT is, then, "to see science under the 
lens of the artist, but art under the lens of life" {BT, 'Attempt', §2). 
It is worth noting Tillotama Rajan's point that it would be a mistake to view BT 
as a nonteleological work in the ordinary sense; that is, "a work that never arrives at 
'meaning' because it denies itself both the consolation of transcending the original 
oneness towards Apollo, and the other, darker, consolation of confronting Dionysos."^° 
This would leave BT unreconstructed: it would not constitute an interpretation, but 
rather the culmination of the theological instinct determined within ordinary language.^' 
Rajan's claim that we can see the text as the culmination of a process of reassessment, 
begun when the contradiction between aesthetics and existence is relocated as a 
dichotomy within aesthetics itself, speaks both to the modem aesthetic alienation of art 
See James I. Porter, The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on The Birth of Tragedy, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 2-4. (Henceforth ID in citations). 
'^ Here, the pessimism of which Nietzsche speaks is obviously that of Schopenhauer. Julian Young notes 
that, like Nietzsche and Aristotle, Schopenhauer's interest lies in the nature of the tragic effect - in other 
words, the reason why we derive pleasure from the representation of suffering. However, Young 
ultimately distinguishes Nietzsche's view from that of Schopenhauer in terms of Schopenhauer's claim 
for the primacy of Christian tragedies over ancient ones. For a wider discussion see Young, op. cit., note 
3, p. 19. 
* Rajan, op. cit., note 56, p. 47. 
For a broader discussion of the theological inheritance of Nietzsche's cultural critique see Duncan 
Large, "Nietzsche's Use of Biblical Language", Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 22, Autumn 2001. 
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as well as to the question of how we are to understand the perception of suffering as 
beautiful.^^ 
Despite the identification of Socrates as the inversion of Nietzsche's Dionysus, 
we should not overlook the fact that there is an additional and highly paradoxical aspect 
of Socrates which plays on the notion that tragedy is bom out of the spirit of music. 
This is the image of Socrates playing music in the form of a hymn to Apollo.^^ It has 
been suggested that this image of Socrates can be read as a cipher for a particular kind 
of art; that the image itself questions towards a mode of artistic discourse for which BT 
is a blueprint; a question finally answered by Nietzsche through the textual unity of the 
unique aestheticist philosophy of Z.^ '* If what Nietzsche has to say about the primacy of 
interpretation is on target - and we have seen in previous chapters that it is - then the 
notion of tragedy as 'aesthetic' in the sense of being distinct from truth or morality is 
itself called into question. This leaves the classical 'aesthetic' view of tragedy as an art-
form in an untenable position. Following von Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, we can allow 
that this classical aesthetic holds tragedy to be (as Nietzsche denies) a pleasant sideline, 
something that is readily dispensable in comparison to the 'real' world.^^ This is also in 
line with the modem, alienated aesthetic. But i f everything, including art, is reducible to 
interpretation, then the alienated aesthetic dissolves: the aesthetic discourse of 
Nietzsche's aestheticism incorporates a reversal of the aesthetic alienation effect. 
To understand this point, we need to examine a suitable example. Nietzsche's 
discussion of Raphael's Transfiguration is his fullest exploration of an individual 
painting. As part of a paper that argues for a link between Nietzsche and Foucault as 
theorists of visual art and visual culture, Gary Shapiro notes that its occurrence within a 
book devoted to the spirit of music is highly significant in terms of the relation between 
the auditory and the visual.^^ However, while he recognises its significance, Shapiro 
" Rajan, op. cit., p. 50. According to Rajan, the contradiction between aesthetics and existence, having 
been tacitly acknowledged by writers such as Shelley, is actively relocated within aesthetics by Schiller 
and Schopenhauer. This is of course one of the sources of the modem phenomenon of aesthetic 
alienation, described by J. M. Bernstein in The Fate of Art, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
" Bishop & Stephenson, op. cit., note 5, p. 428. Nietzsche writes that this hymn of Socrates was the "only 
indication that he ever gave any consideration to the limitations of logic" {BT, § 14). 
An important historical consideration should be observed here. Specifically, this is the influence of 
Weimar Classicism upon Nietzsche's development of the aestheticist claim (Bishop & Stephenson, op. 
cit., note 5, pp. 428-429). See also M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern, Nietzsche on Tragedy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 194, 354-355. 
Ullrich von Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, Future Philology! A Reply to Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of 
Tragedy, Postl, Gertrude (trans.). New Nietzsche Studies, 4, Vols. 1&2, Summer/Fall 2000, p. 24. 
Gary Shapiro, '"This Is Not a Christ': Nietzsche, Foucault and the Genealogy of Vision", in Why 
Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics, Alan D. Schrift (ed.), (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), p. 84. Shapiro points out that at the time he wrote on 
Transfiguration in BT, Nietzsche had not yet actually seen it, other than in reproductions - but that he 
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cannot elaborate upon it: I propose to do so here as an example of the tragic aesthetic 
that may be coupled with Nietzsche's innovation of tragic knowledge. Through his 
discussion of Transfiguration, Nietzsche offers us the guiding principle of Apolline 
culture: delight in the satisfaction of the primordial desire for illusion through the 
reduction of illusion to mere illusion, which the naive artist and the naive work bring 
(fir, §4). Consider the following mention that Nietzsche makes of the nai ve aesthetic: 
Whenever we encounter the naive in art, we should recognize that we are in the 
presence of the highest impact of Apolline culture, which must always overthrow a 
realm of Titans and slay monsters, and which must emerge triumphant over a terrible 
abyss in its contemplation of the world and its most intense capacity for suffering, by 
resorting to the most powerful and pleasurable illusions. But how rarely is the naive, 
that complete immersion in the beauty of illusion, achieved! (fir, §3). 
The naive aesthetic characterises Apolline works of art. The suffering that forms an 
integral part of the world is displaced from perception by a more pleasing and beautiful 
illusion.^^ As Nietzsche allows the example of Transfiguration to show, the illusion of 
the lower half of the painting "with the possessed boy, his despairing bearers, the 
dismayed and terrified disciples" is the reflection of "eternal, primal suffering" and the 
reflection of the eternal contradiction that Nietzsche terms "the father of all things" (fir, 
§4). According to Nietzsche's description, the upper half of the painting arises as a 
second illusion "like an ambrosial vapour" from the lower half, "a radiant floating in the 
purest bliss and painless contemplation beaming from wide-open eyes" (fir, §4). It is 
this illusion of which those in the lower half of the painting are unaware; it is through 
this double play of illusion that, Nietzsche finds, we may understand the reciprocal 
necessity of the Apolline world of beauty and the wisdom of Silenus which is its 
substratum: that wisdom being that best of all is not to have been bom (fir, §4). But 
note that Nietzsche connects the painless state of contemplation with the blindness of 
those supposedly wide-open eyes, hinting again at the contrast between a positive 
interpretation of suffering and the negative ascetic view of suffering as punishment. 
This is another indication of the accord between Nietzsche's defence of his 
identification of Raphael as a naive artist of Apolline culture, and of the consistency 
throughout his texts of his view of acceptance of pain as a part of life. 
would have seen Raphael's Sistine Madonna, and was acquainted with the tradition of Raphael 
admiration that was common amongst nineteenth-century Germans. 
As Michael Tanner points out, however, this is not simply a case of seeing the world as one normally 
would and deciding to call it "art". Tanner, Nietzsche, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 9. 
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Raphael's Transfiguration is in fact based on two separate and anachronous 
stories from the Gospels, one in which the disciples fail to heal a possessed boy because 
their faith is insufficient, and one in which Jesus is transfigured. The two levels of the 
painting are especially useful to Nietzsche's purpose in this aspect of his discussion, 
which is "to demonstrate the way in which Apollonian art has the capacity to represent, 
include, and transcend the Dionysian."^^ However, the Dionysian is able to be 
represented by the painting only through the receipt of Apollonian form, as in a stricter 
sense it cannot be represented but only performed or embodied.^*' Shapiro finds that the 
particular suitability of the painting for Nietzsche's purposes lies in Raphael's 
substitution of a floating figure of Christ for a figure of him that, to be fully in accord 
with the Gospel story of transfiguration, would require the absence of all shadow in the 
picture, and thus would defeat the principles of Raphael's style of painting.^' In so 
doing, Shapiro thinks, Raphael comes as close as possible to representing the idea of 
appearance as appearance - the notion that "what we see is illusion, shining, radiance, 
appearance severed from any ground" - in his depiction of the floating figure of 
Christ.^^ 
Shapiro continues by arguing that what makes the Greek art unique is that it 
involves a kind of double vision, in the sense that the spectator sees virtually from two 
places at once. This is so in that the spectator sees the actors on the raised stage, but at 
the same time, identifies with the chorus located in the orchestra. Thus the spectator 
projects him/herself into the vision that both the actors and the chorus have of the same 
scene, and hence is able to embody a multiplicity of perspectives.^^ I want to reprise 
Nietzsche's accord with Schiller's idealising view of the tragic chorus here, in line with 
the Schillerian distinction between the naive and the sentimental. Recall that Schiller's 
view of the chorus is as a living wall that "tragedy pulls around itself to close itself off 
entirely from the real world", thus in his opinion maintaining its ideal ground and its 
poetic freedom {BT, §7). This is precisely the sense in which Nietzsche's aestheticism 
functions: the extension of the aesthetic to embrace the whole of being is first 
Shapiro, op. cit., note 66, p. 87. 
'^ Shapiro, op. cit., note 66, p. 87. 
™Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
Ibid. Shapiro compares Nietzsche's discussion of Transfiguration with Foucault's discussion of Rene 
Magritte's This Is Not a Pipe, in which Foucault identifies the floating pipe as playing a similar role to 
that of the floating Christ in Raphael's painting. 
Ibid., p. 95. The contrast drawn by Nietzsche between the Cyclops eye of Socrates, and the multiplicity 
of vision of Dionysus, is perhaps his first expression of perspectivism - even if, as Shapiro allows, 
Nietzsche does not yet adopt that term. 
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encountered in the aesthetic function of the chorus in Greek tragedy. The suffering and 
the beauty of tragedy are mirrored by the interpretative power of the chorus. 
In their analysis of the eternal recurrence, Magnus, Stewart and Mileur point out 
that the eternal recurrence extends to encompass all of our experiences; only a 
superhuman being could, they think, accept recurrence without "emendation, evasion, or 
self-deception, a being whose distance from humanity is greater than the distance 
between man and beast."^ '^  They argue that "only self-deception of theological 
proportions could affirm the unconditional worth of every moment of one's life", on the 
ground that as most of us can imagine a better life, we would not want to affirm each 
moment of our lives but would prefer to live "edited" versions.^^ This seems to me to be 
inconsistent with Nietzsche's critique of pity, in that it suggests contra Nietzsche that 
we should have pity for ourselves because our lives are inescapably filled with pain, 
horror and suffering. But perhaps Magnus, Stewart and Mileur are right in that 
Nietzsche's attitude to pity and consequently to aestheticism requires self-deception -
but self-deception conceived of in a less derogatory, and more necessary, sense. 
The importance of self-deception, in the sense of double vision, is evident in Br in 
Nietzsche's discussion of the attentive friend (BT, §22). Shapiro sees this passage in the 
light of the question of how a visual culture can be invigorating or deadening. But in the 
light of the concept of the synthesised Dionysus there is a sense in which we can argue 
that it is both; and there is also the possibility of an auditory culture to add to this 
equation.'^ The question of culture formed in terms of the auditory or the visual is 
another manifestation of the tension between Socrates and Dionysus, in that it yields an 
awareness of the limitation of logic and thereby the requirement for a new kind of 
knowledge: 
But now, spurred on by its powerful illusion, science is rushing irresistably to its limits, 
where the optimism essential to logic collapses. For the periphery of the circle of science 
has an infinite number of points, and while it is as yet impossible to tell how the circle 
could ever be fully measured, the noble, gifted man, even before the mid-course of his 
life, inevitably reaches that peripheral boundary, where he finds himself staring into the 
ineffable. If he sees here, to his dismay, how logic twists around itself and finally bites 
itself in the tail, there dawns a new form of knowledge, tragic knowledge, which needs art 
as both protection and remedy, if we are to bear it (BT, §15). 
Bemd Magnus, Stanley Stewart & Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature, 
(London: Routledge,1993), p. 28. Magnus, Stewart and Mileur note that eternal recurrence suggests a 
Romantic yearning to want to become the very person that one is. 
Ibid., pp. 28, 34. 
Shapiro does not fully allow for this, arguing as he does for Nietzsche to be understood as a visual 
theorist (op. cit., note 66). 
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This also unveils the source of the paradox of the music-making Socrates mentioned 
above, whose reason is forced for one time only to speak the language of Dionysus, the 
language of music. The new kind of knowledge required by the revival of the Dionysian 
in place of Socratic rationality is the tragic knowledge afforded by Nietzsche's 
aestheticism, of interpretation as pre-eminent within an ontology of will to power. 
The relation of suffering to the will to power brings to mind once more the 
ontological priorities in operation within Nietzsche's thinking. The ontological 
foundation of interpretation for Nietzsche is, of course, the will to power, which 
operates dynamically through the imposition of form.^^ This is a fundamentally creative 
act of "giving a shape which, in the highest level of life, consists in giving or imposing 
an interpretation."^^ It is also possible to pair this identification of form as interpretative 
with the notion of the Nietzschean order of rank in which the creative artist, that most 
singular individual, is perhaps one of the few that must "have power to begin with" in 
order to "attain a benevolent, affirmative disposition toward the painful and tragic in 
Hfe".^^ While the creative artist imposes form as interpretation, such articulation of a 
type does not speak to the artist's social standing, for this is itself a part of the herd 
mentality.^" Rather, it hints at the pathos of distance, which for Nietzsche is a 
characteristic of a strong age.^ ' The pathos of distance separates two kinds of life: one 
that is flourishing and superabundant, and one that is degenerative. In terms of power 
being intrinsic to activity, just as the power that an artist derives from his work is not an 
effect or a product (such as money), but resides in the work itself, so the power of 
83 
interpretation and of adopting new perspectives is intrinsic to the action of doing so. 
For Nietzsche, the most exhilarating form of power is that of the interpretative, creative 
and free individual.^'* But there are two kinds of artist: the kind that practices 
superabundant and flourishing art, and the kind that practices degenerative art. 
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™Ibid. 
Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 232. 
Babette E . Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and 
Life, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 281. (Henceforth NPS in citations). 
Ibid. 
"As an active, creative manifestation of Will to Power, the expression of power is the expression of life 
in unstinting, unflinching expenditure and sacrifice, not out of or in terms of an ascetic ideal." Ibid. 
Sarah Kofman, "Metaphor, Symbol, Metamorphosis", David B. Allison (ed.). The New Nietzsche, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), p. 210. 
David E . Cooper, Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy, (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 82-83. 
Ibid., p. 82. The sense of freedom at work here is not to be confused with the notion of free will. As 
Cooper points out, Nietzsche rejects the notion of free will as it is commonly understood, not because it 
serves to bolster the values advantageous to the weak, but because the concept of free will is dependent 
upon an idea of independent ego, or self, distinct from and responsible for behaviour. Nietzsche 
recognises that this idea of independent ego is a fiction, and thus a defence of the ideal of free will is a 
defence of a fiction. This in itself is not without value for Nietzsche, but it does not constitute the 
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This is not, however, to argue for the division of works of art into two distinct 
types. Rather, in the light of my claim here for an ontological identity between beauty 
and suffering, the idea of the artist is to be understood in a wider, aestheticist sense. In 
my discussion of Nietzsche's critique of pity above, we saw how the ascetic ideal was 
able to justify suffering: 
[T]he ascetic ideal has been the best 'faute de mieux' so far. It explained suffering.. .The 
explanation - there is no doubt - brought new suffering with it, deeper, more intemal, 
more poisonous, gnawing suffering: it brought all suffering under the perspecdve of 
guilt... (GM 3, §28). 
Yet while it brings a deeper and more poisonous suffering to bear upon the individual, 
this does not alter the aestheticist relevance of the ascetic ideal. The explanation of 
suffering is fundamentally a creative one in the sense of the creation of meaning. In GS, 
Nietzsche speaks of our ultimate gratitude to art in terms of the "cult of the untrue", 
arguing that without the invention of the arts, the realisation of "general untruth and 
mendaciousness" revealed by science would be unbearable {GS, §107). Where honesty 
would lead to suicide, Nietzsche thinks that art as the "good will to appearance" acts as 
a counterforce to such honesty and prevents self-destruction {GS, §107). Continuing his 
line of thought, Nietzsche reprises his original aestheticist claim from fir, but tempers 
the compass of the claim by contending that "as an aesthetic phenomenon existence is 
still bearable for us" {GS, §107). Walter Kaufmann considers in his edition of GS that 
this allusion to fir is very different in mood by virtue of the distinction between 
"bearable" and "justified", which he thinks suggests to the casual reader that 
Nietzsche's discovery of "gay science" interrupted his commitment to the aestheticist 
claim.^^ However, I think that Nietzsche's argument goes against this notion, and in so 
doing it also speaks to the wider relation between the aestheticist claim and the work of 
art.^ ^ Nietzsche hopes that a more complete understanding of the aesthetic will lead to a 
renewal of art.^ ^ His idea of "gay science" is a part of this renewal, not a counter to it; 
certainly, science as conceived in fir is linked to art, where Nietzsche asks "Might art 
even be a necessary correlative and supplement to science?" (fir, §14). The renewal of 
conceptual ideal for which it is frequently mistaken. Ibid., p. 96. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed 
discussion of the relation between grammar, fiction and object-creation. 
Kaufmann, The Gay Science, Kaufmann, Walter (trans.), (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 163. 
See Babette E . Babich, "Nietzsche and Eros Between the Devil and God's Deep Blue Sea: The Problem 
of the Artist as Actor-Jew-Woman", Continental Philosophy Review, 33 (2000), pp. 187-188. On 
Nietzsche's use of "bearable" to replace the previous aestheticist claim of justification, Babich rightly 
notes that it is "quite unclear how much may reasonably be made of the difference between what may be 
justified and what one can stand." 
Bishop and Stephenson, op. cit., note 5, p. 427. 
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ari; is intended in a specifically aestheticist sense: not only will the work of art be 
renewed, it will be a part of the wider renewal of the aestheticist perception of being. 
I have already argued that the forces of Apollo and Dionysus are necessarily 
linked to one another through the synthesised Dionysus. In a passage from TI, the 
synthesis between the two is expressed by Nietzsche through the notion of intoxication, 
in which Apollo and Dionysus stand as antithetical concepts both linked as forms of 
intoxication. On the one hand, Apollonian intoxication alerts the eye, "so that it receives 
visionary power"; and this form of intoxication is linked to the works of art created by 
the painter, the sculptor and the epic poet {Tl IX, §10). On the other hand, Dionysian 
intoxication alerts and intensifies the entire emotional system, enabling it to discharge 
all its power to "represent, reproduce, transfigure, transform, every kind of mime and 
play-acting" {TI IX, §10). The kind of art associated with Dionysus is music. The key 
thing for the Dionysian man, Nietzsche claims, is the ease of metamorphosis, which is 
to be understood in terms of the incapacity not to react to any stimulus {TI IX, §10). The 
incapacity not to react is clarified with the example of the hysteric, who similarly 
assumes "any role at the slightest sign" {TI IX, §10). The Dionysian man is constantly 
transforming himself; "he adopts every skin, every emotion" {TI IX, §10). 
However, Nietzsche argues that in comparison to this conception of man in a 
Dionysian state of intoxication, music as we understand it today is only a vestige of a 
much fuller emotional world of expression, calling it "a residuum of Dionysian 
histrionism" {TI IX, §10). Nietzsche's point here turns on the issue of specialisation in 
terms of its ecophysiological location: 
To make music possible as a specialized art-form a number of the senses, above all the 
kinaesthetic sense, were made inactive (at least relatively so: for to a certain extent all 
rhythm still speaks to our muscles): with the result that man no longer immediately 
imitates and represents with his body everything he feels {TI IX, §10). 
In this sense of increasing specialisation, all the arts are related; they form a whole 
under the umbrella term 'aesthetic', whose parts have become more and more 
specialised over time.** "The actor, the mime, the dancer, the musician, the lyric poet" 
are essentially one, or rather, were essentially one in the past {TI IX, §11). Each became 
distinguished from the other by virtue of specialisation, which is a characteristic of 
modem aesthetics and, indeed, philosophy.*^ And as such, each became increasingly 
Kofman, op. cit., note 82, p. 205. 
Ibid. Kofman notes that specialisation indicates a poverty of taste, in that it results in the inability to 
enjoy something with all of one's senses. It is no accident that the alienation of the senses by means of 
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distanced from the ecophysiological location of the interpreting perspective.^" Though 
the use of tragedy as a cipher for the aesthetic is commensurate with Nietzsche's use of 
tragedy as a cipher for being, the specialisation of modem aesthetics must be 
reconsidered if Nietzsche's aestheticism is to be recognisable. 
immobilisation, in order to make music possible, yields the specialised arts of modern aesthetics which by 
virtue of their aesthetic status are alienated from life. See Bernstein, op. cit., note 62, for a discussion of 
aesthetic alienation. See also Chapter 1. 
Babich, NPS. 
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4.3: Pity and the tragic hero 
We have seen that there is a dual project at work in BT. Nietzsche is attempting to 
conduct a discussion of the nature of being and of culture through the language of 
tragedy. But he is also using tragedy to make some claims about aesthetics, which in 
turn are dependent upon his conceptions of being and culture. All three aspects are 
linked, as we have seen in previous chapters, on an ontological level through will to 
power as interpretation. In this section, I consider Nietzsche's tragic aestheticism in the 
light of his aestheticist project of restoring the tragic disposition, and suggest how the 
complex figure of the tragic hero enables us to identify a specific power-relationship of 
mirroring at work in the critique of tragedy which reflects the unity between art, being 
and culture discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. 
Nietzsche writes that "[a]t the end of the old tragedies there was a sense of 
metaphysical conciliation without which it is impossible to imagine our taking delight 
in tragedy" {BT, §17). In his account, the audience is free to fully experience the tragic 
effect as Nietzsche defines it, which is in terms of myth. Nietzsche does not believe that 
the meaning of tragic myth was transparent to the Greeks; their heroes, he argues, 
"speak more superficially than they act" because "myth does not find adequate 
objectification in the spoken word" {BT, §17). Thus Nietzsche finds there is a danger for 
tragedy in the "incongmity between myth and word" in that it can mislead us into 
thinking that tragedy is less significant than it actually is {BT, §17). The profundity of 
the tragic effect is therefore attributed by Nietzsche not to the power of the poet's 
words, but to the structure of the scenes and the visible images in terms of the overall 
musical effect of the tragedy. This musical effect culminates in the interaction between 
the tragic hero and the audience. In what follows, I shall concentrate upon the notion of 
the hero in relation to pity. Specifically, I shall consider the power-relation inherent to 
Greek tragedy, in which the figure of the tragic hero is embedded. However, this power-
relation is reflected not only in the perfomance of tragedy, as we shall see, but also in 
the figures of Dionysus and Socrates. 
In early Greek tragedy, the character - our hero, say - is expected to "broaden 
out into an eternal archetype", allowing the spectator to respond to the power of the 
mythical {BT, §17). What myth wants, argues Nietzsche, is "to be seen as a unique 
example of a universality and tmth that gazes into infinity" {BT, §17). Within tragedy, 
the heroic type for Nietzsche is, as we recall from GS, one of "the great pain bringers of 
humanity" {GS, §318). This is connected to the idea of there being wisdom in pain, 
which notion rests upon the importance of the qualitative in terms of an interpretative 
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ontology. Where some individuals respond to the safety signal of pain with purely 
reactive self-preserving behaviour, the heroic type finds that his "expression is never 
prouder, more warlike and happier than it is when a storm comes up; indeed, pain itself 
gives them their greatest moments" (GS, §318). This instinct may not be life-preserving 
in an individual or Darwinist sense; but it is species-preserving, in the sense that the 
heroic type provides the possibility of great actions that will enhance humanity. It is 
consequently easy to see why Nietzsche so disapproved of Euripides' offering of a 
tragic hero that directly reflected the ordinary man of the herd: Euripidean rationality is 
life-preserving, rather than species-preserving. 
But it would be inadequate to read Nietzsche's authentic tragic hero purely in 
terms of opposition to the hero of Euripidean drama. Nietzsche's hero is also a 
reflection, but not necessarily of one particular type: 
Amongst the Greeks, the 'will ' wished to contemplate itself, in the transfiguration of 
genius and the world of art; in order to glorify themselves, its creations had to feel 
worthy of glorification, they had to see themselves in a higher sphere, without this 
contemplation seeming either a command or a reproach. It was in this sphere of beauty 
that they saw reflections of themselves, the Olympians. With this reflection of beauty 
the Hellenic 'will ' batded with the talent, correlative to the artistic talent, for suffering 
and the wisdom of suffering... (BT, §3). 
The broadening out of the tragic hero is done in a way which ultimately reflects Greek 
culture as a whole, whether healthy or in decline. It is this desire of the will to 
contemplate itself that Nietzsche finds to be lacking in our modem, decadent culture; 
the fact that it is present in Greek antiquity signals the reason for his diagnosis of our 
own culture as sick, in terms of its decaying values - its nihilism. The shared goal of a 
culture is identified by Nietzsche in UO as charging each one of us with a single task: 
"to foster the production of philosophers, artists, and saints within us and around us, 
and thereby to work toward the perfection of nature" (UO 4, §5). The sense in which 
nature is to be perfected is a sense of will to power, but of power understood in terms of 
self-enlightenment; the ultimate sense of this is precisely in the creation and 
sustainment of identity. Identity is the interpretative 'fiction' upon which the will's 
survival depends. Nature needs artists "so that it might finally be presented with an 
image of what, in the tumultuousness of its own becoming, it never has the opportunity 
to see clearly - in short, for the purpose of its own self-recognition" (UO 4, §5).^' 
" Note here the parallel between the perfecting power of self-recognition attributed in a collective sense 
to nature, and by contrast the decaying power of pity discussed in Chapter 3, as practised by the 
unfortunate man of asceticism. We can also observe an inverse relation to Porter's claim that Nietzsche's 
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However, we ought to be wary of the biological/natural context here, careless adoption 
of which can lead us into thinking that art seduces us into continued existence on the 
basis of self-preservation.^^ Once again, Nietzsche's point is one of aestheticist 
interpretative affirmation of life, not self-preservation, and art's seduction is a literal, 
rather than a metaphorical one.^ ^ 
We would do well to apply this understanding of the shared goal of culture to 
the figures of Apollo and Dionysus in BT, by asking what the relation is between will 
and deity. Halfway between the individual and the Greek deities, we find the figure of 
the hero; and it is incumbent upon the hero that he/she encapsulates the tragic 
disposition. But for the Greeks, Nietzsche thinks, tragedy has only one authentic hero in 
terms of the will's desire to contemplate itself: and this is Dionysus. But i f Dionysus is 
Nietzsche's authentic tragic hero, then is Apollo by contrast an anti-hero? Certainly, the 
aim of Nietzsche's argument in flr seems to be a Dionysian one: 
In fact, the entire book knows only one overt and implied artistic meaning behind all 
events - a 'god', if you will, but certainly only an entirely thoughtless and amoral artist-
god, who in both creating and destroying, in doing both good and i l l , wishes to 
experience the same joy and glory; who, creating worlds, rids himself of the affliction of 
abundance and super-abundance, of the suffering of his internal contradictions {BT, 
'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', §5). 
Recall that Nietzsche begins his discussion of art in BT with the claim that "art derives 
its continuous development from the duality of the Apolline and Dionysiac" {BT, §1). 
From this, we niight easily develop a reading that casts Apollo and Dionysus as distinct 
halves of a dualism, each with their own distinct contribution to make to the 
development of art. Nietzsche certainly describes them in terms that lead to this 
impression, claiming that for him, they represent ''two worlds of art, utterly different in 
their deepest essence and their highest aims" {BT, §16). But to retain a dualism on this 
point would not do justice to them.^ '* Nietzsche thinks in fact that the Apollonian and 
Dionysian are the same at the peak of humanity by virtue of it being impossible to 
accounts of the past "stage the insoluble antagonisms that definitions of the past, which are invariably acts 
of self-definition, exist to cover over." Porter, AP, p. 38. 
Gregory Moore, "Art and Evolution: Nietzsche's Physiological Aesthetics", British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy, 10 (1), 2002, p. 125. 
Ibid. See also WP, § 652: "It is not possible to take hunger as the primum mobile, any more than self-
preservation", and WP, § 650: "A living thing wants above all to discharge its force: 'preservation' is 
only a consequence of this." 
The sense of duality is owed to a certain extent to the rendering of the German word Duplizitat as 
"duality" in English translation, instead of the less usual, but in this case more accurate, "interaction". 
James M. Curtis makes this point in "Michael Bakhdn, Nietzsche, and Russian Pre-Revolutionary 
Thought", Nietzsche in Russia, Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (ed.), (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
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answer the fundamental question of who is higher, the one who sees or understands 
(designated as Apollo) or the one who creates and acts (Dionysus).^^ For Nietzsche 
(unlike for Socrates) there is no distinction between understanding and evaluating. Thus 
it does not suffice to interpret Apollo and Dionysus in terms of their distinctiveness; 
each of them is wholly necessary to the other within the wider context of the Greek 
will's desire for self-contemplation. 
In the light of this interaction, there is no real problem for Nietzsche's view of 
tragedy in the relation between Dionysus and Apollo in terms of a problem of dualism. 
However, despite the shared goal of culture reflected in the eternal archetype of 
Dionysus, this does not mean that there is no problem of tragedy at all.^^ In a reading by 
Gilles Deleuze, tragedy is represented by the movement of contradiction and its 
resolution, where contradiction and resolution remain in the roles of essential 
principles.^^ A potential problem of tragedy therefore lies in the apparent contradiction 
in fir between "primitive unity and individuation, willing and appearance, life and 
suffering".^^ However, this problem can be dissolved when we consider that the product 
of the analysis to which Nietzsche leads is in fact a reconciliation of this apparent 
contradiction, in which the "sufferings of individuation" are absorbed in "the joy of 
original being".^^ This reconciliation is understood in terms of the obliteration of, and 
the experience of pain, in which Apollo is able to effect the obliteration of pain through 
the mediation of the harshness of individuation:'*^'' 
Apollo overcomes the suffering of the individual by means of the luminescent 
glorificadon of the eternity of the phenomenon; beauty triumphs over the suffering 
inherent in life; pain is, in a certain sense, deluded away from amongst the features of 
nature (fir, §16). 
Dionysus "reproduces contradiction as the pain of individuation" - and this is precisely 
the reason why he is the life-affirming god, for Nietzsche: Dionysus affirms the pains of 
growth instead of replicating the sufferings of individuation, by affirming pain instead 
of attempting to resolve it through the notion of higher pleasure.Both Dionysus and 
Press: 1986), p. 334-335. However, the point is already acknowledged, albeit obliquely, by Nietzsche in 
the immediately subsequent text of BT, as Tanner notes (op. cit., note 67, p. 9). 
Stanley Rosen, The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 115. 
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Hugh Tomlinson (trans.), (London: The Athlone Press, 
1983), p. 11. 
^^Ibid. 
'^Ibid. 
" Ibid., p. 12. 
'"°Ibid.,p.ll. 
Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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Apollo express the sense of the tragic through the form of drama. "^ ^ Hence Deleuze can 
claim that Apollo is not opposed to the tragic, as we might at first think, but that the 
deeper opposition at work is between Socrates and Dionysus. 
Both the historical and the fictional Socrates fully deserve Deleuze's 
characterisation as "the first genius of decadence", and as such, in the spirit of 
Nietzsche's anti-chronology of tragic drama, Socrates is the only true opposition to the 
tragic hero.'"'* Recall that Nietzsche describes Socrates as "an enemy of the art of 
tragedy" (fir, §13). Considered in the light of Kaufmann's comment that Socrates may 
have attended Euripidean tragedies purely in order to source counter-arguments to the 
wisdom of art, Nietzsche's remark here resonates in a much more serious key.'°^ This 
link between Euripides and Socrates is reflected once again in Nietzsche's analysis by 
Euripides' identity as what Nietzsche terms "the poet of aesthetic Socratism": 
Euripides, like Plato, set about showing the world the opposite of the 'irrational' poet; 
his aesthetic axiom, that 'everything must be conscious before it can be beautiful', is, as 
I have said, a counterpart to Socrates' axiom that 'everything must be conscious before 
it can be good' (Br, §12). 
This connection between Euripides and Socrates in BT, and the more fundamental 
interaction between Socrates and Dionysus, brings us to an understanding of how a 
mirroring power-relation is present within Nietzsche's critique of tragedy. The power-
relation is effective on two levels of analysis, which I shall delineate in their relation to 
one another in the remainder of this section: the aesthetic and the tragic. 
But before moving on to this, a brief reiteration of our identification of mirroring 
from the discussion of the critique of pity in Chapter 3 is in order. In the critique of pity, 
mirroring referred to a multidirectional activity of power between individuals. The 
danger of pity was shown to lie in the possibility of having one's being, and thereby 
one's aestheticist interpretative freedom, appropriated by the pitied individual. Through 
an analysis of Zarathustra's overcoming of the test of pity, however, we saw that the 
danger of pity is not insurmountable when a sense of passivity is removed from our 
understanding of this relation. Zarathustra's recognition of the Ugliest Man as 
appropriative, and his response of shame, points to the multidirectional activity of 
being-appropriation within an ontology of will to power. 
Deleuze, op. cit., note 96. 
'"Mbid. 
- Ib id . 






What we give up in the light of this, as the critique of tragedy shows, is an 
authentic sense of self or nonfictional identity. The Hellenic will's desire to contemplate 
itself is not an affirmation of personal identity but a direct acknowledgement of a lack 
of such identity.'''^ The power-relation of mirroring consists in the entirely natural 
expression of force, which, within an interpretative ontology of will to power, 
constitutes being as appropriative of being. This is clearly present in the critique of 
tragedy. The relation between Socrates and the tragic hero, whether this is Dionysus or 
Zarathustra, is one of mirroring power. The beauty of suffering is nonrational or anti-
Socratic, and yet at the same time, through interaction with the Socratic element of 
rationality, transfigures that element and is itself transfigured. The paradoxical image of 
the music-making Socrates stands as evidence of this. As Nietzsche wrote in 7/, "man 
thinks the world itself is overwhelmed with beauty - he forgets he is its cause" {TIIX, 
§19). The judgement 'beautiful' is the conceit of the human species; as with the moral 
ascetic, a lack of meaning is substituted for a human meaning, which in this case is a 
human beauty: 
Basically man mirrors himself in things, he thinks anything that reflects his image back 
to him is beautiful {TI IX, § 19). 
The lack of identity and the lack of meaning inherent to being and from which being 
suffers is disguised by the mask of the tragic; but Nietzsche's point is that it is only a 
mask, and the reflection of it is interpretative rather than directly representative of the 
'true' nature of being. 
'"^  Walter Brogan offers a similar account (op. cit., note 26, p. 165). 
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4.4: Conclusion 
In the preceding sections, we have seen how the problem of common ontological 
ground has been solved by the identification of a mirroring power-relation in 
Nietzsche's critique of tragedy. As such, my claim for the defensibility of aestheticism 
is complete. But I also want to take up Nietzsche's aestheticist outlook in order to offer 
some contextualising remarks on mirroring as a power-relation in both critiques of pity 
and of tragedy. Reprising my point on cruelty in Chapter 3, it is essential to understand 
the power-relation as one of innocence, rather than of cruelty or violence in an 
unmediated sense. I shall consider some of Nietzsche's remarks on innocence, 
conceptualised in the terms of child's play, in order to bring the significance of 
innocence to Nietzsche's notion of being as an interpretative process of becoming into 
light. 
Throughout, I have claimed that aestheticism depends on a freely-creative and 
interpretative ontology of will to power. The free play of creation that is to be 
understood in the same breath as we discuss Nietzsche's will to power is not the same 
as the free play of the imagination of the knowing, mature, and above all, serious agent 
that a Kant or a Descartes might have envisaged. Rather, such free play of creation is 
that of a child, as Nietzsche's Zarathustra knows: 
The child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling 
wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes. 
Yes, a sacred Yes is needed, my brothers, for the sport of creation: the spirit now wills 
its own will, the spirit sundered from the world now wins its own world (Z 1, 'Of The 
Three Metamorphoses').'"^ 
The notion of the innocence of becoming also provides evidence of a continuity between the 'early' 
and 'later' works. 
The image of the child is deeply significant within Nietzsche; it is rare that he uses this image in 
negative terms. On innocence and the child in Nietzsche, see Babette E . Babich, "Against Analysis, 
Beyond Postmodernism", Babich, Debra B. Bergoffen & Simon V. Glynn, Continental and Postmodern 
Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 31-51. Babich draws on 
Nietzsche's reference to the seriousness of a child at play to illustrate the inadequacy of many 
interpretations of Nietzsche's dictum of will to power that read into it a doctrine of will to cruelty, which 
complements my rejection in Chapter 3 of a unity between practicality and cruelty in the critique of pity. 
Babich's interpretation of the will to power is charged by her double reading of Nietzsche's discourse on 
ressentiment and play with the critical debate between modernism and postmodernism. While she 
contends that we must recognise the hopelessness of innocence, as it constitutes perhaps the fundamental 
challenge of the postmodern to minds that remain in irony-bound "tutelage to the myth of the modem", so 
Babich thinks we must learn to appreciate that same postmodern sensibility that liberates us from a 
modernist irony and restores to our interpretative capabilities the innocence of play (p. 46). See also 
Walter Kaufmann's note 38 to §310 of his edition of GS, (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), in which, 
citing §797 of The Will to Power, he remarks that the pais paizon, or child playing, is one of the central 
images in Nietzsche's thinking and is derived (by way of Friedrich Schiller's play theory of art) from 
Heraclitus. 
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We ought not to overlook the sense in which the play of a child is not quite the same 
thing as, say, a play in a theatre, and this sense is that of representation. In Truth and 
Method, Gadamer attempts to free the concept of play from the subjective meaning that 
he thinks it has within modem aesthetics.In his view, play refers specifically to the 
"mode of being of the work of art itself, although play is limited in terms of 
representation to representing itself."° The aestheticist will is not of the order of 
representation.'^' It is interpretative, never merely representative; there can be no 
representations - no facts - which are uninterpreted. The play of the imagination is of 
critical significance to my argument that the aestheticist claim is justifiable. We need 
perhaps to remind ourselves of 'art' as that serious, creative act of play to which 
Gadamer makes reference. As with Nietzsche's claim that we cannot authentically 
withdraw suffering from life, Gadamer reminds us that it is but an illusion to imagine 
that we can truly separate play from seriousness, and "only admit it to segregated areas 
peripheral to real l i fe"."^ This is so on the basis that: 
Play and seriousness, the exuberance and superabundance of life, on the one hand, and 
the tense power of vital energy on the other, are profoundly interwoven. They interact 
with one another, and those who have looked deeply into human nature have recognized 
that our capacity for play is an expression of the highest seriousness."^ 
It is Gadamer's view that a failure to recognise the "ontological dignity" of the play of 
art blinds us to the interdependence of art and being. ""^  It is difficult, however, for us to 
recognise such dignity from an interpretative consciousness still shackled to the moral 
asceticism that views suffering as punishment, and cannot conceive of existence or the 
world justified as aesthetic phenomena. The sense of play as ontologically dignified, for 
which Gadamer argues, is continuous with the ontological significance of Nietzsche's 
aestheticist claim. The will to power can easily be misinterpreted as petulant and yet 
supremely dangerous: as being only the force of an individual will , acting without 
prejudice upon another will in order to subjugate it, and there is very little that is 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Garrett Barden & John Cumming (eds.), (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1975), p. 91. 
Ibid., pp. 91, 97. On Gadamer's notion of play, see also Felix O'Murchadha, "Nature as Other: A 
Hermeneutical Approach to Science", Babette E . Babich, Debra B. Bergoffen & Simon V. Glynn, 
Continental and Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 
189-203. 
"' Alphonso Lingis, 'The Will to Power", David B. Allison (ed.), The New Nietzsche, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1985), p. 41. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Play of Art", The Relevance of the Beautiful and other essays, Nicholas 




dignified about this interpretation. The Ubermensch and its corresponding ontological 
foundation of will to power are darkened within the popular conception by the lingering 
shadow of teleological relentlessness which is signified by the question of the goal that 
is lacked by eternal recurrence. This is never more so than when we are asked to accept 
that the most terrifying and painful experiences are interpretatively aestheticist. 
It is through the redemption from revenge against time that it is possible to read 
the Ubermensch as a figure of nonteleological 'will-to-power': the innocent expression 
of existence by a force, within a necessarily indeterminate contingency of other 
forces."^ This expression of existence can only be creative. 
Where is innocence? Where there is will to begetting. And for me, he who wants to 
create beyond himself has the purest will. 
Where is beauty? Where I have to will with all my will; where I want to love and 
perish, that an image may not remain merely an image (Z 2, 'Of Immaculate 
Perception'). 
It is not the quantification of development towards the Ubermensch, where this is 
understood as an ideal of virtue, which is at stake for Nietzsche. To express a moral 
imperative, even towards the cultural defeat of nihilism, is precisely what he guards 
against. For example he argues that i f one is seeking followers, one ought to seek 
''zeros' (77 I , §14). The same point is made less obliquely, in its connection to 
evaluation, in G5, where Nietzsche states that he does not wish to preach morals, and 
goes on to offer the following advice to those who do: 
If you wish to deprive the best things and states of all honour and worth, then go on 
talking about them as you have been doing. Place them at the head of your morality and 
talk from morning to night of the happiness of virtue, the composure of the soul, of 
justice and immanent retribution. The way you are going about it, all these good things 
will eventually have popularity and the clamour of the streets on their side; but at the 
same time all the gold that was on them will have been worn off by so much handling, 
and all the gold inside will have turned to lead. Truly, you are masters of alchemy in 
reverse: the devaluation of what is most valuable (GS, §292). 
Nihilism cannot be defeated by means of a system, or more accurately through the will 
to systematisation ijl I , §26). What Nietzsche looks to instead is the future qualitative 
phenomenology of the Ubermensch, symbolised within the texts by the play and 
innocence of the child as a part of the affirmation of life. Such life-affirmation is 
certainly in abundance in Z 2, 'The Dance Song', as Zarathustra tries to tell Life about 
Wisdom: 
' Lingis, op. cit., note 111, p. 50. 
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'Perhaps she is wicked and false, and in everything a wench; but when she speaks ill of 
herself, then precisely is she most seductive.' 
When I said this to Life, she laughed maliciously and closed her eyes. 'But whom are 
you speaking of?' she asked, 'of me, surely?' 
'And if you are right - should you tell me that to my face?' (Z 2, The Dance Song'). 
To further illustrate the point that Nietzsche has in mind, we might employ the example 
of Schubert's string quartet in D minor, Der Tod und das Mddchen, alongside Salome's 
Life Prayer in a little more detail, as they stand in clear opposition to one another. 
Schubert's piece exemplifies what Nietzsche would have regarded as the 'anti-life' 
conviction of the ascetic priest/Christian ressentiment, particularly by virtue of the 
physical act of dance between Death and the maiden, which subsumes the natural 
movement of the body into the ritual of dance. '^^  The dance itself, in Schubert's piece, 
formalises the leave-taking of the body that is brought by death - which in that case is 
not necessarily unwelcome. Such abandoning of the physiological contrasts with what 
Salome's poem expresses - the acceptance of the body that goes hand in hand with an 
acceptance of suffering and pain as an integral and welcome part of phenomenological 
experience."^ The positivism of the poem's words is evident: 
Pain does not count as an objection to life: 'Have you no more happiness to give me, 
well then! still do you have your pain' ... (EH, 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', § 1). 
The same contrast between will to life and will to nothingness is evident at the end of 
'The Dance Song' in Z, when the movement, warmth and laughter fade with the end of 
the dance. Zarathustra notices that the sun has set and that coolness is coming from the 
forests. This heralds the "evening that questions thus" within, for which sadness he asks 
our forgiveness, and which constitutes the questioning of the value of life."^ Following 
almost immediately on from this is 'The Funeral Song', where the question of the value 
of life is both formed and answered. Nietzsche's Zarathustra can only conceive of a god 
who can dance, and forces us to note the cessation of movement that is effected in the 
move from the dance to the funereal."^ Zarathustra tells us that his ecstasy is murdered 
by the tones of his favourite singer, who is lured away by his enemies. The "gruesome. 
"The nonteleological movement of the dance is the divine movement, the archetype of all vital 
movement." See Lingis, op. cit., note 111, p. 50. 
Nietzsche writes that Salome's poem constitutes the lyric to his own composition Hymn to Life (EH, 
'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', §1). 
In EH, we learn that Zarathustra is a dancer by virtue of his persistence in finding no objection to life 
even despite having considered the possibility of eternal recurrence. EH, 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra", §6. 
Lingis, op. cit., note 111, p. 50. 
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gloomy melody" renders him inarticulate for a moment, for Zarathustra can speak only 
of the parable of the highest things in the dance, and this parable is forced to remain 
passive in his limbs, unspoken (Z 2, 'The Funeral Song'). Even Zarathustra must think 
to ask the paralysing question of the value of life.'^° However, having been posed by 
virtue of such expression of silence, disharmony and stillness, this question does not 
receive a judgement on life as an answer - in fact, while Zarathustra responds to it, he 
does not answer it at all, as this would be to take the question seriously as a valid 
question. Instead, the question founders on the invulnerability of Zarathustra's will , 
"something that rends rocks" (Z 2, 'The Funeral Song'). It is the unburiable, dynamic 
will of Zarathustra that shows up the unnecessary nature of the question of the value of 
life, by asserting that "only where there are graves are there resurrections" (Z 2, 'The 
Funeral Song'). In this way, we can see how the question of the value of life loses its 
significance as a question, when considered within an ontology of will to power. Within 
such an ontology, it is no longer necessary to ask the question at all. 
We might begin here to describe the phenomenological quality of will to power 
in functional terms, as that of the expression of existence of a force that is creative, 
playful, and fundamentally innocent, within an infinite contingency of f o r c e . T h e 
presence and absence of meaning of the phenomenon of suffering in relation to 
asceticism and the will to power may thus be taken to bear a certain resemblance to the 
play and seriousness of art. Suffering allows us to connect art and being, something that 
Nietzsche finds so distinctive of tragedy but which, we should emphasise, he extends 
towards the revaluation of all values: 
Over and above terror and pity, being oneself the eternal joy of becoming - that joy 
which also encompasses the joy of destruction (77 X, §5). 
The aestheticist unity of beauty, suffering and life is laid bare before us. Nietzsche's 
understanding of being as a process of becoming connects the will to life with the 
creation that is necessary for life. Here, childbirth signifies not only the act of 
reproduction but also the physiological necessity of creation for life. We should not be 
This detail emphasises that Zarathustra himself is not the personification of the Obermensch. However, 
in EH, Nietzsche connects Zarathustra's definition of himself as the highest species of all existing things 
with the concept of Dionysus. This echoes the point made by M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern that the paradox of 
the music-making Socrates points to a mode of artistic discourse for which BT is an original prototype; 
Bishop and Stephenson argue that this prototype is realised in the discourse of Z. See Silk and Stern, op. 
cit., note 64, pp. 354-355. See also Bishop and Stephenson, op. cit., note 5, p. 428-429. 
See also Patricia Hermstein Smith, Contingencies of Value, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1988), for a wider discussion of the interaction of contingencies in terms of force. 
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misled by the arduousness of childbirth, or labour; for, as Nietzsche recognises, tragic 
feeling for "[e]temal l ife" is characterised by life and energy, in terms of which even 
pain acts as a stimulus {TIX, §4). The birth pains of becoming are transfigured by the 
aestheticist interpretation of becoming, hence the ontological sanctity of suffering in 
tragic art. It is the innocence of Nietzsche's child which can enable our access to the 
aestheticist perspective. The idea of becoming as innocent child's play affords us a 
glimpse of life affirmed in all its aspects, the cycle of the eternal recurrence complete, 
and of mankind in possession of a goal: the goal of the Ubermensch, of humanity's self-
overcoming. Such a goal itself is nonteleological. On an aestheticist reading, there are 
no interpretative limits and no real end to the interpretative act of self-overcoming, 
merely another step in the dance of becoming. 
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Conclusion: The Future of Nietzsche's Aestheticism 
Having set out the diverse threads of my argument in the preceding chapters, it falls to 
these concluding remarks to draw these threads together and put forward a final 
conclusion to my thesis. Throughout, I have been concerned with three main aims: to 
respond to a relative neglect of the aestheticist view of the art/truth relation within 
Nietzsche studies; to defend Nietzsche's aestheticism; and to offer evidence of 
Nietzsche's philosophy as continuous as a means of raising the question of textual 
periodisation. These concluding remarks will thus evaluate my discussion in terms of its 
stated aims, and in terms of its wider potential. As a result, my conclusion is divided 
into three main sections. 
The first section, 5.1, will evaluate the success of the first two of my aims, and 
will confirm the verdict on the defensibility of Nietzsche's aestheticism suggested in the 
previous chapter. I then move on to evaluate the effect of my argument in terms of 
relocating aestheticism to a more prominent position within Nietzsche studies. 
Section 5.2 is concerned solely with my third aim: to offer evidence of 
Nietzsche's philosophy as continuous, and in so doing, to raise the methodological 
question of periodisation. I re-examine my use of Nietzsche's texts in the preceding 
chapters in order to determine whether or not there is satisfactory evidence of a 
continuity, and will thereby confirm a definition of the question of continuity. I consider 
some possible objections to the claim for continuity, and show how these are 
ineffectual. Finally, I consider where the continuity question leaves the issue of textual 
periodisation. 
In the light of these, I speculate in section 5.3 on the further potential of the 
arguments in my thesis. I identify two related points which bear particular 
consideration: the ontological status of the work of art, and the modem concept of the 
aesthetic. I also raise one broader issue: the effect of Nietzsche's aestheticism upon the 
contemporary question of the relationship between mind and culture. As I suggest, a 
sustained treatment of Nietzsche's philosophy of mind might also have something to 
contribute to the modem crisis in philosophy. 
My closing remarks in section 5.4 affirm the project which has been conducted 
in my thesis in terms of Nietzsche's own question of understanding from EH. 
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5.1: A defence of the standard account of aestheticism 
This section of my conclusion will consider the efficacy of my establishment and 
defence of a standard account of Nietzsche's aestheticism. As a corollary, I consider 
whether or not my project has given adequate reason for a renewal of interest in 
Nietzsche's aestheticism within Nietzsche studies. 
In the preceding chapters, I have been responding to a relative neglect of the 
aestheticist view of the art/truth relation in Nietzsche studies. Although this relation has 
received some attention within the available literature, as we have seen, it has been 
given a sceptical evaluation. This has resulted in a continuing tendency to speak of 
Nietzsche's aesthetics and his metaphysics. While such talk is perfectly acceptable 
within what Nietzsche calls 'metaphysical' philosophy, it is less acceptable within 
'historical' philosophy, which emphasises the fundamentally interpretative nature of 
philosophical discourse along with the rest of the 'real world'. Hence in defending a 
standard account of Nietzsche's aestheticism, I have drawn attention to the question that 
the status of such talk poses to modem philosophy as a whole. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the standard account comprises three main features: 
extension of the aesthetic to encompass the whole of being; extensionist dependence on 
interpretation, effected attitudinally and productively throughout Nietzsche's works; 
aestheticism as therefore the key feature of Nietzsche's philosophy. The standard 
account may be summarised by Nietzsche's aestheticist claim from BT, that "it is only 
as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified" {BT, 
§5). My defence of aestheticism was given in response to three main problems raised 
with the standard account. The first problem was the metaphysical issues surrounding 
the interpretative feature of the standard account. However as I showed, the 
metaphysical issues simply do not apply; they are themselves products of the 
'metaphysical' approach to philosophy and assume Nietzsche to be metaphysically-
engaged in the sense of making strong metaphysical claims when in fact he is not. 
Chapter 3 engaged with the second problem facing the standard account of 
aestheticism. This was an ethical problem: ought we to justify suffering as beautiful? 
Doing so seemed to invite a charge of trivialisation of the realia of suffering. This 
question was considered in the light of Nietzsche's critique of pity, which treats 
suffering as desirable and pity as undesirable. I showed that the ethical problem for 
aestheticism is not in fact insuperable, in as far as Nietzsche's critique of pity is both 
coherent and defensible from charges of cruelty. The key innovation of the chapter was 
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to identify the mirroring power-relation as the mode of interaction between individuals 
within the context of the critique of pity. 
Having dismissed the problem of ethics, the final problem facing Nietzsche's 
aestheticism was identified as the problem of finding common ontological ground 
between the work of art and being. I addressed this problem in Chapter 4, arguing that 
one instance of common ground would provide evidence of the defensibility of 
aestheticism. The mirroring power-relation was proposed as the source of such common 
ground; I argued that i f this power-relation could be identified within Nietzsche's 
critique of tragedy, then the problem of common ontological ground would be solved. 
Having considered Nietzsche's critique in BT both as a discourse on being through the 
language of tragedy and as a cipher for the aesthetic, the power-relation was shown to 
exist in the critique of tragedy. This was so in a complex manner: the factor of being-
appropriation was reclaimed as a part of Nietzsche's wider interpretative ontology of 
will to power on the ground of identity. Being-appropriation was thus shown to be 
reducible to interpretative will to power, and not to personal identity. Hence in as far as 
the critique of tragedy evinces the direct extension of the aesthetic to the whole of 
being, the mirroring power-relation in the critique of tragedy was identified as the 
transfiguration of being by itself. 
As such, my discussion has shown that aestheticism is coherent and defensible, 
and that it is significant for our understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole. In 
so doing, I believe that I have created an opportunity for further questions to be raised 
concerning the status of Nietzsche's aestheticism. However, the defence of aestheticism 
which I have conducted here has also attempted to provide evidence of a continuity 
across Nietzsche's wider thought, and it is to an evaluation of this aim that I will now 
turn. 
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5.2: Continuity and the question of periodisation 
My third aim in the thesis was to maintain an implicit account of Nietzsche's 
philosophy as continuous, in order to provide a methodological therapy to counteract 
the effect of the textual periodisation technique. The idea of Nietzsche's thought as 
continuous is not a claim for his thought as rigid and unchanging over time. Rather, a 
claim for continuity is a suggestion in the spirit of my basic position throughout the 
thesis: that Nietzsche's thought is not obscure. My claim has been for Nietzsche's 
aestheticism as his defining thought and, in as far as I have ignored chronological 
considerations in applying them to my successful defence of aestheticism, my textual 
use stands as evidence of such a continuity. At the least, my defence of aestheticism 
gives Nietzsche studies some reason to reconsider the possibility of a continuity. 
Following James I . Porter's rejection of the textual periodisation technique, my 
use of the texts throughout has been intended as evidence against the critical liking for 
separating Nietzsche's works into distinct phases based either on his changing 
metaphysical views, or on his views on art.' A changing role is frequently accorded to 
art in distinct phases of Nietzsche's thought.^ This is for example one of the central 
claims behind Julian Young's study entitled Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art, in which it is 
argued that Nietzsche's changing views on the importance of art and aesthetics fall into 
four distinct periods, but that these four periods or phases themselves add up to a kind 
of aesthetic unity. The argument is that the importance of art in Nietzsche's texts waxes 
and wanes, and that therefore, his views on art must have changed accordingly. 
Although this aim has been implemented tacitly throughout, there are two points 
that I think it appropriate to raise here: Nietzsche's changing conception and use of 
Schopenhauer, and his self-criticism. Nietzsche's early Schopenhauerianism, and his 
subsequent rejection of pessimism, might be considered to count as a significant 
objection to my claim for continuity. His initial dependence on Schopenhauer is clear in 
BT, where his distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian forces is rendered 
through Schopenhauer's language of will and representation.^ However, my reading of 
Nietzsche has argued for a continuity between BT and the later works, in which 
Nietzsche had rejected Schopenhauer and all his works. This seems to involve a choice 
between maintaining a continuity, and acknowledging Nietzsche's changing 
' James I. Porter, The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on The Birth of Tragedy, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000). 
^ See for instance for instance Julian Young, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). In terms of the relation of Nietzsche's aesthetic views to his views on truth. 
Young maintains a commitment to discontinuity. 
^ For a complete discussion of Nietzsche's relation to Schopenhauer, see Young, ibid., p. 2. 
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appreciation of Schopenhauer. As a brief response to this, I would suggest that the 
danger here is in reading Nietzsche's Schopenhauerianism as determining his early 
thought, rather than treating it as a paradigm of his wider aestheticist analysis. 
As further evidence of continuity, the factor of Nietzsche's self-criticism should 
be considered.'* Nietzsche's own attempts at self-criticism are an integral part of his 
philosophy. I shall briefly canvass three examples of his self-critique. First, Nietzsche 
clearly states that his thoughts on the origin of our moral prejudices "found their first, 
spare, provisional expression" in HA (GM, Preface, §2). Second, EH as a whole 
constitutes an exercise in self-criticism, both in an ad hominem sense and as a tour of 
Nietzsche's thought. Third, Nietzsche's 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' in BT stands as 
evidence of Nietzsche's continuing commitment to his work. In the 'Attempt', 
Nietzsche certainly criticises his early efforts; but this is hardly surprising, given the 
proverbial clarity of hindsight, and does not amount to a rejection of BT, as a sustained 
comparison of the 'Attempt' and the main body of the text on this point would show. 
Nietzsche uses art, and other paradigms such as morality, or science, to explore 
the same core idea - the aestheticist claim - again and again. Where we find Nietzsche 
in BT claiming that existence is justifiable as an aesthetic phenomenon, we do not 
simply find a precursor of the seemingly more moderate Gay Science claim that 
existence is made bearable though art, or the TI assertion that beauty is the 
anthropomorphic conceit of humanity: we find a continuity of thinking. As such, I think 
there is evidence to suggest that the question of periodisation is worthy of further 
attention within contemporary Nietzsche studies. 
' See Philip Pothen, Nietzsche and the Fate of Art, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2002). 
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5.3: Evaluating the further potential of the standard account 
Although the aims of my thesis have been fulfilled, a number of further questions have 
been raised along the way. It seems appropriate here to offer some guiding remarks on 
the form that the further contributions of the thesis might take. I shall consider two 
related points: the ontological status of the work of art, in relation to the modem concept 
of the aesthetic. I shall also consider a broader point conceming the relationship of 
culture to mind, and thereby the possible value of my thesis to the crisis in modem 
philosophy. 
As we have seen, a defended aestheticism includes the key Megillian notion of 
extension of the aesthetic to the nonaesthetic, in as far as the distinction between the 
aesthetic and the nonaesthetic are dissolved by Nietzsche. The intrinsic power of 
aestheticist interpretation stands as evidence of the wider ontology of will to power at 
which Nietzsche hints, but which can never be fully articulated or described in the same 
way as a scientific theory. Putting this language barrier to one side, however, one thing 
is particularly clear in the light of the aestheticist claim's success. The question of the 
ontological status of the artwork which continues to receive significant attention within 
contemporary aesthetics, would be challenged by an aestheticist perspective. I shall 
offer some explanation of the question of ontological status of the artwork in its relation 
to the conception of the aesthetic. 
One issue upon which debate on the ontological status of the work of art tums is 
the possibility of an essentialist definition of art. The value of an essentialist theory lies 
in finally being able to define the features which go to make up a work of art. Thus 
when faced with an artefact of questionable status, the critic may tum to an essentialist 
definition and by comparison with the relevant features, determine the aesthetic status 
of the artefact. An example of this kind of thinking might include Arthur Danto's 
response to Andy Warhol's Brillo Box, which identifies the advent of the Brillo Box as 
the end of art in the wake of modemism, but which simultaneously makes a definition 
of art possible.^ The antiessentialist complaint to this is typically given as the possibility 
of any future artwork created after the genesis of an essentialist definition serving as a 
counterexample to that definition, in as far as the essentialist definition would rely upon 
' See Arthur C. Danto, 'The End of Art", The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 81-115. For a counter-claim to Danto's view, see Sondra 
Bacharach, "Can Art Really End?", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 60:1, Winter 2002. Through 
examining the concept of narrative in art history, Bacharach is able to make a convincing claim that 
Danto's argument does not presuppose any essentialist theory of art, and that on his own terms, art history 
cannot come to an end anyway (p. 57). 
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the properties of works of art.^  But in as far as Danto's view seems to be that the 
defining question of art history seems to be one of the nature of art, the link between 
essentialism about art and ontology seems clear: the nature of the work of art refers, at 
root, to the ontological status of such a work. Essentialism is thus essentialism about the 
thing of which 'aesthetic' properties are properties.' 
Debate about the ontological status of the artwork is closely related to debate 
surrounding the notion of the death of art. As I observed in Chapter 1, the problem of 
the death and rebirth of the work of art is seemingly irreducible in modernity. This is to 
be understood in terms of the history of ontological theory. Beauty loses its ontological 
home when modernity breaks with the Platonic ontology of Forms; as such, the work of 
art as distinct from concerns of truth and morality is invoked in order to house beauty 
conceived of as a property. Inversely, however, the work of art is itself conceived of as 
dead in modernity because of the very distance between beauty and truth, giving rise to 
J. M . Bernstein's claim that "modernity is the site of beauty bereaved - bereaved of 
truth."^ However, Nietzsche's liberation from the Platonic ontology of Forms allows for 
a challenge to be brought against the modem conception of art as alienated from truth or 
morality. As we have seen, the primacy of interpretation within the aestheticist 
worldview reduces art, truth and science to a fundamental interpretative level. This is 
not to reverse the modem hierarchy of truth and science over art; rather, it is to remove 
the hierarchical conception and to replace it with what we might almost describe as an 
interpretative egalitarianism. The question that arises when the categorical separation of 
art, tmth and morality from one another is refuted, is in fact a challenge: to "think 
through" what these actually are.^  This is a challenge which modem aesthetics, and 
especially analytic aesthetics, must take on board. 
I want to end my discussion in this section by pointing to the beginning of one 
other. Amongst the points that have been touched on only briefly is the question of 
Nietzsche's theory of mind. Nature, understood as existence and the world, is not 
merely home to beauty, joy and plenty, but also to pain, suffering and want; terrible 
experiences feature large in our terrible, basic text. In the face of such experiences, 
Nietzsche argues, we may well "wonder whether he who experiences them is not 
something terrible" {BGE, §89). But these ideas are, to put it mildly, not easy to face. 
* This is Bacharach's historical analysis of the reason why essentialist definitions of art fail (op. cit., note 
5). 
^ Robert Howell, "Ontology and the Nature of the Literary Work", Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 60:1, Winter 2002, p. 68. 
* J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 4-5. 
' Ibid., p. 2. 
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Lord Byron anticipated something of these sentiments, when he wrote the following 
lines: 
And men are - what they name not to themselves. 
And trust not to each other.'° 
It might be argued that the idea of man being what he cannot name to himself could 
stand as a representation of the self as self-deceiving. But in a Nietzschean context, it 
makes no sense to lament the self-deception of the self, as acknowledging the need for 
such deception takes precedence over the (supposed) fact of representation. 
For Nietzsche, "we necessarily remain a mystery to ourselves"; we have no 
knowledge of ourselves by virtue of our being bound to mistake ourselves (GM 
'Preface', §1). In keeping both with his denial of the objective existence of an 
individuated self and with his ontology of will to power, Nietzsche would acknowledge 
this exercise in deception to be the construction of the self as a beautiful fiction, but 
would claim this fiction as necessary; not on the ground of human survival, as we might 
think, but on the ground of his ontology of will to power." As his conclusion to GM 
shows, the survival instinct stems from the will to power: "man would rather will 
nothingness than not will at all ..." (GM 3, §28). But as a result of this, Nietzsche's 
more pressing concern is in contemplating what man may become in the future, of how 
the terrible, basic text may come to be read. In the sense of culture, his concern is with 
nihilism as a product of ascetism, and thereby with what is, in terms of the text of homo 
natura, an increasing failure to read at all - the willing of nothingness in preference to 
not willing at all. Nietzsche's concern for our future renders a confrontation with the 
notion of self, and thereby with the notion of will , inevitable. 
What is necessary for our survival, namely truth and the will to truth, is linked to 
beauty and to the phenomenon of creation. Nietzsche uses his mirror-imagery to hint at 
the nature of the world, and at the nature of humankind. As an example, he argues in BT 
that the Greeks invented tragedy in order to reflect the nature of the will ; "the 'wi l l ' 
wished to contemplate itself, he tells us {BT, §3). But there is a caveat; the Greek will's 
self-contemplation required the transfiguration of genius, which is effected by the 
phenomenon of art: "in order to glorify themselves, its creations had to feel worthy of 
glorification, they had to see themselves in a higher sphere, without this contemplation 
Byron, "Manfred", Scene II, The Poetical Works of Lord Byron, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1930), p. 383. 
" This would be to mistake the effect for the cause; self-preservation is the effect of the world as will to 
power, and not the cause, as is made clear in BGE §13. 
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seeming either a command or a reproach" (BT, §3). Even with the Greeks, whom 
Nietzsche so admired, Byron's sentiment rings true; men do not name themselves to 
themselves, for the nature of being is to deceive. Nietzsche renames deception as tmth: 
there are no uninterpreted facts, and these interpretations are by nature creative. Culture 
is determined in and through the intrinsic power of aestheticist interpretation; culture is 
thus both superficial form and content of an underlying will to power, which raises 
various issues of self-deception. The relationship between culture and the mind is 
receiving increasing attention from contemporary philosophers of mind and from 
cognitive scientists. Nietzsche's philosophy of mind has, however, received 
comparatively little notice within Nietzsche studies, and from the wider philosophical 
community. Perhaps this is unsurprising given Nietzsche's rejection of a fixed 
conception of self. However, I anticipate that his aestheticist reading of the problem and 
the necessity of self-deception for modem culture will not go unnoticed for much 
longer. 
This is especially likely given the crisis in modem philosophy. Richard Rorty, 
describing the determination of philosophy by science, argues that such determination 
results in philosophy being transfixed by the conception of the mind as a mirror.'^ This 
conception of the mind allows for all philosophical activity to be evaluated according to 
the criterion of the accuracy of representation. Throughout Nietzsche's works, the 
symbolic image of the mirror is used to reflect the basic currency of his thought: 
acknowledgement of the boundaries of the human perspective, and simultaneously, the 
beauty of that perspective. The mirroring power-relation present in both critiques of pity 
and tragedy demonstrates this interpretatively. We saw in Chapter 1 that through the 
reliance of philosophy upon science for its self-definition and the simple fact of 
contemporary philosophy's fragmentation into discrete areas of enquiry such as 
aesthetics, as evinced by Bernstein's identification of the process of aesthetic alienation, 
the idea of the philosophic life itself has been overwritten by devotion to the more 
specific issues encountered on the road to the philosophic life. And as I argued, the fact 
of the analytic/continental schism in contemporary philosophy is but another feature of 
this. Philosophy must either treat its questions as pseudo-problems that may be diffused 
by analysis, or find a nonphilosophical space where "philosophy as such can appear to 
itself as other than itself, so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original 
Richard Rorty, The Mirror of Nature, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 12. 
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manner".'^ Can modem philosophy find such a nonphilosophical space? If Rorty is right 
in his conception of philosophy as transfixed by mind as mirror, then the answer to this 
question seems to involve engaging with this conception of mind. The innovation 
promised by a Nietzschean theory of mind seems like a step in the right direction. 
Jacques Derrida, Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 108. 
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5.4: Conclusion 
- Have I been understood? {EH, 'Why I Am A Destiny', § § 1 , 7 , 8, 9) 
Perhaps the defining sign of Nietzsche's genius is the continuing relevance of what he 
has to say. From our current standpoint only a few years into the third millennium, we 
might like to think that we are in a better position to understand the nature of our being 
than was Nietzsche himself, writing at the end of the nineteenth century. But for all of 
the advances of science and technology in the intervening decades, the fact remains that 
we are still faced by the same problems to which Nietzsche responded. There is 
increasing talk of the degeneration of culture as a problem which suggests that while 
Nietzsche's guiding concern of nihilism as a problem of culture still stands as a problem 
for modernity, that same modernity is at least able to recognise it as a problem and to 
begin to consider the possibility of a solution. As such, we could do a great deal worse 
than to take him as our guide: not following him blindly, as Nietzsche does "not want 
believers", but putting him to work in our cause by taking his questions as models for 
our own {EH, 'Why I Am A Destiny', §1) . 
Nietzsche's wider discussion in the section of EH from which the above 
quotation is taken, 'Why I Am A Destiny', exemplifies the cultural and thereby the 
philosophical significance of his thought. He locates his own genius in his nostrils, by 
virtue of his being "the first to discover the truth" and to "sense - smell - the lie as lie". 
The truth is that there is no truth. Nietzsche has his Zarathustra opine that "good men 
never tell the truth" precisely for that reason, showing the response of our culture to this 
truth in the terms of two aspects: the optimistic and the pessimistic. Zarathustra was the 
first to recognise that these are just as ''decadent" as one another; the truth that there is 
no truth is reflected in his name for Nietzsche, through two factors of overcoming: "the 
self-overcoming of morality through truthfulness" and "the self-overcoming of the 
moralist into his opposite". These two factors speak to Zarathustra's ultimate 
delineation of man as a species "not estranged from or entranced by" reality as it is, but 
to the species of man understood as "reality itself. This species still incorporates "all 
that is fearful and questionable", because as Nietzsche shows, "only thus can man 
possess greatness". I have argued that this is to understand being both in and through 
the aestheticist claim that "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the 
world are eternally justified" {BT, §5). The problems of our culture are brought into 
focus, and are brought closer to a solution, through the aestheticist interpretative unity 
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